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'But next to a  new  ~isto&  of  Law,  what we most require  is a 
new  Philosophy  of  faw.'-Sir  HENRY  SUMNE~  MAINE. 
KANT'S  Science  of  Riyht '  is a complete exposition of  the 
Yhilosophy of  Law, viewed  as  a rational investigation of 
the  fundamental  Principles  of  Jurisprudence.  It  was 
published in  1'796,2  as  the First Part of  his Metaphysic 
of  Mo~nls: the  promised  sequel  and  completion  of  the 
Foundation  for  a ilfetaphysic  of  Movals~  published  in 
1'785.  The irnportance and value o£ the great thinker's 
exposition  of  the  Science of  Right, both  as  regards the 
fundamental Principles of  his  own Practical Philosophy 
and the general interest of  the  Philosophy of  Law, were 
at  once  recognised.  A  second  Edition,  enlarged  by  an 
1 Rechtslehre. 
It appeared soon  after Michaelmas 1796,  but with the year 1797 on 
the title-page.  This has given rise to some  confusion regarding the date 
of  the first Edition, which is now  usually quoteri as 1796-7.  (Schubert, 
Kant's  Werke, Bd. ix. viii.,  and Biographie, p.  145.) 
* Die Metaphysik der Sitten.  Erster Theil.  Metaphysische Anfangs- 
gründe der Rechtslehre.  Köriigsberg, 1797. 
4  Grundlegung zur  Metaphysik der  Sitten.  Translated  by  Willich 
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Appendix, containing  Supplementary Explanations of  the 
Principles  of  Right, appeared  in  1'79  8?  The work has 
since  then  been  several  times reproduced  by  itself,  as 
well  as  incorporated  in  all  fhe  complete  editions  of 
Kant's  Works.  It was immediately rendered into  Latin 
by Born  in  1'798, and  again  by König  in 18  00.  It 
was translated into French by Professor Tissot in  1837: 
of  which  translation  a  second  revised  Edition  has 
appeared.  It was  again  translated  into  French  by  M. 
Barni, preceded  by an  elaborate  analytical  introduction, 
in  1853.5  With  the  exception  of  the  Preface  and 
Introductions,G the  work  now  appears  translated  into 
English for the first time. 
Kant's Science  of  Rig7bt  was  his  last great worlr  of  an 
independent kind in the department of  pure  Philosophy, 
These Siipplementary Explanations were appended by  Kant to the 
Pirst Part of  the work,  to which  most  of  their  detail more  directly 
apply ;  but they are more conveniently appended inthis translation to the 
whole work,  an arrangement which  has also been  adopted by  the other 
Translators. 
Initia  Metaphysica Doctrine  Jiiris.  Immanvelis  Kantii  Opera  ad 
philosophiam criticam.  Latine vemt Fredericus Gottlob Born.  Volumen 
qrrartum.  Lipsie, MDCCLXXXXVIII. 
Elementa Metaphysica Juris Doctrine.  Latine vertit  G. L.  König. 
Amstel. 1800, 8.  (Warnkonig and others erroneoiisly refer it to Gotha.) 
Principes Mhtaphysiques du Droit, par Emm.  Kant, etc.  Paris, 1837. 
Elements Mhtaphysiques de la Doctrine du Droit, etc.  Paris,  1853. 
G The Preface and the Introductions (infra,  pp.  1-58,  259-265)  have 
been  translated  by  Mr.  Semple.  See  The  Metaphysic  of  Ethics  bg 
and with  it he virtually brouglit his activity as  a master 
of  thought  to  a  close?  It fittingly  crowned  the, rich 
practical  period  of  his  later  philosophical  teaching, and 
he  shed  into it the  last  effort of  his energy of  thought. 
Full  of  years  and  honours  he  was  tlieii  deliberately 
engaged,  in  the  calm  of  undisturbed  and  unwearied 
reflection, in gathering  the  finally matured  fruit  of  all 
the  meditation  and  learning  of  his  life.  His  three 
immortal  Critiques  of  the  Pu~e  Reason  (1  '78 I),  t7~e 
Practical  Reason  (1  7 8 B),  and  the  Judgment  (1  '7 9  O), 
had unfolded all the theoretical Principlee of  his  Critical 
Philosophy, and established his clain~  to be recognised ,as 
at once the most profound and the  most original thinlcer 
of  the  modern  world.  And  as  the  experience  of  life 
deepened around and within him, towards the  sunset, his 
lmrnanz~el  Kant,  translated by  J. W.  Semple, Advacate.  Fourth Ed. 
Edited with Introduction by Rev.  Henry Calderwood,  LL.D.,  Professor 
of  Moral Philosophy, 'University of  Edinburgh.  Edin. :  T.  & T.  Clark, 
1886.-These  are indispensable parts of  the present work, but they have 
been translated entirely anew. 
1 He ceased  lecturing in 1797 ;  and the only works of  any iniportance 
published  by  himself  subsequent to  the  Rechtslehre,  were  the  Meta. 
physische A~lfangsgründe  der  Tugendlehre in 1797, and Der Streit der 
Facultäte~,  and the  Anthropologie  in  1798.  The  Loyik  was  edited by 
JLche in 1800 ;  the Physische Ceographk  by Rink  in 1802,  and the 
Pädagogik, also by Rink, in 1803, the year before Kant's death. 
'  Kritik der reinen Vernunft.  Translated anew by  Max  Miiller (1881). 
3 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.  Translated by Abbott. 
4 Kritik der Urthcilskraft.  Translated into French by  M.  Bariii. viii  KANT'S PHILOSOPHY  OF LAW. 
interest had  been  more and  more absorbed  and  concen- 
trated in the  Practical.  For to him, as to all great and 
comprehensive thinkers, Philosophy has only its beginning 
in the theoretical explanation of  things ; its chief  end is 
the  rational  organization and animation and guidance of 
the higher life in which all things culminate.  Kant hacl 
carried  with  him  through  all  his  struggle  and  toil  of 
thought, the cardinal faith in God, Freedom, and Immor- 
tality, as an inalienable possession of  Reason, and he had 
beheld the human  Personality transfigured  and  glorified 
in tbe Divine radiance of  the prinial Ideas.  But he had 
further to contemplate the common  life  of  Humanity in 
its varied ongoings and  activities, rising with  the  innate 
right of  mastery from the bosom of  Nature and asserting 
its  lordship  in the  arena  of  the  mighty world  that  it 
incessantly  struggles  to  appropriate  and  subdue  to 
itself.  In  the  natural  chaos  and  conflict  of  the 
social  life  of  man,  as  presented  in the  multitudinous 
and  ever-changing  mass  of  the  historic  organism,  he 
had  also  to  search  out  the  Principles  of  order  and 
form,  to  vindicate  the  rationality  of  'the  ineradicable 
belief  in  human  Causation,  and  to  quicken  anew  the 
lively hope of  a higher issue of  History.  The age of  the 
Revolution called  and  inspired  him  to his task.  With 
keen vision he saw  a  new  world  suddenly  born  before 
him, as the blood-stained product 6f a motion long toiling in 
the gloom, and all old things thus passing away ; and he 
knew that it was only the pure and the practical Reason, 
in that inrnost union which  constitutes  the  birthright of 
Freedom, that could  regnlate  and  harmonize the  future 
order of  this strongest offspring of  time.  And  if  it was 
not  given  to  him  to  work  out the  whole  cycle  of  the 
new  rational  ideas, he  at least  touched  upon  them  all, 
and  he  has  embodied  the  cardinal  Principle  of  the 
Sysiem  in  his  Science  of  Right  as  the  philosophical 
Magna  Charta  of  the  age  of  political  Reason  and  the 
permanent foundation of  all true Philosophy of  Law. 
Thus produced, Kant's Science  of  Right  constituted  an 
epoch  in jural  speculation, and  it  has  commanded  the 
homage  of  the  greatest  thinkers  since.  Fichte,  with 
characteristic  ardour  and  with  eagle  vision,  threw  his 
whole energy of  soul into  the  rational problem of  Right, 
and if  not without a glance of  scorn at the sober linxita- 
tions of  the '  old Lectures '  of  the  aged  professor, he yet 
acknowledges in  his  own  more  aerial  flight the initial 
safety of  this  more  practical  guidance.'  In those early 
days  of  eager  search and  high  aspiration, Hebel, stirred 
to the depths by Kant, and  Fichte, and  Schelling, wrote 
his  profound  and  powerful  essay  on  the  Philosophy of 
1 Fichte's Nachgelassene Werke, 2 Bd.  System der Rechtslehre (1804), 
198, eto.  (Bonn, 1834.)  Fichte's Grundlage des Naturrechts (1796),  as he 
himselfpoints  out, was publisliedbefore Kant's ]Rechtslehre,  butits principles 
are all essentially Kantian.  (Translated by Kroeger,  Philadelphia, 1870.) Right, laden with an  Atlantean  burden  of  thought  and 
striined to intolerable rigidity and severity of  form, but 
his own highest achievement  only aimed  at a  coinpleter 
integration of  the Principles differentiated by Kant.'  It 
was  impossible  that  the  rational  evangel  of  universal 
freedom  and  the  seer-like  vision  of  a  world,  hitherto 
groaning and travailing in pain  but now  struggling  into 
the  perfection  of  Eternal  Peace  and  Good-will,  should 
find  a  sympathetic  response  in  Schopenhauer, notwith- 
standing  all  his  admiration  of  Kant ; biit  the  racy 
cynicism  of  the  great  Pessimist  rather  subsides  before 
him into mild  lamentation  than  seeks  the  usual  refuge 
from its own vacancy and  dospair  in  the  wilful  caustic 
of  scorching  invective  and  reproach?  Schleiermacher, 
the greatest theologian and moralist of  the Century, early 
discer~led  the limitations  of  the  b priori  formalism, and 
supplemented it by the comprehensive conceptions of  the 
prima1 dominion  and the  new order  of  creation, but  he 
owed  his  critical  and  dialectical  ethicality  mainly  to 
KanL8  Krause,  the  leader  of  the  latest  and  largest 
1 Hegel's  Werke,  Bd.  i.  Philosophische  Abhandlungen, iv.  Ueber 
tlie  Wissenschaftlichen  Behandlungsarten  des  Natzbrrechts  (1802-3) ; 
and the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,  oder  Naturrecht  und 
Staatswissenschaft im  Grundrisse (1821).  Werke,  Bd.  viii.  (passim). 
Dr. J. Hutchison Stirling's Lectures on  the  Philosophy of  Law present a 
most incisive and suggestive introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of  Right. 
Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (1841), pp. 118-9. 
Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803).  Entwurf 
tliought  in this  sphere-at  once  intuitive,  radieal,  and 
productive in his faculty, analytic, synthetic, and orpic 
in his method, and real, ideal, and historic in his product 
-caught  again ths archetypal perfectibility of  the human 
reflection of  the Divine, and the living conditions of  the 
true Progress of humanity.  The dawn of  the thought of 
tlie  new  age  in  Kant  rises  above  the  horizon  to  the 
clear  day,  full-orbed  and  vital,  in  Krause?  All  the 
continental  thinkers  and  schools  of  the century in this 
sphere  of  Jurisprudence,  whatever  be  their  distinctive 
characteristics  or  tendencies, have  owned  or  manifested 
their  obligations  to  the  great  master  of  the  Critical 
Philosophy. 
eines Systems der Sittenlehre, herausg. von A.  Schweizer (1835).  Gmnd- 
riss der philosophischen Ethik, von A.  Taesten (1841).  Die Lehre vom 
Staat, herausg. von Ch.  A.  Brandes (1845). 
Grundlage des  Naturrechts  (1803).  Abriss des  Systems der Philo- 
sophie des Rechts oder des Naturrechts (1828).  Krause is now  univer- 
sally recognised as the definite founder of  the organic and positive &hool 
of  Natural Right.  His principles have been ably expoiinded by his two 
nlost faithful followers, Ahrens (Cours de Droit Naturel, 7th ed. 1875)  and 
Roder (Urundzüge des Naturrechts  o.  der Rechts$loso$e,  2 Auf.  1860). 
Professor J. S. del Rio of Madrid has vividly expounded and enthusiastically 
advocated Krause's  System in Spanish.  Professor Lorimer of  the Edin- 
burgh University, ivhile maintaining an independent and critical attitude 
towards the various Schools of  ~uris~idence,  is in close sympathy with 
the Priiiciples of  Krause (The Institutes of  Law :  a Trentise of  the Prin- 
ciples of  Jurisprudence as determined by Nature, 2nd ed.  1880, and  The 
Institutes of  the Law of  Nations).  He has clearly indicated his agreement 
with the Kantian School, so far as its p'nciples go  (Instit. p.  336, n.). xii  KANT'S  PHILOSOPHY  OP LAW.  TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE.  xiii 
The  influence of  the  Kantian  Doctrine  of  Right has 
thus been vitally operative in all the subsequent Progress 
of  jural  and political  science.'  Kant, here  as in every 
other  department  of  Philosophy,  summed  up  the  frag- 
mentary  and  critical  movement  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century, and  not  only spoke its last word, but  inaugu- 
rated  a  method  which was  to  guide  and  stimulate  the 
highest  thought  of  the  future.  With  an  unwonted 
blending  of  speculative  insight and practical knowledge, 
an ideal  universality  of  conception and  a Sure grasp of 
the reality of  experience, his  effort,  in  its inner  depth, 
vitality,  and  concentration,  contrasts  almost  strangely 
with  the  trivial  formalities  of  .the Leibnitzio-Wolffian 
Rationalists  on  the one  hand?  and  with  the  pedantic 
This applies to the latest Gernan discussions  and  doctrines.  The 
following works may ba referred to as the most important recent contribu- 
tions, in addition to thore mentioned above (such as Ahrens and Roder, 
xi. n.) :-Trendelenburg,  Naturrecht auf  dem  Grunde der Ethik, 2 Auf. 
1868.  Post, Das Naturgesetz des Rechts, 1867.  W.  Arnold, Cultur und 
Rechtsleben,  1865.  Ulrici,  Naturrecht,  1873.  Zoepfl,  Grundriss  zu 
Vorlesungen über Rechtephilosophie, 1878.  Rudolph von  Ihering, Der 
Zweck im  Recht, i. 1877, ii.. 1883.  Professor  Frohschammer  of  Munich 
has discussed the problebo of  Right'in a thoughtful and.suggestive  way 
from the standpoint of  his original and interesting System of  Philosophy, 
in his new volume,  Ueber die Organisation  und  Cdtur der menschlichen 
Ce~eUschaft, Philosophische  Untersuchungen  über  Recht  und  Staat, 
sociales Leben und Erziehung, 1885. 
Leibnitz, Nova Uethodus discendrie docendzeque Jurisprudentia, 1767. 
Observationes de principio Juris. Codex Juris Gentium, 1693-1700. 
Wolff,  Jus Natum Methodo Scieiitifica pertractatiim, Lips.  8  Tomi. 
t,ecliousness of  tlie  Empiricists  of  tlie  School of  Grotius 
on the 0ther.l  Tliomasius and his School, the expounders 
of  the  Doctrine  of  Rigllt  as  an  independent  Science, 
were  the  direct  precursors  of  the  formal  method  of 
IS;antJs System.2  Its firm  and clear outline iniplies tlie 
substance  of  rna;ny  an  operose  and  now almost  unread- 
able  tome ;  and it is  alive  throughout  with  the  quick,  - 
keen  spirit  of  tlie  modern  world.  Kant's  unrivalled 
- 
genius  for  distinct  division  and  systematic  form, found 
full and appropriate scope in this sphere of  thought.  He 
1740-48.  Institutioncs  Juris Nature  et Gentium,  Hala,  1754.  (In 
French by Luzccc,  Amsterdam, 1742, 4 vols.)  Vernünftige Gedanken. 
Vatel,  Le  Droit des Gens,  Leyden,  1758.  Edited  by  Royer-Collard, 
Paris, 1835.  English translation by Chitty, 1834.  [For the other workv 
of  this school, see Ahrens, i.  323-4,  or Miller's Lectures, p.  411.1 
'  Grotius,  De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pacis,  lib.  iii  1625.  Translated  hy 
Barbeyrae iuto French, 1724 ;  and by Whewell into English, 1858. 
Pufendorf,  Elementa Juris  Universalis,  1660.  De  Jure  Nature  et 
Gentiuni, 1672.  [English translation by Kennett, 1729.1 
Cumberlaud,  De  Legibus  Naturzp  Disquisitio Philosophica,  London, 
1672.  Translated into English by Towers, Dublin, 1750. 
Cocceji, Grotius illustratus, etc.,  3 vols.  1744-7.  [See Miller, 409.1 
2 Christian Thomasius (1655-1728)  first clearly distinguished betreen 
the  Doctrine  of  Riglit and  Ethics, and  laid the  basis of  the celebrated 
distinction of  Perfect and Imperfect Obligations as differentiated by  the 
element  of  Constraint.  See  Professor  Lorimer's  excellent  account  of 
Tliomasius aiid of  Kant's relation  to his System, Inst.  of  Law,  p.  288 ; 
and Köder, i.  240.  The principal works of this School are :  Thomasius, 
Fundamenta juris  nature et gentium ex sensu communi deducta, 1705. 
Gerhard,  Delineatio juris  naturalis,  1712.  Gundling, Jus Nature.  et 
gentium.  Koehler, Exercitationes, 1728.  Aclienwall, Prolegomena Juris 
nattiiralis, and Jus Natiirix, 1761. siv  KANT'S  PHILOSOPHY OF  LAW.  TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE.  XV 
had now all his technical art as  an  expounder of  Pliilo- 
sophy in perfect control, and  after the hot rush through 
the  first  great  Critique  he had leicrned to take his time. 
His exposition thus  became simplified, systematized, and 
clarified throughout to  utmost  intelligibility.  Here, too, 
the  cardinal  aim  of  his  Method was to wed  speculative 
thought  and  empirical  fact,  to  harmonize  the  abstract 
universality of  Reason with the concrete particularities of 
Right,  and  to  reconcile  the  free  individuality  of  the 
citizen with  the  regulated  organism of  the  State.  And 
the least that can be said of  his execution is, that he has 
rescued the essential principle of  Right from  the  debase- 
ment of  the antinomian  naturalism  and  arbitrary politi- 
cality of  Hobbesl as well as from the extravagance of  the 
lnwless and destructive individualism of  Rousseau,2 while 
conceding  and  even  adopting what  is substantially true 
in the antagonistic theories  of  these  epochal thinkers; 
and  he  has  thereby  given  the  birthright  of  Freedom 
again, full-reasoned  and  certiorated, as '  a  possession for 
ever'  to  modern  scientific thought.  With  widest  and 
1  Hobbes,  De Cive,  1642.  Leviathan  seu de civitate ecclesiastica et 
civili,  1651.  On  Hobbes  generally,  See  Professor  Croom  Robertson's 
Monograph in  Blackwood's Philosophical Classics.' 
L'origine  et  les fondements de l'in6galit6 parmi les hommes,  Dijon, 
1751.  Contrat  social,  1762.  RousSeau's  writings  were  eagerly read  by 
Kant,  and  greatly  influenced him.  On  Rousseau  generally,  See  John 
Morley's Roußseau, Lond.  1878. 
furthest vision, and with a wisdom iiicomparably superior 
to  the  reactionary  excitement  of  the  great  English 
Orator:  he  looked  calmly beyond '  the  red  fool-fury  of 
the  Seine' and  all  the  storm  and stress of  the time, to 
the  Sure  realization  of  the  one  increasing  purpose that 
runs  through  the  ages.  The  burden  of  years  chilled 
none of  his sympathies nor dimmed any of  his hopes for  - 
humanity;  nor  did  any  pessimistic  shadow  or  murmur 
becloud  his  strong  poetic  thought,  or  disturb  '  the 
mystical lore ' of  his eventide.  And thus at the close of 
all  his  thinking, he made the  Science of  Right the very 
corner-stone  of  the  social building  of  the race, and the 
practical culminntion of  all Religion and all Philosophy. 
It is  not  meant  that  everything  presented  here  by 
Kant  is  perfect  or  firial.  On  the  contrary,  there  is 
probably nothing  at all in  his whole  System of  Philo- 
sophy-whose  predominant  characteristics are criticism, 
initiation,  movement -  that  could  be  intelligently  so 
regarded ; and  the  admitted  Progress  of  subsequent 
theories  of  Right,  as  briefly  iildicated  above,  may  be 
considered  as  conceding  so  much.  It  must  be  further 
admitted  of  Kant's  Scielzce  of  Riglzt  that  it  presents 
1 Burke  is  assigned  to  the  Historical  School  of  Jurisprudence  by 
Ahrens,  who  not  inaptly designates hin1  'Che  Mirabeau  of  the  anti- 
revolution'  (i., 53).  See the Rejeections on the  French Revolution (1790). 
Stahl gives a high estimate  of  Biirke as  '  the  purest  representative of 
Conservatism.' TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.  xvii 
ererywliere  abundant  opening  and  even provocation for 
'  Metacriticism ' and liistorical anticriticism, which  have 
certainly not  been  overlooked  or  neglected.  But  it is 
meant  withal that the  Philosophy of  Jurisprudence has 
really flourished  in  the  Nineteenth  Century only where 
Kant's  influence  has  been  effective, and that the higher 
altitudes  of  jural  science  have  only  come  into  sight 
where he has been taken as a guide.  The  great  critical 
thinlcer  sei!  the  problem  of  Right  anew  to  the  pure 
Speculative Reasoi~,  and  thus accomplished  an  intellec- 
tual transformation of  juridical thought corresponding  to 
the  revolutionary  enthusiasm  of  liberty in the practical 
sphere.  It  is only from  this point of  view that we  can 
rightly appreciate  or  estimate  his  influence  and  signifi- 
cance.  The all-embracing problem of  the modern meta- 
morphosis of  the institutions of  Society in the free State, 
lies implicitly in his  apprehension.  And  in  spite of  his 
negative  aspect,  which  has  sometitnes  entirely  misled 
superficial students, his solution, although betimes  tenta- 
tive and hesitating, is in the niain faithful  to the highest 
ideal of humanity, being foundationed on  the  eternity of 
Right  and  crowned  by the  universal security and peace 
of  the gradually realized Freedom of  mankind.  As Kant 
saved  the  distracted  and  confused  thought  of  his time 
from utter scepticism and  despair, and  set  it again with 
renewed  youth  and  enthusiasm  on its way, so his spirit 
seems  to  be  rising  again  upon  us  in  this  our hour of 
need, with fresh healing in his wings.  Our  Jurists must 
therefore also join  the ever increasing throng  of  contem- 
porary thinkers in the now general return.  to Kant.'  Their 
principles  are  even  more  conspicu~usly  at hazard than 
any others,  and  the whole method of  their  science, long 
dping of  intellectual  inanition  and  asphyxia, must  seel; 
the conditions of  a complete renovation.  It is oiily thus, 
too, that the practical Politician will find the guidance of 
real  principle in this agitated and troubled age in which 
the  foundations of  Government as well as  of  Right  are 
so  daringly  scrutinised  and  so  manifestly  imperilled? 
and  in which  he  is  driven  by  the  inherent  necessary 
1 '  The very cry of  the hour is, Fichte and Schelling are dead, and Hegel, 
if  not clotted nonsense, is unintelligible ;  let 11s  go back to Kant.  See, 
too, in other countries, what a difference the want of  Kant has made.' 
Dr. J.  H. Stirling, Hind, No.  xxxvi.  Witliin the last ten years many 
voices have been heard, both in this country and in Germany, bidding us 
return  to Kant, as to that which  is alone  sound and hopeful  in Philo- 
sophy;  that  which  unites  the  prudence  of  science  with  the  highest 
speculative enterprise that is possible without idealistic extravagances.' 
Professor E.  Caird, Jouvnal  of  Speculative Philosophy, vol. xiv. 1, 126. 
'  From  Hegel, we  must, I think, still return  upon  Kant, seeking fresh 
hope for Philosophy in a continued iise of  the critical method.'  Professor 
Calderwood, Introduction to Kant's Metaphysie of  Ethics, p.  xix. 
The Socialistic and  Communistic  Doctrines  of  Owen  (1771-1858), 
Fourier  (1777-1837),  Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Louis  Blanc, Proudhon, 
and Cabet, '  considered as aberrations in the development of  Right,'  are 
sketched by Ahrens  (i.  3  12) with his characteristic discrimination and 
fairness.  The principles  of  the coiitemporary English SociaIism will be xviii  KANT'S  PEILOSOPHY  OB LAW.  TRANSLATOR'S  PKEFACE.  xix 
implication  of  local  politics to face the inevitable issue 
of  world-wide' complications and  the universal  probleni 
of  human solidarity.  And thus only, as it now appears, 
will  it  be  possible to find a Principle  that will  at once 
be  true  to  the  most  liberal tendency of  the  time, and 
yet do justice to its most conservative necessities. 
Of  criticism  and  comment,  blind  adulation  and 
unjnst  depreciation  of  Kant's  system  of  Right,  there 
has  been,  as  already hinted, abundance  and  even  more 
than  enough.  Every  philosophical  Jurist  has  had  ta 
define  morc  or  less  explicitly  his  attitude towards  the 
Kantian  standpoint.  The  original  thinkers  of  the 
dogmatic Schools-Fichte,  Schelling,l Hegel, and Krause, 
found sumriied  up in A  Summary of  the Principles.of SocialWm un-itten 
for the Democratic Federation, by H. M.  Hyndman and William Morris 
(1884).  Compare  also Hyndmau's The Histomcal Basis of  Socialism in 
England, and To-day and Jhtice,  the Organs of the Social Democracy. 
'  ~clielling's contributions  to  the  Science  of  Right  have  hardly 
received the attention  they deserve.  The absorptiou of  his thought in 
the Philosophy of  Nature  left  him  less free to devote himself to  the 
Yhilosophy  of  History,  but it  is mainly to him  that  the  idea  of  the' 
systematic  objectivity  and  the  organic  vitality  of  the  State,  in 
its latest  forms,  is  due.  Hegel  and  Krause  have  severally  adopted 
and developed the two  sides  of  this  conception.  Compare Schelling's 
Abhandlung über das Naturrecht in Fichte und Niethammer's Journal, 
iv.  and v. ;  and his  Vorlesungen  über  die Methode  des  akademischen 
Studiums,  p.  146,  etc.  See  Stahl's  excellent  account  of  Schelling's 
Doctrine,  Philosophie  des  Rechts,  i.  403-14,  and  The 'Journal  of 
Speculative PJ~ilosophy,  vol. xiii.  No.  3,  vi.,  Schelling on  History and 
Jurisprudence.' 
-have  niade it the starting-point of  their special efforts, 
and have elaborated their own conceptions by positive or 
negative  reference to  it.  The recent Theological School 
of  Stahl and Baader, De Maistre and Bonald,'  represent- 
ing  the Protestant and Papal reaction from  the  modern 
autonomy of  Reason, has  yet left the  Kantian  principle 
unshaken, and has at the best only formulated its doctrine 
of  a  universal  Divine  order in more  specific  Christian 
terms.  The  Historical  School of  Hugo  and  Savigny2 
arid, Puchta,-which  is  also  that of  Bentham,  Austin 
1 Stahl and Baader represent the Neo-Schellingian standpoint in their 
pliilosophical doctrines.-F.  J. Stahl, Die Philosophie des Rechts, 3 Bde., 
3 Auf.  1865 (an important and meritorious werk).-Franz von  Baader's 
Sämmtliche Werke,  16 Bde.  1851-60.  (Cf.  Franz Hoffmann's  Behchtung 
des An&%  auf  Baader in Thilo's Sch~ft  :  '  Die theologisikende Rechts- 
und Staatslehre,' 1861.)-Joseph  de Maistre, Soirks de St.  Petersburg, 
Paris, 1821.  Mdmoires, etc.,  par  A.  Blanc,  1858.-L'AbbB  de Bonald, 
Ldgislatimolt primitive, 1821. 
2  Hugo (1768-1844)  is usually regarded  as  the founder, and Savigny 
(1778-1861)  as  the chief representative of  the Historical School.  Hugo, 
Lehrbuch des Naturrechts  als einer  Philosophie  des  positiven  Rechts, 
1799, 3 Auf.  1820.  Frederich Carl von  Savigny,  Vom  Beruf  unserer 
Zeit für  Gesetzgebung und Recl~tswissenschafi,  1814 ;  System des heutigem 
Römischen Rechts, 1840.  (See Guthrie's translation of  Savigny,  Treatisc 
016 the Conflict of Laws, with an excellent Preface.  , T. & T.  Clark.) 
The Historical School, as Ahrens shows, must be carried back so as 
to include such thinkers  as Cujas, the great  French Jurist  of  the  16th 
century,  who  called the History of  Right  his  'hameqon  d'or ;' Mon- 
tesquieu (1689-1755),  whose well-known book, L'Esprit  des Lok (1748), 
ran through twenty-two editions in a few yean ;  and the Neapolitan Vico 
(1688-1744),  the founder of  the '  New Science' of  History.  Vico is only 
now  becoming  properly  appreciated.  See  Professor's Flint's  able and XX  KBKT'S  PHILOSOPHY  OB  LAW.  TBANSLATOR'S  PREFACE.  xxi 
and  Buckle,  Sir  George  C.  Lewis  and  Sir  Henry 
Siimner  Maine,  and  Herbert  Spencer,-with  all  its 
apparent  antagonism,  has  only  so  far  supplemented 
the  rational  universality  of  Kant  by  the  necessary 
connterpart of  an historical  Phenomenology of  the rise 
and  development  of  the  positive  legal  institutions,  as 
the natural  evolution  and  verification in experience of 
the juridical  conceptions?  The  conspicuous want  of  a 
criterion  of  Right  in the application of  the niere  his- 
instructive '  Vico '  in Blackwood's  PhilosophicaZ Classics.  '  In his work, 
De  universi juris  uno principio  et $ne  (1820), Vico  divides tlie whole 
Science of  Right into three parts :  (1) the Philosophy of  Right, (2) the 
History of  Right, and  (3) the Art of  applying the Phiiosophy to facts. 
He distinguishes profoundly in Laws the spirit or will of  the legislator 
(mens leg&) and the reason of  the 1aw (ratio legis), which  consists in the 
accordance of  a Iaw with historical facts and with the etemal principles 
of  the Tiue  and Good' (Ahrens).  The contemporary Historical School 
does not yet occupy so philosophicd a position. 
1  Sir Henry Sumner Maine, the most  eminent English representative 
of  the Historical School, continues to regard '  the philosophy founded  on 
tlie hypothesis of  a state of  nature '  as '  still the greatest antagonist of  the 
Historical afethod ' (Ancient Law, pp; 90, 91) ;  but thisis evidently said in 
disregard of  the  transformation of  Roiisseau's  theory by Kant, and the 
contributions to the application of  the Historical Method by Hege1 and 
his  school,  in  whose  principle  the  historic  evolution  is  an  essential 
element.  Sir H.  S.  Maine's  own  contributions cannot be  too  highly 
recommended for their thoroughness and suggestiveness.  He has gathered 
much  of  his  original and pregnant matter from direct acquaintance with 
India, where, as is the case with the forms oP  nature, the whole  genesis 
and stratification of  the forms of  Society are presented livingly to view. 
(Anctent Law,  1861, 7th  ed.  1880.  Vil2aye  Comnaunities  in the  East 
aild  Wat, 4th ed.  1881.  EarZy History of  Znstitutions, 1874.) 
torical  Method  to  the  manifold, contingent,  and  vari- 
able  institutions  of  human  society,  has  been  often 
aignalized ;  and  the representatives  of  the  School have 
been  driven  again,  especially  in  their  advocacy  of 
political  liberalism,  upon  the  rational  principles  of 
Freedom? 
The  Civil  Jurists who  have  carried  the  unreasoning 
admiration  of  the Roman Law almost to  the idolatry of 
its letter, and who  are too apt to ignore  the  movement 
of  two  thousand  years  and  all the  aspirations  of  the 
modern  R,eason, could  not  be  expected  to  be  found  in 
sympathy  witli  the  Rational  Method  of  Kant.  Their 
multiplied  objections  to  the  details  of  his  expositio~i, 
from  Schmitthenner  to  the present day, are, however, 
founded upon an cntire  misapprehension of  the  purpose 
of  his  form.  For  while  Kant  rightly  recognised  the 
1 Extremes  meet  in the moral indigerence of  the universal naturalism 
of  the  ultra-historical School and the abstract  absolute rationalism  of 
Spinoza.  It  was Grotius who first clearly distinguished between positive 
fact aiid  rational idea in the sphere of  Right, and  thus originated the 
movement of  modern 'jural ' speculation.  For evidence of  the statement 
in the text, see Bentham's  Works,  Buckle's History of  Civiltation,  Mi11 
on  Liberty,  aud especially  Puchta's  Encyclopädie, introductory to  his 
Cursus der Institutionen, 6 Auf.  1865.  The  standpoint of  the Historical 
School  has  been  thoroughly reviewed  by  Stahl,  i.  570-90 ;  Ahrens,  i. 
51-61 ;  and Köder, i. 266-219. 
'  Ueber den Charakter unddie Aufgaben unserer Zeit in Beziehung aiif 
Staat  uild  Staatswissenschaft, ' Giess.  1832.  Zwölf Bücher  vom Staate, 
1839.  See Rosenkranz's Geschichte der Kant'sches Philosopl~ie,  p, 268. xxii  ICANT'S  PHILOSOPHY  OE LAW. 
Roman  Law as the highest embodiment  of  the juridical 
Reason  of  the  ancient  world, and  therefore  expounded 
his  own  conceptions  by  constant  reference  to  it,  he 
clearly discerned  its  relativity  and  its  limitations ;  aild 
he accordingly aims at unfolding everywhere through  its 
categories the juridical  idea in its ultimate  purity.  In 
Xant  the juridical  Idea  first  attains  its  essential  self- 
realization  and  productivity, and his system  of  Private 
ltight  is  at  orice  freer  and  more  concrete  than  the 
Systems  of  Hobbes  and  Rousseau,  because  it  involves 
tlie  ancient  civil  system,  corrected  and  modernized  by 
regard  to  its rational  and  universal  principles.  This 
consideration alone  will  meet a host of  petty objections, 
and guard the student  against expecting  to  find  in this 
most  philosophical  exposition of  the Principles of  Right 
a mere elementary text-book of  the Roman Law.' 
In England, Kant's  Scielzce  of  R9ht  seems as  yet to 
Vhis  remark especially applies to the running fire of criticism in Voii 
Kirchmann's  recent  Erläuterz~ngen  zu  Kant'~  Metaphysik  der  Sitten, 
1882.  It is a  matter of  regret that such criticisnis cannot be  here dealt 
ivith in detail.  Kant  has himself  clearly iiidicated  the position  stated 
above, as at p.  54,  infra.-The  depth and subtlety of  Kant's  method, so 
far transcending the common modes of juridical thinking in England, are 
inseparable from the system, buthe has himself given the sufficient reasoii 
for their appearance in it (infra,  p.  116).  Without  entering in detail 
iipon  the  point,  the  translator  may  remark  with  regard  to one  con- 
spieuoiis,  yet  irremoveable  blot,  that  he  homologates  the  uiianimoiis 
disapprobation  of  subsequent  jurists,  and  would  only  refer  to  Dr. 
Hutchison Stirling's drastic castigation of  it in his Leclzbres,  p.  51.  But 
have been  little studied, and it has certaiiily exerted  biit 
little influence ori  English  Juridical  Science.  This has 
no  doubt been mainly due to the traditional habit  of  the 
national  mind, and  the  complete ascendancy during the 
present  century  of  the  Utilitarian  School of  Bentham.' 
The criterion of  Utility found a  ready application to the 
more  pressing  interests  of  Political  and  Legal  Eeform, 
and thus responding  to  the practical  legislative spirit of 
the time, its popular plausibilities completely obscured or 
superseded  all  higher  rational  speculation.  By  Austin 
the  system  was  inethodically  applied  to  the  positive 
determination  of  the juridical  conceptions , under  aid of 
the resources of  the German  Historical  School,  with the 
result that Right was made the inere 'creature'  of  positive 
law, and  the whole  Rational  Method  pretentiously  con- 
demned as irrational '  jargon.'  In  Austin %e  have only 
of  this and other difficulties in so  original and originative a work  can 
only be said in the meantime : 
'  Sunt delicta tarnen, quibus ignovisse velimus.' 
And  every  reader and student should  be  ready to apply  the Horatian 
niIe here too : 
'  Verum ubi plura nitent . . .  nonego paucis 
Offendar maculis, quas aut incuria fudit 
Aut humana parum cavit natura.' 
l Fragment on  Government, 1776.  Essay on  Political Tactics, 1791. 
Principles of  Morals and Legislation, 1780.  Traites de Legislation, 1802. 
Province of  Jurisprudenee determined, or Philosophy of  Positive Law, 
1832.  Lectures on Jurisprudence, edited by his Widow. 
Austin (1790-1859)  has been  greatly overestimated as a Jurist by his xsiv  KANT'S  PHILOSOPHY OF  LAUr.  TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE.  xxv 
the positive outcome of  Hobbes and Hurrie and Bentham. 
The  later forms  of  this  legal  positivism have  not  been 
fruitful  in  scientific  resnlt,  and  tlie  superficiality  and 
infutility of  tlie standpoint are becoming more  and more 
apparent.  Nor  does  the Utilitarian  Principle,'  with all 
friends and followers.  The affectionate tributes of  his widow  rnay  be 
borne with, but it is more  extraordinary to find Professor Sheldon Amos 
characterizing him as '  the true founder of  the Science of  Law' (S. Amos, 
The Science of  Law, p.  4).  Here is Austin's  estimate of  Kaut's Seienee 
of  Right :  '  A treatise darkened by a philosophy which, I own, is my aver- 
sion, but abounding, I miist needs admit, with traces of  rare sagacity.  He 
has seized a number of  notions, complex and difficult in the extreme, with 
distinction and precision wliich are marvellous, considering the scantiness 
of  his  means.  For  of  positive  systems  of  law  he  had  scarcely  the 
slightest tincture ;  and the knowledge of  the principles of jurisprudence, 
which he borrowed froni other sriters, was drawn, for the most part, from 
the muddiest sources ;  from  books  about the f~istian  which is styled thc 
Law  of  Nature.'  (Leetures, iii. 157.)  And  here is his  account of  the 
German  Jurists generally : '  It is really lamentable that the instructive 
and admirable books which  many of  the German Jurists  have  certainly 
produced, should be rendered inaccessible, or extremely difficult of  access, 
by  the thick coat of  obscuring jargon  with which  they have wantonly 
incriisted their necessarily ciifficult sciencs' (ii. 405).  Comment  on  this 
is superfluous.  In  the Same breath a more condemnatory  judgrnent is dealt 
out cven to Sir W.  Blackstone.  So  long as such Statements passed  as 
philosophical criticism there was no possibility for a genuine Philosophy of 
Law  in  England.  Austin,  notwithstanding his  English reputation, is 
eritirely ignored by the German Jurists.  He seenis to have known only 
enough  of  German  to  consult  the  more  popular  productions  of  the 
Historical School.  Dr. Hutchison Stirling has dealt witli Austin's  com- 
monplace  Hedonism  in a severe way,  and yet  not too  severely, in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of  Law (subjn.). 
1 Utilitarianism has been the subject of  incessanf discussion in England 
down to its latest systematic exposition in Sidgwick's  Methods of  Ethies. 
its  seeining  justice  and  humaiiity,  appear  capable  of 
longer  satisfying  the popular  mind  with  its deepening 
Consciousness of  Right, or  of  resolving  the more funda- 
mental  political  problems  that  are  again  coming  into 
view.  In this  connection we  may quote  end apply the 
nuthority  of  Sir  Henry Sumner  Maine when  he  says : ' 
'There  is such  widespread  dissatisfaction  with  existing 
theories of  jurisprudence, and so general a conviction that 
they do  not  really solve  the  questions  they pretend  to 
dispose  of,  as  to  justify  the suspicion  that  some  line 
of  inquiry  necessary  to  a  perfect  result  has  been  in- 
completely  followed,  or  altogether  omitted  by  their 
authors.'  The  present  unsatisfactory  condition  of  the 
Science of  Right in England-if  not in Scotland2-could 
not be better indicated. 
On the Continent the system has also been carefully and abIy reviewed by 
Th.  Jouffroy (Cour,s de droit naturel, 1835), Ahrens (i. 48,  but less fully 
in the Iater editions), I. H.  Fichte (Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht, 
Staat tcnd  Sitte,  1850), De  Wal (Prysverhandeling van het Natuurregt, 
1833), and particularly by the Itzlian Jurists (Köder, i. 108). 
Ancient Law,  p.  118. 
2  Much more may be justly  claimed  for Scotland than for England 
since the middle of  the last century in regard to the cultivation of  the 
Philosophy of  Right.  The Scottish School of  Philosophy started on this 
side from Grotius and Thomasius.  Gershom Carmichael edited Pufendorf 
with praiseworthy notes.  Hutchison discussed the doctrine of  Right with 
fulness and care in his System of  Moral Philosophy (1755).  Hume,  in 
consistency with the method of  his Intellectual Philosophy, derationalized 
the conceptions of  Justice and Right, and resolved them into en.pirica1 
products of  public  Utility  (Treatise on  Hzcman  Nature,  1739.  Essays, xxvi  KAMT'S PHILOSOPHY OF  LAW.  TI:ANSLATO~~'S PREFACE.  xsvii 
In these circnmstances, no  other alternative is left for 
11s  but  a  renewed  and  deepened appeal to the universal 
principle  of  Beason, as the essential condition of  all true 
Progress  and  certainty.  And  in  the present  dearth  of 
philosophical  origination  and  the  presence  of  the  un- 
assimilated products of  well-nigh a century of  thought, it 
seerils as if  the prosecution of  this Method of  all methods 
1742).  Reid,  leacliiig the realistic reaction, examined this side of  Hume's 
speculatioii with his  characteristic earnestness, and  advanced  by  his 
practicd principle of  Common Sense to positions akin to those of  Kant's 
Practical  Reasoii (Aetive Powers, 1788,  Essay V.  C.  iii.  Of  Systems of 
Natural Jurisprudenee,  and  the  following  chapters on  Hume's  Utili- 
taiianism).  Henry Home,  Lord  Kames,  prosecuted  the  same  method 
with  more juridical knowledge  (Principles of  Ep26ity;  Historien1 Latv 
Tracts,  1758 ;  Sketches  of  the  History  of  Man).  The movement  was 
carried on by Adam Ferguson (Principles of  Moral and Political Science, 
1792 ;  Eisay on  the  History of  Cavil ~S'ociety, 1767),  Diigald Stewart (see 
especially the account of  the Grotian School in the Dissertation, 1815), 
aud  Dr.  Thomas  Brown  (Lectures).  Sir  James  Mackintosh  wrote  a 
Diseourse on the Study of  the Law of  Nature and Nations, 1835.  The 
cultivation of  the Philosophy  of  Law  Iias  never  been  extinct  in  the 
Scottish Universities.  Since the revival of  $he  Chair of  Public Law in 
the University of  Edinburgh in 1862, Professor Lorimer has done much 
by his devotion and erudition to further the cultivation of  the subject. 
(See the reference to his own works, supra, xi. n. )  One of  his pupils, Mr. 
W.  G. Miller, Lecturer on Pnblic Law in the University of  Glasgow, has 
published a series of  excellent Lectures on the subject, displaying exten- 
sive knowledge and critical acumen, with general regard to the HegeIian 
standpoint (Leetures on  the  Philosophy of  Lau, Qesigned mainly as an 
introduction to the study of  International,Law, 1884).  Professor Flint's 
important ivork  on the Philosophy of  History in France und  Geermany, 
and Professor Edward Caird's  recent book on Comte's Social Philofiophy, 
may also be referred to in this connection. 
can  only  now  be  fruitfully  carried  on  by  a  veturn  to 
Kant  and  advance  through  his  System.  Enoiigl~  has 
perhaps  already  been  said  to  indicate  the  recognised 
importance of  the Kantian standpoint, and  even to point 
to the rich fields of  thought and inquiry that Open  every- 
where  around it to the student.  Into these fields it was 
the  original  intention  of  the translator  to  attempt  to 
fiirnish  some  rnore  definite  guidance  by  illustrative 
cominent  and  Iiistorical  reference  in  detail,  but  this 
intentioil  must  be  abandoned  meanwhile,  and  all  the 
riiore  readily as  it must  be  reckoned  at the most but a 
cluty of  subordinate  obligation and of  secondary import- 
axice.  The Translation is therefore sent forth by itself in 
reliance  upon  its intelligibility as a faithful rendering of 
tlie  original, and in the hope that it will prove at once a 
help to the  Students and an auxiliary to  the Masters  of 
our present juridical  science.  \V.  H. 
I3IBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. 
HÖDER remarks (i.  254) that by far the most  of  the later philosophical 
writers on Natural Right-'nomen  illis legio f I-follow  the system of  Kant 
and Fichte,  which  is in the main identical  in principle  with  that  of 
Thomasius.  It  was  impossible to refer  to  them in detail in these pre- 
fatory remarks, but it may be iisefnl  to quote  the following as tlie more xxviii  ICANT'S  PHILOSOPEY  OF  LAW. 
TIZANSLATOR'S  PREFACE.  xxix 
important works on the siibject from this stanclpoint since tlie appearaiice 
of  Kant's Rechtslehre :- 
A.  Mellin, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Rechte, 1796. 
P. J. A. Feuerbach, Kritik des natürlichen Rechts, 1796, 
H.  Stephani, Grundlinien der Rechtswissenschaft, 1797. 
Ph.  Schmutz, Erklärung  der  Rechte  des  Menschen  U.  des  Bürgers, 
1798.  Handbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, 1807. 
R.  Gerstacker, Metaphysik des Rechts, 1802. 
L.  Bendavid,  Versuch einer Rechtslehre,  1802. 
I<. H.  V.  Gros,  Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, 1802.  6 Ausg.  1841. 
Fries,  Philosophische Rechtslehre  U.  Kritik  aller  positiven  Gesetz 
Gebung,  1803. 
L. N.  Jacob, Philosophische Rechtslehre, 2 A.  1802. 
K. S.  Zachariä, Anfangsgriinde der Philosoph.  Privatrechts, 1804. 
Philosophische Rechtslehre o.  Naturrecht  U.  Staatslehre, 1819. 
Vierzig Bucher vom Staate, 1839-43. 
Chr. Weiss, Lehrbuch der Philosophie des Rechts, 1804. 
A.  Bauer, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, 1808.  3 Aiisg.  1825. 
J.  C.  F.  Neister, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, 1809. 
Dresch, Systeniatische Entwickelung der Grundbegriffe U.  Grundprin- 
zipien des gesaminten Privatrechts, Staatsrechts, und Volkerrechts, 
1810, 1822. 
V.  Zeiller, Naturrecht, 1813. 
W.  F.  Krug, Dikäologie oder philosophische Rechtslehre, 1817, 1830. 
Eschenmeyer, Normalrecht, 2 Thle. 1819. 
S. Reck, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, 1820. 
V.  Droste-Hülshoff,  Lehrbuch  des  Naturrechts  o.  der  Rechtspliilo- 
sophie, 1823, 1831. 
Politz, Natur- und Volkerrecht, Staats- und Staatenrecht, 1823, 1825. 
J.  Haus, Eleinenta doctrinze philosophia sive juris natnralis.  Gondavi, 
1824. 
K.  von  Rotteck,  Lehrbuch  des Vernunftrechts und der  Staatswissen- 
schaft, 4 Bde.  1829-34,  1841. 
Ant.  Virozsil, Epitome jiiris naturalis.  Pesthini, 1839. 
F.  Fischer, Naturrecht und natürliche Staatslehre, 1848. 
G. Schilling, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, 1859. 
Resides these a considerable number of  similar German works might be 
referred to by  Schaumann, Heydenreich, Klein, A.  Thomas, Weiss, J. K. 
Schmid, T.  M.  Zacharia, Stockhardt, E.  Reinhold, Schnabel, Pfitzer, and 
others. 
Of  the French  works,  from  the Kantian standpoint, may  be  qnoted 
(Ahrens, i.  326) :- 
M.  Bussart, Elements de droit nature1  priv6.  Fribourg en Suisse, 1836. 
V.  Beliine, Philosophie du droit.  Paris, 1844, 4 ed.  1881. 
In ItaIy, where the Philosophy of  Law has been  cultivated '  with great 
zeal and intelligence' (Ahrens, i.  327; Köder, Km't. Zeitschmjz für Rechts- 
~SS.  XV.  1, 2, 8), the Kantian system has becn ably discussed by Mancini, 
Mamiani, Rosmini, Poli, and others.  Its chief representatives have been- 
Baroli,  Diritto naturale piivato e publico, 6 vol.  Cremona, 1837. 
Tolomei, Corso elementare di diritto naturale, 2 ed.  Padova,  1855. 
Soria  di Crispan, Filosofia di diritto publico.  (Philosophie du droit 
public.  Brux.  1858-4.)  Transl. into French. 
Rosmini-Serbati, Filosofia del diritto, 1841.  (In part Kantian.) 
[Since writing tlie foregoing Preface there has come to hand the import- 
ant work,  'La  Vita del Diritto,  nei  suoi rapporti  colla  Vita  Sociale: 
Studio comparativo  di  Filosofia Giuridica.  Per  Giusseppe  Carle,  Pro- 
fessore ordinario di Filosofia  de Diritto  nella R.  Universita  di Torino.' 
Its comprehensive method and profouud insight  add to the already ample 
evidence of  the '  great zeal  and intelligence '  with which the Philosophy 
of  Law  iu  now being cultivated by the countrymen of  Vico,  the natural 
successors of  Antistius Labeo, and Papinian.  Professor  Carle points out 
the relation of  Kant not only to Rosmini, but also to Mamiani and others. 
His view  of  the iniportance and influence of  the Kantian System is in 
accord with the brief indiaations ventured in thqse Prefatory hints.  It is 
impossible to quote hii exposition here, but attention  may be  directed to 
P. ii.  L.  i.  Cap.  ii.  1  3,  'Emmanuele  Kant come  iniziatore del metodo 
rationale nello studio del diritto naturale ;  ' and L.  ii.  Cap.  V.  '  Ulteriore 
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BY 
IMMANUEL  KANT. 
APOLOGIA. 
Kant's Vindication of  his Philosophical Strle,  .  ,  259 PREFATORY  EXPLANATIONS. 
THE  METAPHYSIC  OF MORALS,  as constituting the System 
of  Practical  Philosophy,  was  to  follow  tl~e  '  Critique  of 
the Practical Reason,'  as it now  does.  It falls ilito two 
parts : (1)  THE  METAPHYSICAL  PRINCIPLES  OB  JDRIS- 
PRUDENCE AS  THE SCIENCE  OF RIGHT,  and  (2) THE  META- 
PHYSICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  ETHICS AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF 
VIRTVE. The whole  System forms  a  counterpart to the 
'  Metaphysical Principles of  the Science of  Nature,'  which 
have  been  already  discussed  in a  separate work  (1786). 
The General Introduction to the '  Metaphysic of  Morals ' 
bears mainly on its form  in  both the Divisions;  and the 
Definitions and Explanations it contains  exhibit  and, to 
some  extent, illiistrate the formal Priilciples of  the whole 
System. 
THE SCIENCE  OF  RIGHT  as a  philosophical  exposition 
of  the  fundamental  Principles  of  Jurisprudence,  thus 
forms the First Part of  the Metaphysic of  Morals.  Taken 
here by itself-apart  from t-he  special Principles of  Ethics 
as the Science  of  Virtue which  follows it-it  has to be KÄNT'S  13REFATORY EXPLANATIONS.  5 
treated as a System of  Principles that originate in Reason ; 
and, as such, it might be properly designated '  The Meta- 
physic  of  Rigbt.'  But the  conception  of  Right, purely 
rational in its origin though  it be,  is also applicable to 
cases  preseiited  in  experience;  and,  consequently,  a 
Metaphysical System of  Rights  must take into considera- 
tion the empirical variety and maiiifoldness of  these cases 
in order  that  its Divisions  may be complete.  For com- 
pleteness and comprehensiveness are essential  and indis- 
pensable to the formation of  a  rational system.  But, on 
tlie  other  hand,  it is impossible to obtain .a  complete 
survey of  all the details  of  experience, and where it may 
be attempted to approach this, the empirical conceptions 
embracing those details cannot form integral elements of 
the system itself, but can only be introduced in subordinate 
observations, and mainly as furnishing examples illustrative 
of  the General Principles.  The only appropriate designa- 
tion for the  First Part of  a Metaphysic of  Morals, will, 
therefore,  be  Tm METAPHYSICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE 
SCIENCE  OF RIGHT.  And, in regard to the practical appli- 
cation to cases, it is manifest that only an apgroximation 
to  systematic  treatment  is  to  be  expected, and not the 
qttainment  of  a  System  complete in  itself.  Hence  the 
Same  method of  exposition will be  adopted here as was 
followed in the former work on '  The Metaphysical Prin- 
ciples of  the Science of  Nature.'  The Principles of  Right 
which belong to the rational system wilI form the leading 
portions  of  the  text,  and  cletails  connected  with Rights 
which  refer  to  particular  cases  of  experience,  will  bs 
appended  occasionally in  subordinate  remarks.  In this 
way a distinction  will  be  clearly made between what is a 
Metaphysical or rational Principle, and what refers to the 
empirical Practice of  Right. 
Towards the  end  of  the work,  I have treated several 
sections with less fulness of detail than might have  been 
expected  when they  are  compared  with  what  precedes 
them.  But  this  has  been  intentionally  done,  partly 
because it appears to me that the more  general principles 
of  the later subjects may be easily deduced from what has 
gone before; and, also, partly  because  the details  of  the 
Principles  of  Piiblic  Right  are at present subjected to so 
much  discussion, and  are  besides  so  important in theni- 
selves, that they  may well jiistify delay,  for  a  time, of  a 
final and decisive judgment regarding them. PROLEGOMENA. 
GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
T0 
THE  ilfETAPHYSIC  OF  MOKALS. GENERAL  INTRODUCTION T0 THE 
METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALS. 
The Practical Faculty of Action.-THE  ACTIVE FACULTY 
OF THE HUMAN  MIND,  as the Faculty of  Desire in its widest 
sense, is the Power which  man  has, through  his mental 
representations, of  becoming  the  cause  of  objects corre- 
sponding  to  these  representations.  The  capacity  of  a 
Being to act  in conformity with his own representations, 
is what constitutes the Life of  such a Being. 
The Feeling of  Pleasure or Pain.-It  is to be observed, 
Jirst, that with Desire  or Aversion  there  is  always  con- 
nected PLEASURE  or  PAIN,  the susceptibility for which is 
called FEELING.  But the converse does not  always hold. 
For  there  may  be  a  Pleasure  connected,  not  with  the 
desire of  an object,  but  with  a  mere  mental  represen- 
tation, it being indifferent whether  an object correspond- 
ing  to  the representation exist or not.  And, second, the 
Pleasure  or  Pain  connected  with  the  object  of  desire 
does  not always precede the activity of  Desire ;  nor can 
it  be  regarded  in every case as  the cause,  but  it may 
as  well  be  the  Effect  of  that  activity.  The  capacity 
of  experiencing Pleasure or  Pain  on  the occasion  of  a 10  ICANT'S  PHILOSOPHY  OB LBW.  THE METAPHYSIC  OF MORALS.  11 
mental  representation, is  called  'Feeling,'  because  Plea- 
sure  and  Pain  contain  only  what  is  subjective  in  the 
relations  of  oiir  mental  activity.  They do  not  involve 
any relation  to  an  object  that  could possibly furnish  a 
kniwledge  of  it  as  such; they  cannot  even  give  us  a 
knowledie  of  OUT  own  mental state.  For  even  Sensa- 
tions:  considered apart from the qualities which attach to 
them on account of  the modifications of  the Subject,-as, 
for instance, in reference to Red, Sweet, and such like,- 
are  referred  as  constituent  elements  of  knowledge  to 
Obiects, whereas Pleasure or Pain felt in connection with  ". 
what is  red or  sweet, express  absolutely nothing that  is 
in  the  Obiect,  but  merely  a  relation  to  the  Subject. 
And for the  reason  iust  stated, Pleasure  and  Pain  con- 
sidered  in themselvei  cannot  be more  precisely  defined. 
All  that can  be  further  done  with  regard  to  them is 
merely  to  point  out what  consequences  they may  have 
in certain relations, in order  to  make  the  knowledge  of 
them available practically. 
The Sensibility  as the Faculty of  Sense, may be defined by reference to 
the subjective Nature of  our Representations generally.  It  is the Under- 
standing that first refers the subjective Representations to an object ;  it 
alone thinks  anything by means of  these Representations.  Now, the siibjec- 
tive nature of  our Representations might be of  such a kind that they could 
be related to Objects so as to furnish knowledge of  them, either in regard 
to their Form or Matter-in  the former relation  by pure  Perception, in 
the latter  by  Sensation proper.  In this case the Sense-faculty, as the 
capacity for receiving objective Representations, would be properly called 
Sense-perception.  But  mere  mental Representation from its subjective 
nature  cannot,  in fact,  become  a constituent  of  objective knowledge, 
because  it contains merely the relation  of  the Representations  to the 
Subject, and includes nothing that can be used for attaining a knowledge 
of  the object.  In this case, then, this receptivity of  the Mind for sub- 
jective  representations is called PEELING.  It includes the effect of  the 
Representations, whether sensible or intellectual, upon  the Subject ;  and 
it belongs to  the  Sensibility, although the  Representation  itself  may 
belong to the Understanding or the Reason. 
Practical Pleasure, Interest, 1nclination.-The  Pleasure, 
which is necessarily connected with the activity of  Desire, 
when the representation of  the object desired  affects  the 
capacity  of  Feeling,  rnay  be  called  Practical  Pleasure. 
And  this designation  is applicable whether the Pleasure 
is the cause  or  the effect  of  the  Desire.  On  the other 
hand, that  Pleasure  which  is not  necessarily  connected 
with the Desire of  an object, and which, therefore, is  not 
a pleasure in the  existence  of  the object, but  is  merely 
attached to a  mental representation  alone, rnay be called 
Inactive Complacency, or mere Contemplatiz~e  Pleasure.  The 
Feeling of  this latter kind  of  Pleasure, is what  is  called 
Taste.  Hence, in a System  of  Practical Philosophy, the 
Contemplative Pleasure of  Taste will not  be discussed as 
an essential  constituent  conception,  but  need  only  be 
referred to incidentally or  episodically.  But os  regards 
Pract.ica1 Pleasure, it  is otherwise.  For  the determina- 
tion  of  the  activity of  the  Faculty  of  Desire  or  Appe- 
tency,  which  is  necessarily  preceded  by  this  Pleasure 
as  its  cause,  is  what  properly  constitutes  DESIRE in 
the  strict  sense  of  the term.  Habitual  Desire,  again, 
constitutes  Inclination;  and  the  connection  of  Plea- 
sure  with  the  activity  of  Desire,  in  so  far  as  this 
connection  is  judged  by  the  Understanding  to  be 
valid  according  to  a  general  Rule  holding  good  at 
least  for  the  individual,  is  what  is  called  Interest. 
Hence,  in  such  a  case,  the  Practical  Pleasure  is  an 
Interest  of  the  Inclination  of  the  Individual.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  Pleasure  can  only follow a pre- 
ceding determination of  the  Faculty of  Desire,  it  is an 
Intellectual  Pleasure, and the interest in the object must 
be  called  a  rational  Interest ; for  were  the  Interest 
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Reason,  Sensation  would  necessarily  be  conjoined  with 
the Pleasure, and would  thus  determine  the  activity of 
the Desire.  Where an entirely pure  Interest of  Reason 
must be assumed, it is not legitimate to introduce  into it 
an Interest of  Inclination  surreptitiously.  However, in 
order  to  conform  so  far with the  cornmon phraseology, 
we  rnay allow the  application of  the term '  Inclination ' 
even to that which  can only be the object of  an '  Intel- 
lectual '  Pleasure  in  the  sense  of  a  habitual  Desire 
arising  from  a  pure  Interest  of  Reason.  But  such 
Inclination would  have to be  viewed, not  as the  Cause, 
but as the Effect of  the rational Interest ;  and we might 
call it  the  non-sensuozcs or  RATIONAL  INCLINATION  (pro- 
pensio intellectualis).-Further,  Con'olznpiscence is to be dis- 
tinguished from the activity of  Desire itself, as a stimulus 
or incitement  to its determination.  It is  always a sen- 
suous  state of  the mind, which  does not itself  attain to 
the definiteness of  an act of  the Power of  Desire. 
The Will  generally as Practical  Reason.-The  activity 
of  the Faculty of  Desire rnay proceed in accordance with 
Conceptions ;  and in so far  as the Principle  thus deter- 
mining it to action is found in the  mind, and not in its 
object,  it  constitutes  a Power  of  acting  or  not  acting 
according to  1.i-6n.g.  In so  far  as the  activity is accom- 
panied  with  the  Consciousness  of  the  Power  of  the 
action  to produce  the  Object, it forms an act of  Choice ; 
if  this  consciousness  is  not  conjoined  with  it,  the 
Activity  is  called a Whh.  The Faculty of  Desire, in so 
far as its inner Principle  of  determination as the ground 
of  its liking  or  Predilection lies  in  the Reason  of  the 
Subject,  constitutes  THE  WILL.  The  Will  is therefore 
the  Faculty of  active  Desire  or  Appetency, viewed  not 
so much in relation to the  action-which  is the relation 
of  the act of  Choice-as  rather in relation to the Principle 
that determines the power  of  Choice  to  the  action.  It 
has, in itself, properly no  Special Principle of  determina- 
tion, but in so far as it rnay determine the voluntary act 
of  Choice, it is THE PRACTICAL  REASON  ITSELF. 
The  Will  as  the  Faculty  of  Practical  Princip1es.- 
Under  the  Will, taken  generally, rnay  be  included  the 
volitional act of  Choice,  and  also  the  mere  act  of  Wisl~, 
in so far as Reason rnay determine the Faculty of  Desire 
in its activity.  The act of  Choice that can be determined 
by pure Renson, constitutes  the act  of  Free-will.  That 
act  which  is  determinable  only  by  Inclination  as  a 
sensuous  inipiilse  or  stimulus would  be  irrational brute 
Choice  (nrhitrium  brutztnz).  The human  act  of  Choice, 
Iiowever, as human, is in fact a$eeted  by such impulses or 
stimuli, but is not  determined by  them ;  and it is, there- 
fore,  not  piire  in  itself  when  taken  apart  from  the 
acquired habit of  determination by Reason.  Bnt it rnay 
be determined to action by  the pure Will.  The Freedow. 
of  the  act  of  volitional  Choice, is  its independence  of 
being determined by sensuous impulses or stimuli.  This 
forms  the  negative  conception  of  the  Free-will.  The 
positive Conception of  Freedom is given  by the fact that 
the Will is the capability of  Pure Reason to be practical 
of  itself.  Rnt this is not possible otherwise than by the 
Maxim  of  every action  being  subjected to the condition 
of  beiilg  practicable  as  a  universal  Law.  Applied  as 
Pure lteason to the act of  Choice, and  considered  apart 
from  its  objects, it rnay be  regarded  as the  Faculty of 
Principles ; and, iri  this  connection, it is  the  source  of 
Yractical Principles.  Hence it is  to be  viewed as a law- 
giving  Faculty.  But  as  the  material  upon  which  to 
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the form  of  the Maxim  of  the  act of  Will, in so far as 
it is available as a universal Law, the  supreme  Law and 
determining Principle of  the Will.  And as the Maxims, 
or Rules of  human action derived from subjective causes, 
do  not  of  themselves  necessarily agree with  those  that 
are  objective  and  universal,  Reason  can  only prescribe 
this  supreme Law as an absolute Imperative of  prohibi- 
tion or command. 
The Laws of  Freedom as Moral, Juridical, and Ethica1.- 
The  Laws  of  Freedom,  as  distinguished  from the Laws 
of  Nature, are  mo~al  Laws.  So  far  as  they refer  only 
to  external  actions  aiid their lawfulness, they are called 
JzcrZdieal;  but  if  they  also  require  that, as  Laws, they 
shall  themselves  be  the  deterrnining Principles of  our 
actions, they  are Ethical.  The  agreement  of  an  action 
with  Juridical  Laws,  is  its Le,gality;  the  agreement  of 
an action with  Ethical  Laws, is its Morali$y.  The Free- 
dom to which the former laws refer, can only be Freedom 
in  external  practice;  but  the  Freedom  to  which  the 
latter  laws  refer,  is Freedom  in the  internal as well as 
the  external  exercise  of  the activity of  the Will  in  so 
far as it is  determined  by  Laws  of  Reason.  So,  in 
Theoretical Philosophy, it is said  that  only  the  objects 
of  the external  senses  are  in  Space, but  all the objects 
both of  internal and external sense are in Time ;  because 
the representations of  both,  as  being  representations, so 
far  belong  all  to  the  internal  sense.  In like manner, 
whether  Freedom is viewed in reference  to  the external 
or  the  internal  action  of  the  Will,  its Laws,  as  pure 
practical  Laws  of  Reason  for  the  free  activity  of  the 
Will  generally,  must  at the  Same  time  be  inner  Prin- 
ciples  for  its  determination,  although  they  may  not 
always be considered in this relation. 
11. 
THE  IDEA  AND  NECESSITY  OB  A METAPHYSIC  OB MORALS. 
The  Laws of  Nature Rational  and  also  Empirica1.-It 
has  been  shown  in  l'he  Metaphysical  Principks  of  tlze 
Science of  Nature, that  there must  be  Principles d, priori 
for  the Natural Science that has to deal with the  objects 
of  the  external  senses.  And it was further shown that 
it is  possible, and even necessary, to formulate a System 
of  these Principles under  the name of  a '  Metaphysical 
Science  of  Nature,'  as  a  preliminary  to  Experimental 
Physics regarded as Natural Science applied to particular 
objects  of  experience.  Rut  this  latter  Science, if  care 
be  taken to keep its generalizations free from error, may 
accept  many propositions as universal on the evidence of 
experience, although if  the term '  Universal ' be taken in 
its  strict  sense,  these  would  necessarily  have  to  be 
deduced  by the Metaphysical Science  from  Principles 2c 
pl.iori.  Thus  Newton  accepted  the  principle  of  the 
Equality  of  Action  and  Reaction  as  established by ex- 
perience,  and  yet  he extended  it  as  a  universal  Law 
over  the  whole  of  material  Nature.  The  Chemists go 
even farther, grounding  their  most  general Laws regard- 
ing  the  combination and decomposition of  the  materials 
of  bodies wholly upon experience ; and yet they trust  so 
completely to the Universality and Necessity of  those laws, 
that  they  have  no  anxiety as to any error  being found 
in  propositions founded  upon  experinients conducted  in 
accordance with them. 
Moral  Laws  il  priori and Necessary-But  it is other- 
wise  with  Moral  Laws.  These, in  contradistinction to 
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can  be  rationally established ci p~iori  and  compreliended 
as necessay.  In  fact, conceptions and judgments regard- 
ing ourselves and our conduct have no.mora1 significance, 
if  they contain  only what may be  Iearned from  experi- 
ence ;  and  when  any  one  is,  so  to  speak, misled into 
making a Moral  Principle out  of  anything derived from 
this latter  source, he is  already in danger of  falling into 
the coarsest and most fatal errors. 
If the  Philosophy of  Morals were nothing more than 
a  Theory  of  Happii~ess (Euda~nzonisrn), it  would  be 
absurd to search after Principles  2z  priori as a foundation 
for it.  Por however plausible it may sound  to  say that 
Reason, even prior to experience, can comprehend by what 
lneans we  may attain to a lasting enjoyment  of  the  real 
pleasures  of  life,  yet  all that is taught  on this subject 
h pl.iori  is  either  tautological,  or  is  assumed  wholly 
without  foundation.  It  is  only  Experience  that  cari. 
show what  will  bring  us  enjoyment.  The  natural  im- 
pulses directed towards  nourishment, the sexual  instinct, 
or the tendency to rest and motion, as well as the higher 
desires of  honour, the acquisition of  knowledge, and such 
like, as developed with our natural  capacities,  are alone 
capable  of  showing in what those enjoyments are  to be 
found.  And,  further,  the knowledge  thus  acquired, is 
available  for  each  individual  merely  in  his  own  way ; 
and it is only thus  he  can  learn the means by which he 
has  to seek  those enjoyments.  All  specious rationalizing 
&  priori,  in  this  connection, is  nothing  at bottom  but 
carrying  facts  of  Experience  up  to  generalizations by 
induction (secundz~m  principia generalia non  z~niversalia)  ; 
and  the generality thus  attained  is  still so limited that 
numberless  exceptioiis  must  be  allowed  to  every indi- 
vidual  in  order  that  he  niay  adapt  the  choice  of  his 
niode  of  life  to his  own  particular inclinations and  his 
capacity  for  pleasure.  And,  after  all,  the  individual 
has rmlly to acquire his Prudence at the cost of  his own 
suffering or that of  his neighbours. 
But  it  is  quite  otherwise  with  the  Principles  of 
Morality.  They  lay  down  Commands  for  every  one 
without regard to his particular  inclinations, and  merely 
because  and  so  far  as  he  is  free,  and  has  a  practical 
Beason.  Instruction  in  the  Laws  of  Morality  is not 
drawn  from  observation of  oneself  or  of  our  animal 
nature, nor  from perception  of  the course  of  the world 
in  regard  to  what  happens,  or  how  men  act?  But 
Reason commands how we  oyht to act,  even  although 
no example of  such action were  to  be  found; nor  does 
Reason  give  any  regard  to  the Advantage which  may 
accrue to us by so acting, and which Experience could alone 
actually show.  For, altliough  Reason  allows  us to seek 
what  is for  our  advantage  in  every possible  way,  and 
although, founding upon the evidence of  Experience, it may 
further  promise  that  greater  advantages will  probably 
follow on the average from the observance of  her commands 
than from their transgression, especially  if Prudence giiides 
the conduct, yet the authority of  her precepts as Commartds 
does aot rest on  such  considerations.  They are used by 
Reason only as  Counsels, and by way of  a  counterpoise 
against seductions to  an  opposite course, when acljusting 
beforehand the  equilibrium  of  a  partial  balance  in the 
sphere of  Practical  Judgment, in order thereby to secure 
the decision of this Judgment, according to the due weight 
of  the & priori Principles of  a pure Practical Reason. 
* This holds notwithstanding the fact that the term  <Morals,'  in Latin 
Mores,  and in German Sitten, signifies originally only Man~?ers  or  Mode 
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The Necessity  of  a  obetaphysic  of  Mo~~Is.-<META- 
PHYSICS ' designates any System  of  Knowledge  h pri0.l.i 
that  consists  of  pure  Conceptions.  Accordingly  a 
Practical  Philosophy not  having  Nature, but  the Free- 
dorn  of  the Will  for its  object,  will  presuppose  and 
require  a  Metaphysic  of  Morals.  It is  even  a  Duty 
to have such a Metaphysic ; and every man does, indeed, 
possess  it  in  himself,  although  commonly  but  in  an 
obscure way.  For  how  codd any  one  believe  that he 
has  a  source of  universal Law in himself, without Prin- 
ciples h priwri 1  And just  as in a Metaphysic of  Nature 
there  must  be  principles  reguIating  the application  of 
the universal  supreme  Principles  of  Nature  to  objects 
of  Experience, so there cannot but be such principles  in 
the Metaphysic of  Morals; and we will often have to deal 
objectively with the particular lzatzlre  of  man  as  known 
only by Experience, in order  to  show  in it  the  conse- 
quences of  these  universal  Moral  Principles.  But  this 
inode of  dealing with these  Principles in their particular 
applications  will  in no way detract  from  theii.  rational 
purity, or throw doirbt on their h p.piori  origin.  In other 
words,  this  amounts  to  saying  that  a  Metaphysic  of 
Morals  cannot  be  founded  on  Anthropology  as  the 
Empirical Science of Man, but may be applied to it. 
Moral Anthropo1ogy.-The  Counterpart of  a Metaphysic 
of  Morals,  and  the  other  member  of  the  Division  of 
Practical Philosophy, would be  a Moral Anthropology, as 
the Empirical Science of  the Moral Nature of  Man.  This 
Science  would  contain  only  the  subjective  conditions 
that  hinder  or  favour  the  realizatiolz  in practice of  the 
universal moral Laws  in human  Nature, with  the means 
of  propagating, spreading, and  strengthening  the  Moral 
Principle~~as  by the  Education  of  the young and the 
instrnction  of  the people,-and  all other such doctrines 
and precepts founded upon experience and  indispensable 
in  themselves,  although  they must  neither  precede  the 
metaphysical investigation  of  the Principles  of  Reason, 
nor be mixed up vith it.  For, by doing so, there would 
be a great danger of  laying  down false, or  at least very 
flexible Moral Laws, which would hold forth as unattain- 
able what is not attairied  only because  the Law has  not 
been comprehended and presented in its purity, in which 
also  its  strength  consists.  Or,  otherwise, spurious  and 
rnixed  rnotives  might  be  adopted  instead  of  what  is 
dutiful and good  in itself; and  these would  furnish  no 
certain Moral Principles  either  for  the  guidance  of  the 
Judgment  or  for  the  discipline  of  the  heart  in  the 
practice of  Duty.  It  is only by  Pure  Reason, therefore, 
that Duty can and must be prescribed. 
Practical  Philosophy  in  relation  to  Art.-The  high 
~iviiion  of  Philosophy, under  which  the  Division just 
rnentioned  stands,  is  into  Theoretical  Philosophy  and 
Practical Philosopliy.  Practical Philosophy is just Moral 
Philosophy in  its  widest  sense, as  has  been  explained 
elsewhere?  All that is practicable  and  possible, accord- 
ing to Natural Laws, is the special subject of  the activity 
of  Art, and its precepts and  rules entirely depend on the 
Theory of  Nature.  It  is only what is practicable accord- 
ing  to  Laws  of  Freedom  that  can  have  Principles  in- 
dependent of  Theory, for  there is  no  Theory in  relation 
to  what  passes  beyond  the  determinations  of  Nature. 
Philosophy therefore cannot  ernbrace  under its practical 
Division  a  techltical Theory, but only a morally practical 
Doctrine.  But  if  the  dexterity  of  the Will  in acting 
according  to  Laws  of  Freedom,  in  contradistinction to 
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Nature, were  to be  also  called  an Art, it  would  neces- 
sarily indicate  an Art which  would  make  a  System  of 
Fresdom  possible  like  the  System  of  Nature.  This 
would truly be a Divine Art, if we were in a position  by 
means of  it to realize  completely what Reason  prescribes 
to us, and to put the Idea into practice. 
Two Elements involved  in  all  Legis1ation.-All  Legis- 
lation, whether  relating  to  internal  or  external  action, 
and whether prescribed h prio9-i  by mere  Reason  or  laid 
down  by the Will of  another, involves two Elenients :- 
Ist, a  LAW which  represents  the  action  that  ought  to 
happen  as  necessary objectively,  thus  making  the  action 
a  Duty; 2nd,  a  MOTIVE  which  connects  the  principle 
determining the Will to this action with the Mental repre- 
sentation of  the Law subjectively, so that the Law makes 
Duty the motive  of  the Action.  By  the  first  element, 
tlie action is represented  as  a  Duty, in  accordance with 
the  mere  theoretical  knowledge  of  the  possibility  of 
determining the  activity of  the Will  by practical  Rules. 
By  the  second  element,  the  Obligation  so  to  act,  is 
connected in the Subject with a determining Principle of 
the Will as such. 
Division  of  Duties  into  Juridical  and  Ethica1.-All 
L-islation,  therefore, may  be  differentiated by  reference 
to its  Motive-principle.'  The  Legislation  which  makes 
1 This ground of  Division  will  apply,  althougli  the acfion  which it 
malies  a duty may coincide with another action, that may be  otlierwise 
looked at from another poiilt  of  view.  For instance,  Actions  may in all 
cases be classified as exteriial. 
an  Action  a Duty, and  this  Duty  at  the same  time  a 
Motive,  is  etltieal.  That  Legislation  which  does  not 
include  the  'Motive - principle  in  the  Law,  and  conse- 
cluently admits  another  Motive than  the idea  of  Duty 
itself, is juridiz'cal.  In respect of  the latter, it is  evident 
that  the  motives  distinct  from  the  idea  of  Duty,  to 
which it inay refer, must  be  drawn  from  the  subjective 
(pathological) influences of  Incliiiatioii  and  of  Aversion, 
determining 'the voluntary  activity, and  especially  from 
the  latter;  becanse  it  is  a  Legislation  which  has  to 
be  compulsory,  and  not  merely  a  mode  of  attracting 
or persuading.  The agreement  or. non-agreenient  of  an 
aetion  with  the  Law,  without  reference  to  its  Motive, 
is  its  Legality;  and  that  character  of  the  action  in 
which  the  idea  of  Duty  arising  from  the  Law,  at 
the Same  time  fornis  the  Motive  of  the  Action,  is its 
Morality. 
Duties specially in accord with a Jnridical Legislation, 
can only be external Duties.  For this mode  of  Legisla- 
tion does not require that the idea of  the Duty, which is 
internal, shall be  of  itself  the  determining  Principle  of 
the act. of  Will ; and as it requires  a  motive suitable  to 
the  nature  of  its  laws,  it  can  only  connect  what  is 
external  witli  the  Law.  Ethical  Legislation,  on  the 
other  hand, makes  internal  actions  also  Duties, but not 
to  tbe  exclusioii  of  the  external,  for  it  embraces 
everything  which  is  of  the  nature  of  Duty.  And 
just  because  ethical  Legislation  includes  within  its 
Law  the  internal  motive  of  the  action  as  contained 
in  the  idea  of  Duty, it involves  a  characteristic which 
cannot at all enter into the Legislation that is external. 
Hence, Ethical  Legislation cannot  as  such  be  external, 
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it mny receive Duties which  rest  on  an  external  Legis- 
lation  as Duties, into  the position  of  motives, within its 
own Legislation. 
Jurisprudence  and  Ethics  distingui8hed.-From  what 
has  been  said,  it  is  evident  that  all  Duties,  merely 
because  they are  duties, belong to  Ethics;  and  yet  the 
Legislation upon which they are founded  is not  on  that 
account  in all cases contained in  Ethics.  On  the con- 
t,rary, the Law of  many of  them  lies  outside of  Ethics. 
Thus  Ethics  commands  that  I must  fulfil  a  promise 
entered into by Contract, although the other party might 
not be able to compel me to do so.  It  adopts  the  Law 
'pacta mnt servanda,'  and the Duty corresponding  to it, 
from  Jurisprudence  or  the  Science  of  Right, by  which 
they are established.  It  is not  in Ethics, therefore, but 
in Jurisprudence,  that  the principle  of  the  Legislation 
lies,  that  'promises  made  and  accepted  must  be  kept.' 
Accordingly, Ethics  specially teaches that if  the Motive- 
principle  of  external  compulsion  which Juridical  Legis- 
lation connects with a Duty is even  let  go,  the  idea  of 
Duty alone is sufficient of  itself  as  a  Motive.  For were 
it not  so, and  were  the  Legislation  itself  not  juridical, 
and consequently the Duty arising  from  it not specially 
a Duty of  Right as distinguished  from a Duty of  Virtue, 
then  Fidelity in the performance  of  acts, to  which  t,he 
individual  may  be  bound  by  the  terms  of  a  Cohtract, 
would have to be classified with acts of  Benevolence and 
the  Obligation  that  underlies  them,  which  cannot  be 
correct.  To  keep one's  promise  is not  properly a Duty 
of  Virtue, but a Duty of Right;  and the performance  of 
it  can  be  enforced  by  external  Compulsion.  But  to 
keep  one's  promise,  even  when  no  Compulsion  can  be 
appl.ied  to  enforce  it,  is,  at  the  Same  time:  a  virtuous 
action,  and  a  proof  of  Virtue.  Jurisprudence  as  the 
Science of  Right, and  Ethics  as the Science  of  Virtue, 
are therefore distinguished not so much by their diffe~ent 
Duties,  as rather  by  the  difference  of  the  Legislation 
which connects the one or the other kind of  motive with 
their Laws. 
Ethical Legislation is  that which  cannot be  external, 
although  the  Duties  it  prescribes  may  be  external 
as  well  as  internal.  Juridical  Legislation  is  that 
which  may  also  be  external.  Thus  it  is  an  external 
duty to keep  a  promise  entered  into  by  Contract ;  but 
the  injunction  to  do  this merely because  it  is  a  duty, 
without  regard  to any other n~otive,  belongs  exclusively 
to  the internal  Legislation.  It does not belong  thus  to 
the  ethical  spliere  as  being  a  particular  kind  of  duty 
or a particular mode of  action to whieh we are bound,- 
for  it is  an external duty in Ethics as well as in Juris- 
prudence,-  but  it  is  because  the  Legislation  in  the 
case  referred to is internal, and cannot  have an external 
Lawgiver, that  tlie  Obligation  is  reckoned  as  belonging 
to  Ethics.  For  the Same reason, the Duties  of  Benevo- 
lence>  alkhough  they are external  Duties  as  Obligations 
to  external  actions,  are,  in  like  manner,  reckoned  as 
belonging  to  Ethics, because  they can  only be  enjoined 
by Legislation  that is interna1.-Ethics  has no doubt its 
own  peculiar  Duties,-such  as those towards  oneself,- 
but  it has  also  Duties in  common with  Jurisprudence, 
only not  under the Same mode  of  Obligation.  In short, 
tlie  peculiarity  of  Ethical  Legislation  is to  enjoin the 
performance of  certain  actions  merely because  they are 
Duties, and to make the Principle of  Duty itself-what- 
ever  be  its source or occasion-the  sole sufficing motive 
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ethica2  Duties  that  are  directly  such ; and  the  inner 
Legislation also makes the others-all  and each  of  them 
-indirectly  Ethical. 
The Deducti0.n  of  the Division of  a System is the 
proof  of  its completeness as well as of  its continuity, 
so  that there may be  a logical transition  from  the 
general  conception  divided  to  the members  of  the 
Division, and  through  the whole  series of  the sub- 
divisions without  any break or leap  in the  arrange- 
ment (divkio per saltum).  Such a  Division is one of 
the most difficult conditions for  the  architect  of  a 
System to  fulfil.  There  is  even  some  doubt  ab  tQ: 
what  is  the  highest  Conception  that  is  primarily 
divided  into  Right  and  Wrong  (aut fas  aut nefas). 
It is assuredly  the conception of  the activity of  the 
Free-will in general.  In  like manner, the expounders 
of  Ontology  start from '  Something ' and '  Nothing,' 
without  perceiving that these are already members of 
a Division for which the highest divided  conception 
is awanting, and which can  be  no  other  than that of 
Thing '  in general. 
GENERAL  DIVISIONS  OF THE METAPHYSIC 
OF  MORALS. 
DIVISION  OF THE METAPHYSIC  OF MORALS  AS A  SYSTEM 
OB DUTIES  GENERALLY. 
1. All  Duties  are  either  Duties  of  Right,  that is, 
JURIDICAL  DUTIES  (Oficia  Juris),  or  Duties  of  Virtue, 
that  is,  ETHICAL  DUTIES (Oflcia  YirtutG  s.  ethica). 
Juridical  Duties  are  such  as  may  be  promulgated  by 
external Legislation ;  Ethical Duties are those  for which 
such  legislation  is  not  possible.  The  reason  why  the 
latter  cannot  be  properly  made  the subject of  'external 
Legislation is because  they relate to an End or final pur- 
pose,  which is itself, at the same time, embraced in these 
Duties, and which it is a Duty for the individual to have 
as such.  But no external  Legislation can cause any one 
to adopt a particular intention, or  to  propose  to himself 
a  certain  purpose;  for  this  depends  upon  an  internal 
condition or act  of  the  mind  itself.  However, external 
actions  conducive  to  such  a  mental  condition  rnay  be 
commanded, without its being implied that the individual 
will of  necessity make them an End to himself. 
But  why,  then,  it may be asked, is the Science of 
Morals  or  Moral  Philosophy, commonly  entitled-- 
especially  by  Cicero-the  Science of  hty  and  not 
also  the  Science  of  Right,  since Duties and Rights 
refer to each other ?  The reason  is this.  We know 
our  own  Freedom-from  which  all  Moral  Laws 
and  consequently all  Rights  as  well  as  all Duties 
arise-  only  through  the  Moral  Imperative,  which 
is an immediate  injunct,ion of  Duty ; whereas  the 
conception of  Right  as  a ground  of  putting  others  - iinder Obligation  has  afterwards to be developed out 
of  it. 
2.  In the Doctrine of  Duty, Man may and ought to be 
represented in accordance with  the  nature of  his faculty 
of  Freedom,  which  is  entirely  supra-sensible.  He is, 
therefore,  to  be  represented  purely  accoiding  to  his 
Humanity  as  a  Personality  independent  of  physical 
determinations  (homo noumeno.n), in distinction  from the 
Same  person  as a  Man  modified  with  these  determina- 
tions  (homo  phenomenon).  Hence  the  conceptions  of 
Right  and  End when  referred  to  Duty, in  view of  this 
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DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 
ACCORDINQ  TO  TEE  OBJECTIVE  RELATION  OF  THE LAW  TO  DUTY. 
I. THE RIQHT  OF  HUNANITY 
in  oiir  own  Person 
(Juridical Diities towards  6 
I. JURIDICAL!  to 
DUTIES  OTHERS.  11.  THE RIQHT  OF  MANRIND k 
Others  foridical  & 
Diities towards  thers). 
111.  THE END OF  HUMANITY 
in  onr  Person  (Ethical 
Duties towards Oneself). 
IV. THE END OE  MANKIND 
in Others (Ethical Duties 
towards Others). 
DIVISION  OF THE METAPHYSIC  OF MORALS  ACCORDING T0 
RELATIONS  OF  OBLIGATION. 
As  the  Subjects between  whom  a  relation  of  Right 
to  Duty  is  apprehended-whether  it  actually  exist  or 
not -  adrnit  of  being  conceived  in  various  juridical 
relations  to  each  other,  another  Division  may  be  pro- 
posed from this point of  view, as follows :- 
DIVISION  POSS~BLE  ACCORDINQ  TO  THE  SUBJECTIVE  RELATION  OF 
THOSE  WHO  BIND  UNDER  OBLIGATIONS,  AND  THOSE  WHO  ARE 
BOUND UNDER OBLIGATIONS. 
1.  2. 
The juridical Relation of  Man  The juridical Relation of  Mai 
to Beings who hve  neither Right  to Beings who have both  Rights 
nor Duty.  and Duties. 
V~car.-There  is no such Re-  ADEST.-There  is such a Rela- 
lation.  For  such  Reings  are  tion.  For it  is the Relation  of 
irrational,  and they  neither put  Men to Men. 
us under Obligation, nor can we 
be put iinder Obligation by them. 
3.  4. 
The juridical Relation of  Man  The juridical Relation of  Man 
to Beings who  have only Duties  to a  Being who has only Rights 
and no Rights.  and no Duties-(GoD). 
VAc~~.-There is no such Re-  VACAT.-There  is no such Re- 
lation.  For such Beings would  lation in merePhilosophy,  because 
be Men without juridical Person-  such a Being is not  an object of 
ality, as Slaves or Bondsmen.  possible experience. 
A real  relation  between Right  and  Duty is therefore 
found, in this  scheme, only in No.  2.  The  reason  why 
such is not likewise  found  in No.  4 is, because it would 
constitute  a t~anscendent  Duty, that is, one  to which  no 
corresponding subject can be given that is  external  and 
capable of  irnposing Obligation.  Consequently the Rela- 
tion  from  the  theoretical point of  view  is here  merely 
ideal; that is, it  is a  Relation  to  an object  of  thought 
which we  form for oiirselves.  But the conception of  this 
object is  not  entirely  empty.  On  the contrary, it is  a 
fruitful  conception  in  relation  to  oiirselves  and  the 
maxirns of  our  inner  morality, and therefore in relation 
to practice generally.  And it is in this bearing, that all 
the Duty involved and practicable for us in such a merely 
ideal relation lies. 
111. 
DIVISION  OF  THE METAPHYSIC  OB MORALS. 
AS A  SYSTEM  OI(< DUTIES  QENERALLY. 
Accordinq to the cmtituent Prineiples und the Method of  the  System. 
I. private Ri ht. 
I. PRIXCELES, { I'  RIQHT,  {II. Public ILigft. 
11. DUTIES  OF  VIRTUE.  ETC.-And  so  on.  in- 
cliiding ail  that  refers not 'only 
to the Materials, but also to the 
Architectonic Form of  a scientific 
System of  Morals, when the Meta- 
physical investigation of  the ele- 
ments has  completely traced out 
the Universal  Principles  consti- 
tuting the whole.  - 
11 METHOD,  . { I.  DIDACTICS. 
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IV. 
GENE~UL  PRELIMINARY  CONCEPTIONS  DEFINED AND 
EXPLAINED. 
(Philosophia practica universslis.) 
Freedom.-Tlie  conception of  FKEEDOM  is a coiieeption 
of  pure  Eeason.  It js  therefore  tramcendent  in  so far 
i~s  regards  Theoretical Philosophy ; for it is a conception 
for whicli  no corresponding instance  or  example  caii  be 
found  or  supplied in  any possible  experience.  Accord- 
ingly  Freedoni  is  not  presented  as  an  object  of  any 
theoretical  knowledge that  is  possible  for  us.  It is in 
no  respect  a  constitutive,  but  only  a  regulative  con- 
ception;  and  it  can  be  accepted  by  the  Speculative 
Reason  as at most a  merely negative  Principle.  In  the 
practical  sphere  of  Reason,  however,  the  reality  of 
Freedom  may  be  demonstrated  by  certain  Practical 
Principles  which,  as  Laws,  prove  a  causality  of  the 
Pure Reason  in the process of  determining  the  activity 
of  the Will,  that is  independent  of  all empirical  and 
sensible conditions.  And  thus there  is  established the 
fact of  a pure Will existing  in us  as  the  source of  all 
moral conceptions and laws. 
Moral  Laws  and  Categorical  Imperatives.-  On  this 
positive conception of  Freedoni in  the practical  relation 
certain  unconditional  practical  Laws  are  founded, and 
they specially constitute  MORAL  LAWS.  In rdation to 
11s as human beings, with an activity of Will modified by 
sensible  influences  so  as  not  to be  conforinable  to  the 
pure Will, but as often contrary to it, these Laws appear 
as  IMPERATIVES  comnianding  or  prohibiting  certain 
actions; and as such  they are  CATEGORICAL  or  UNCON- 
DITIONAL  IMPERATIVES.  Their  categorical  and  uncon- 
ditional character  distinguishes tliem from  the 'Technical 
Imperatives  which  express  the prescriptions of  Art, and 
which  always  command  only conditionally.  Accordi~ig 
to  these  Categorical  Imperatives,  certain  actions  are 
allowed  or  disallowed  as  being  morally possible  or  iin- 
possible ; and  certain  of  them  or  their  opposites  are 
morally  necessary  and  obligatory.  ~ence,  in  reference 
to  sucli  actions, tliere  arises  the  conception  of  a  Duty 
whose observance or transgression is  accompanied with a 
Pleasure  or  Pain  of  a  peculiar  kind, known  as  Moral 
Feeling.  We do not, however, take the Moral Feelings or 
Sentiments  into  account,  in  considering  the  practical 
Laws of  Reason.  For  they do not form  the foundation 
or principle of  practical Laws of  Reason, but only the sub- 
jective Efects that  arise in  the mind on  the  occasion of 
our voluntary activity  being  deterrnined by these  Laws. 
And while they neither add to nor take  from the objec- 
tive validity or influence of  the moral Laws in the judg- 
ment  of  Reason, such Sentiments may vary according to 
the differences of  the individuals who experience them. 
The  following  Conceptions are  common  to  Jurisprudence 
and Ethics  as  the  two main Divisions of  the Meta- 
physic of Morals. 
Ob~igation.-O~~1~~~10~  is  the  Necessity  of  a  free 
Action when viewed in relation to a Categorical  Impera- 
tive of  Reason. 
An IMPERATIVE  is a practical  Rule  by which  ail 
Action, otherwise contingent in itself, is made neces- 
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that  such  a  Law,  while  likewise  representing  the 
Action  as necessary, does not consider whether it is 
internully necessary as involved in the nature of  the 
Agent-say  as a holy Being-or  is co~itingent  to him, 
as in the case of  Man as we find him ;  for, where the 
first condition holds good, tltere is in fact no  Impera- 
tive.  Hence  an Imperative is a Rule which not only 
represents but makes  a  siibjectively contingent action 
necessary ;  and it, accordinglj-, represents the Subject 
as being  (morally) necessitated  to  act in  accordance 
with  this  Eule. -  A  Categorical  or  Unconditional 
Imperative is one which does not represent the action 
in any way rnediately through  the  conception  of  an 
E&  that is to be attained  by it; but  it presents  the 
action  to the rnind  as  objectively  necessary  by the 
mere represeiltation of its form as an action, and thus 
makes it iiecessary.  Such Imperatives cannot be put 
forward by any other practical Science than that which 
prescribes Obligations, and it is only the Science of 
Morals  that does this.  All other  Imperatives  are 
technical,  and they  are altogether  conditional.  The 
around of  the possibility of  Categorical Imperatives, 
fies in the fact that they refer to no  determination of 
the activity of  the Will by wlzich a purpose might be 
assigned to it, but solely to its FREEDOM. 
The  Allowab1e.-Every  Action  is  ALLOWED  (licitunt) 
which is not  contrary to  Obligation ; and  this  Freedom 
not being limited  by an opposing Imperative, constitutes 
a Moral Right as a warrant  or  title of  action  (facz~ltas 
moralis).  From this it  is  at once  evident what  actions 
are DISALLOWED or illicit (illicita). 
Duty.-Duty  is  the designation  of  any  Actioii  to 
which  any one is  bound  by an  obligation.  It  is there- 
fore  the  subject - matter  of  all  Obligation.  Duty  as 
regards the Action  concerned, may be one and the same, 
and yet we may be bound to it in various ways. 
The Categorical Imperative, as expressing an Obli- 
gation  in  respect  to  certain  actions,  is a  morally 
practical Law.  But because  Obligation  involves  not 
merely practical Necessity expressed in a Law as such, 
but also actual Necessitatiogt, the Categorical Irnpera- 
tive  is a  Law  either  of  Command  or  Prohibition, 
according as the doing  or not  doing  of  an action is 
represented as a Duty.  An Action which  is neither 
conimanded nor  forbidden, is merely aZlou7ed,  because 
there is no Law restricting Freedoin, nor any Duty in 
respect of  it.  Such an Action  is said  to be morally 
indifeq-ent (indifere?zs, adiuphoron, res merm famltatis). 
It  may be asked whether there are such morally in- 
different actions ;  and if there are, whether in addition 
to the preceptive and prohibitive Law (lex prceceptiva 
et  prohibitiva,  lex  mandati  et  vetiti),  there is  also 
required  a  Permissive Law (lex permissiva), in order 
that one may be  free in such  relations  to act, or to 
forbear from  acting, at his  pleasure?  If  it were so, 
the moral  Right in question would not, in all cases, 
refer  to  actions  that are  indifferent  in  themselves 
(adiaphora) ;  for no special Law would be required to 
establish such a Right, considered according to Moral 
Laws. 
Act ;  Agent.-An  Action is called  an ACT-or  moral 
Deed-in  so far as it is subject  to  Laws  of  Obligation, 
and consequently in so far as the Subject of  it is regarded 
with  reference  to  the  Freedom  of  his  choice  in  the 
exercise of his Will.  The  AGENT-as  the actor or doer 
of  the deed-is  regarded as, through  the act, the Author 
of  its effect ; and this effect, along with the action  itself, 
niay  be  imputed  to him, if he previously knew the Law, 
in virtue of  which an Obligation rested upon him. 
Person; Imputation.-A  PERSON  is  a  Subject who  is 
capable of  having  his  actions  imputed  to  him.  Moral 
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rational Being  under  Moral  Laws ; and it is  to  be  dis- 
tiiiguished  from  psychological  Freedom  as  the  mere 
faculty by which  we  become  conscious  of  ourselves  iii 
different states of  the  Identity of  our existence.  Hence 
it follows that a Person  is  properly subject  to  no  other 
Laws than those  he  lays down  for  hiinself, either  alone 
or 'in conjunction with others. 
Thing.-A  THING  is  what  is incapable  of  being  the 
subject of  Imputation.  Every object of  the free activity 
of  the Will,  which  is  itself  void  of  freedom,  is  there- 
fore called a Thing (res corpo?.eal&). 
Right  and  Wrong.-R1G~r~  or  WRONG  applies, as  a 
general quality, to an Act  (rectum aut  minus  rectzbm), in 
so  far  as  it is  in accordance with  Duty or  contrary to 
Duty (factum licitum azit  illicztum), no matter what may 
be the subject or origin of  the Duty itself.  An act that 
is contrary to Duty is called a Transgression (reatzis). 
Fault ;  Crime.-An  unintentional  Transgression  of  a 
Duty, which  is, nevertheless, imputable  to  a  Person,  is 
called a mere FAVLT  (czilpa).  An intentional Transgres- 
sion-that  is, an act accompanied with the consciousness 
that it Zs  a Transgression-constitutes  a CRIME  (dolzcs). 
Just and  Unjust.-Whatever  is juridically in accord- 
ance  with  External  Laws,  is  said  to  be  JUST  (AIS, 
&turn) ;  and  whatever  is  not  juridically  in accordaiice 
with external Laws, is UNJUST  (unjwtzcm). 
Collision of  Duties.-A  COLTJSION  OF  DUTIES  OR  OBLI- 
GATIOWS (collisio o$ciort~rn s.  obligationum) would  be  the 
result  OE  such  a  relation  between  them  that  the  one 
would  annul  the  other,  in whole or in part.  Duty and 
Obligation, however,  are concepeions which  express  the 
objective  practical  ATccess.ity of  certain  actions, and two 
opposite  Rules  cannot  be  objective  and  necessary  at 
the  Same  time; for  if it is  a  Duty to act according  to 
one  of  them,  it  is  not  only  no  Duty to  act  according 
to an opposite Rule, but to do so would even be contrary 
to Duty.  Hence  a  Collision  of  Duties and  Obligations 
is  entirely  inconceivable  (obligatiom non  colliduntur). 
There  may,  however,  be  two  grounds  of  Obligation 
(rationes obligandi), connected with  an individual under 
a  Rule  prescribed  for  himself, and yet  neither the one 
nor  the  other  may  be  sufficient  to  constitute an actual 
Obligation (rationes obligandi non obligantes) ; and in that 
case  the  one  of  them  is  not  a  Duty.  If two  such 
grounds  of  Obligation are actually in collision with each 
other, Practical Philosophy does not say that the stronger 
Obligation  is to  keep  the  upper  hand  (fortio~m  obligatio 
vhzcit), but that the stronger ground  of  Obligation  is  to 
maintain its place (fortior obligandi ratio vincit). 
Natural  and  Positive  Laws.-Obligatory  Laws  for 
which  an  external  Legislation  is  possible,  are  called 
generally  Elcternal  Laws.  Those  External  Laws,  the 
obligatoriness of  which  can  be  recognised  by  Reason 
d priori  even withont  an  external Legislation, are called 
~TURA~  LAWS.  Those  Laws,  again,  which  are  not 
obligatory without actual External Legislation, are cailed 
POSITIVE  LAWS.  An  External  Legislation,  containing 
pure  Natural  Laws,  is therefore  conceivable ; but  in 
that case a  previous  Natural Law must  be  presupposed 
to establish the authority of  the  Lawgiver  by the Right 
to subject others to  Obligation  through  his  own  act  of 
Will. 
Maxims.-The  Principle which  makes a certain action 
a Duty, is a Practical Law.  The  Rule of  the Agent  or 
Actor, which he forrns as  a Principle for himself  on sub- 
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the  Law  is  one  and  invariable,  the  Maxims  of  tlie 
Agent may yet be very different. 
The  CategoricaI  Imperative.-The  Categorical Impera- 
tive only expresses generally what constitutes Obligatioii. 
It  may  be  rendered  by  the  following  Formula:  'Act 
according to a Maxim which can be adopted at the Same 
time  as a  Universal  Law.'  Actions must  therefore  be 
considered, in the first place, according to their subjective 
Principle;  but  whether  this  principle  is  also  valid 
objectively, can  only  be  known  by the criterion  of  the 
Categorical Imperative.  For Reason brings the principle 
or  maxim  of  any action to the test, by calling upon the 
Agent to think of  himself in connection with it as at the 
Same time laying down a Universal Law, and to consider 
whether his action is so qualified as to be fit for enteririg 
into such a Universal Legislation. 
The  simplicity  of  this  Law,  in  comparison  with  the 
great  and manifold  Consequences which  may be  drawri 
, from  it,  as  well  as  its  commanding  authority  and 
supremacy  without  the  accompaniment  of  any  visible 
motive  or  sanction,  must  certainly at  first  appear very 
surprising.  And we  may well wonder  at the  power  of 
our  Reason to determine the activity of  the Will by tlie 
mere  idea  of  the  qualification  of  a  Maxim  for  the 
univarsality  of  a practical  Law,  especially when we are 
taught thereby that this practical Moral Law first reveals 
a  property  of  the  Will which  the  Speculative  Reason 
would never have come upon either by Principles h priol-i, 
or  from  any  experience  whatever;  and  even  if  it  had 
ascertained  the  fact,  it  could  ilever  have  theoretically 
established its possibility.  This  practical Law, however, 
not only discovers the fact  of  that property of  the Will, 
which is FRJZEDOM,  but irrefutably establishes  it.  Heilce 
it will be  less  surprising to  find  that  the  Moral  Lnws 
are  undemonstrabb,  and  yet  apodictic,  like  the  mathe- 
matical  Postulates;  and  that  they,  at the  Same  time, 
Open  up before us a whole  field  of  practical  knowledge, 
from  which  Reason,  on  its  theoretical  side,  must  find 
itself  entirely excluded with its speculative idea of  Free- 
dom and all such ideas of  the Supersensible generally. 
The  conformity  of  an  Action  to  the  Law  of  Duty 
constitutes its Legality;  the conformity of  the Maxirn of 
the Action  with  the Law  constitutes  its Momlity.  A 
Mmim is  thus  a  subjective  Principle  of  Action,  whicli 
the  individual  makes  a  Rule  for himself  as to how iii 
fact he will act. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Principle  of  Duty  is what 
Reason absolutely, and  therefore  objectively and univer- 
sally,  lays  down  in  the  form  of  a  Command  to  the 
individual, as to how he ought to act. 
The  SUPREME  PRINCIPLE  of  the  Science  of  Morals 
accordingly is this: '  Act according  to  a  Maxim  which 
can  likewise  be  valid  as  a  Universal  Law.' -  Every 
Maxim which is not qualified according to this condition, 
is contrary to Morality. 
Laws  arise  from  the  Will,  viewed  generally  as 
Practical Reason ;  Maxims  spring. from  the activity 
of  the Will in the process of  Clioice.  The latter in 
Man, is what  constitutes  free-will.  The Will which 
refers to nothing else than mere Law, can neither  be 
called  free nor not free ;  because it does not relate to 
actions immediately, but to the giving of  a Law for the 
Maxim of  actions; it is therefore the Practical Reason 
itself.  Hence as a Faculty, it is absolutely necessary 
in itself, and is not  sabject to any external necessita- 
tion.  It is, therefore, only the act  of  Choice  in the 
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The Freedom of  the act of  Will, however, is not  to 
be defined as a Liberty of  Indifference (libertas indifer- 
ewtim), that is, as a  capacity of  choosing to act for or 
against the Lnw.  The voluntary process, indeed, viewed 
as a phenomenal appeararice, gives rnany examples of 
this choosing in experience ;  and some have accordingly 
so defined  the free-will.  For  Freedom, as it is first 
made knowable by the Moral Law, is known only as 
a negative Property in us, as constituted by the fact of 
not  being  necessitated to act by sensible principles  of 
determination.  Regarded as a no~~menal  reality, how- 
ever, in reference to Man  as a pure  rational Intelli- 
gence, the act of  the Will cannot be at all theoretimlly 
exhibited;  nor can it therefore be exylained how this 
power can act necessitatingly in relation to the sensible 
activity in the process  of  Choice, or  consequently in 
what the positive quality of  Freedom consists.  Only 
thus much  we  can  See  into  and  comprehend,  that 
although  Man, as  a Being  bclonging  to  the  world of 
Sense,  exhibits-as  experience shows-a  capacity of 
choosing  not  only eonformably  to the Law  but also 
contraqy to it, his Freedom as a rational Being belong- 
ing to  the  world  of  Intelligence cannot be defined  by 
reference merely to sensible appearances.  For sensible 
phenomeria cannot make a supersensible object-such 
as free-will is-intelligible  ;  nor can Freedom ever be 
placed  in the mere fact that the rational Subject  can 
make  a  choice  in conflict  with his  own  Lawgivirig 
Reason,  although  experience  may  prove  that  it 
happens  often enough, notwithstanding our inability 
to conceive  how it is possible.  For  it is one thing 
to admit  a  proposition  as based  on  experience, and 
another  thing  to make it the dejwing Principle and 
the universal  differentiating mark of  the act  of  free- 
will, in its distinction from the arbitriuvt  butzcm  s. 
servum;  because the  empirical  proposition  does not 
assert  that  any  particular  characteristic  necessarily 
belongs  to  the  conception  in  question,  but  this is 
requisite in  the process  of  Definition.-Freedom  in 
relation  to  the internal  Legislation  of  Reascn,  C~IL 
alone  be  properly called a Power ;  the possibi1it.y o2 
diverging from  the Law thus giveri, is an incapacity 
or  want  of  Power.  How  then can  the  former  be 
defined by the latter ?  It  could only be by a Defini- 
tion which would  add to the practical  conception of 
the free-  will,  its  mereise  as shown  by  experience ; 
but this would  be  a hybrid  Dejnitwn which would 
exhibit tlie conception in a false light. 
Law;  Legis1ator.-A  morally practical  LAW  is  a  pro- 
position  which  contains  a  Categorical  Imperative  or 
Command.  He who  commands  by  a  Law  (impernns) 
is the Lawgiver  or  LEGISLATOR.  He  is  the Author  of 
the  Obligation  t.hat acconipanies the Law, but he is  not 
always the Author of  the Law itself.  In the latter case, 
the Law  would  be  positive,  contingent,  and  arbitrary. 
The  Law which is iinposed upon us d priori and  uncon- 
ditionally by our  own Reasoii, may also  be  expressed  as 
proceeding  from the Will of  a Supreme Lawgiver or  the 
Divine  Will.  Such  a  Will  as  Supreme  can  conse- 
quently have only Rights  and  not  Duties ;  and  it  only 
indicates  the idea  of  a  moral  Eeing whose Will is Law 
for all, without conceiving of  Him as the Author  of  that 
Will. 
Imputation ;  Judgment ;  Judge.-IMPUTATION, in  the 
moral  sense,  is  the  Judgment  by  which  any  one  is 
declared  to  be  the Author  or  free  Cause  of  an  action 
which  is  then regarded as his moral fact or deed, and  is 
subjected  to  Law.  When  the  Judgment  likewise  lays 
down the juridical consequences of  the Deed, it is judicial 
or  valid  (imputatio judiciar;a  s.  validu) ; otherwise  it 
would  be  only  adjudicative  or  declaratory  (imputatio 
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who is iiivested with the Right to impute actions judicially, 
is called a JUDGE  or a Court (judex s. forunz). 
Merit and Demerit.-When  any one does, in conformity 
with Duty, more  than he can be compelled  to  do  by the 
Law, it  is  said  to  be  meritorious (meriturn).  What is 
done  only in exact conforrnity with  the Law, is what  is 
tlzse  (dehitum).  And  when  less  is  done  than  can  be 
clemanded  to be  done  by  the  Law,  the  result  is moral 
Demerit  (demerikm) or Culpability. 
Punishment ;  Reward.-The  jzcrz'dical  Effect  or  Con- 
sequence  of  a  culpable  act  of  Demerit  is PUNISHMENT 
(poena)  ;  that of  a meritorious act is REWARD  (prmitsm), 
assuming that this Reward was promised in the Law and 
that  it formed  the motive of  the  action.  The  coinci- 
dence  or exact conformity of  conduct to what is due, has 
no  jiiridical  effect.-Benevolent  REMUNERATION  (remune- 
ratio  s.  repensio  benefia) has no place  in juridical  Rela- 
tions. 
The  good  or  bad  Consequences arising  from  the 
performance of  an obligated action-as  aIso the Con- 
sequences arising from failing to perform  a  meritori- 
ous action-cannot  be imputed  to the Agent (modus 
imputationis tollem). 
The  good Consequences of  a meritorious action-as 
also the bad Consequences of  a wrongful action-may 
be imputed to the Agent (modus Zmputationis poneus). 
The degree of  the Imputability of  Actions is to be 
reckoned  accordiiig  to  the  magnitude  of  the hin- 
drances or  obstacles which it has been  necessary for 
them  to  overcome.  The  greater  the  natural  hin- 
drances in the sphere of  sense, and the less the moral 
hindrance of  Duty, so  much the more is a good DeecZ 
imputed  as  rneritorious.  This may be  Seen  by con- 
sidering stich examples as resciiing a man who  is an 
entire stranger from great distress, and at very consider- 
able  sacrifice.-Conversely,  'the less the  natural hin- 
drance, and the greater the hindrance on the ground of 
Duty, so much the more is a Transgression imputable 
as  cu1pable.-Hence  the state of  mind  of  the Agent 
or  Doer of  a deed makes a difference in imputing its 
consequences,  accorcling  as he  did  it in passion  or 
performed it with coolness and deliberation. INTRODUCTION 
T0 
THE  SCIENCE  OF  RIGHT. INTRODUCTION  T0 THE  SCIENCE 
OF  RIGHT. 
0- 
GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  AND  DIVISIONS. 
A. 
What the Science of Right is. 
TIIE SCIENCE  OB  RIGHT  has for its object the Principles 
of  all the  Laws which it  is  possible  to  promulgate by 
external  legislation.  Where there is such  a  legislation, 
it becomes in actual application to it, a system of  positive 
Right and Law ;  and he who is versed in the  knowledge 
,  of  this  System is  called a  Jurist or Jurisc~nsult  (juris- 
colzsultz~s).  A  practical  Jurisconsult  (jurhpel.itus), or  a 
professional Lawyer, is one who is  skilled in  the  know- 
ledge of  positive external Laws, and who can  apply them 
to  cases that  may occur  in  experience.  Such  practical 
knowledge of  positive Right, and Law, may be regarded as 
belonging to Jurisprudence (Jurhprmdentia) in the original 
sense of  the term.  But the theoretical knowledge of  Right 
and Law in Principle, as distinguished from positive Laws 
and empirical cases, belongs to the pure SCIENCE  OF  RIGHT 
(Jurisscientia).  The Science of  Right thus designates the 
philosophical and systematic  knowledge of  the Principles 
of  Natural Plight.  And it is from  this Science  that the INTRODUCTION  T0  THE  SCIENCE OF  RIGHT.  4  5 
irnmutable  Principles of  all positive Legislation lllust be 
nivers.  derived by practical Jurists and Law,' 
B. 
What is Right ? 
This question may be said to be about as embarrassing 
to  the  Jurist  as  the well-known  question,  '  What  is 
Truth ? ' is to the Logician.  It is all the  morc so, if, on 
reflection, he strives to avoid  tautology in his  reply, and 
recognise  the  fact  that  a  reference  to what  holds  true 
merely of  the laws of  some  one  country at a particular 
time,  is  not  a  solution  of  the  general  problem  thus 
proposed.  It  is  quite  easy to  state what  may be  right 
in particular  cases  (pug sit  juris),  as  being  what  the 
laws of  a certain place and of a certain  time say or may 
have  said;  but  it is much more  difficult  to  determine 
whether what they have enacted is right in itself, and to 
lay  down  a  universal  Criterion  by  whicli  Right  and 
Wrong  in general, and what is just  and unjust, may  Be 
recognised.  All  this  may remain  entirely  hidden  even 
from the practical  Jurist until he  abandon his empirical 
principles for  a  time, and  search in the pure  Reason for 
the  sources  of  such  judgments, in  order  to  lay a  real 
foundation for actual positive Legislation.  In this search 
his  empirical  Laws  may,  indeed,  furnish  him  with 
excellent  guidance; but a  merely empirical system  that 
is void of  rational  principles is, like the wooden  head in 
the fable  of  Phedrus, fine  enough  in  appearance, bnt 
mfortunately it wants brain. 
1. The  conception of  RIGHT,-as  referring to a corre- 
sponding Obligation which is the moral aspect of  it,-iii 
thefirst place, has regard only to the external and practical 
relation of  one  Person  to  another, in so far  as  they can 
have influence upon each other, immediately or mediately, 
by their  Aetior~s  as  facts.  2.  In the  second  place,  the 
conception of  Right does not indicate the relation of  the 
action of  an  individual  to  the  wish or the  mere  desire 
of  another, as in acts of  benevolence or of  unkindness, but 
only the  relation  of  his  free  action  to  the  freedom  of 
action  of  the other.  3.  And, in the third place, in this 
reciprocal relation of  voluntary actions, the conception of 
Right does not take  into  consideration the matter of  the 
act of  Will in so far as the end which any one may have 
in view in willing it, is concerned.  In other words, it is 
not  asked  iii  a  question of  Right  whether  any one  on 
buying goods for  his  own  business  realizes  a  profit  by 
the transaction or not; but  only the form  of  the  trans- 
action is taken  into  account, in considering the relation 
of  the mutual acts of  Will.  Acts  of  Will  or voluntary 
Choice are thus regarded only in so far as  they are fiee, 
and as to whether the action of  one  can  harmonize with 
the Freedom of  another, according to a universal Law. 
RIGHT,  therefore,  comprehends  the whole  of  the  con- 
'ditions  iinder which  the  voluntary  actions  of  any  one 
Person can  be  harmonized  in  reality with the voluntary 
actions of  every other  Person, according  to  a  universal 
Law of  Freedom. 
Universal Principle of Right. 
'  Every Action is right which in itself, or in the maxim 
on which it proceeds, is such  that  it can  CO-exist  along 
with the Freedom of  the Will  of  each and all in action, 
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If,  then,  my  action  or  my  condition  generally  can 
CO-exist  with the freedom  of  every other, according  to  a 
universal Law, any one does me a wrong who hinders me 
in the performance of  this action, or in the maintenance 
of  this condition.  For such  a  hindrance  or  obstructioii 
cannot  CO-exist with  Freedom  according  to  universal 
Laws. 
It  follows also that it cannot be demanded as a matter 
of  Right, that this universal Principle of  all maxims shall 
itself be adopted as my maxim, that is, that I shall make 
it the maxim of  my actions.  For  any one  rnay be  free, 
although his Freedom is entirely indifferent to me, or even 
if I wished in my heart to infringe it, so long as I do not 
actually  violate  that  freedom  by  my  external  action. 
Ethics,  however,  as  distinguished  from  Jurisprudence, 
imposes upon me  the obligation  to  make  the  fulfilment 
of Right a mm'm of  my conduct. 
The  universal  Law of  Right  rnay then  be  expressed, 
thus: '  Act externally  in such  a  manner  that  the  free 
exercise of  thy Will rnay be  able  to  CO-exist  with  the 
Freedom  of  all others,  according  to  a  universal  Law.' 
This  is  undoubtedly  a  Law  which  imposes  obligation 
upon  me;  but  it  does  not  at all imply  and  still  less 
command that I ought, merely on account  of  this obliga- 
tion,  to  limit  my  freedom  to  these  very  conditions. 
Reason in this connection says  only that  it is restricted 
thus far by its Idea, and rnay be likewise thus limited in 
fact  by  others; and  it lays  this  down  as  a  Postulate 
which is not capable of  further proof.  As  the  object  in 
view is not to teach Virtue, but to explain what Right is, 
thus far the  Law of  Right, as  thus  laid  down, rnay not 
and should  not  be  represented as  a  motive-principle  of 
action. 
D. 
Right is conjoined with the Title or  Authority to compel. 
The resistance which  is  opposed  to  any hindrance  of 
an effect, is in reality a furtlierance  of  this effect, and is 
in accordance with its accomplishment.  Now, everything 
that is wrong  is  a  hindrance  of  freedom, according  to 
universal  Laws ; and  Compulsion  or  Constraint of  any 
kind is a hindrailce or resistance made to Freedom.  Con- 
sequently,  if  a  certaiii exercise of  Freedom  is  itself  a 
hindrance of  tlle Freedom that is according  to  universal 
Laws,  it is  wrong ; and  the  coinpulsion  or  coilstraint 
which is opposed to it is right, as  being a hindering of  U 
hin&rance  of  Frecdom, arid  as  being  in  accord with  the 
Freedom which exists in accordance with universal Laws. 
Hence, according to the logical pririciple of  Contradiction, 
all Right is accompanied with an implied Title or Warrant 
to bring compiilsion to bear on  any one who  rnay violate 
it in fact. 
E. 
Strict Right  rnay  be  also  represented as the possibility oF 
a  universal  reciprocal  Compulsion  in  harmony with 
the Freedom of  all according to universal Laws. 
This proposition means that Right.  is not to be regarded 
as cbnlposed of  two different elements-Obligation  accord- 
ing  to  a  Law, and  a  Title  on  the part of  one who has 
bound  another  by liis own free choice, to compel  him to 
perform.  But  it  imports  that  the  conception of  Right 
rnay be  viewed  as  consisting  immediately in  the  possi- 
bility of  a  universal  reciprocal Compulsion, iii  Iiarmony 
with the Freedom of  all.  As Right in general lias for its object  only what is  external  in actions, Strict Right, as 
that with which nothing  ethical is intermingled, requires 
ilo other motives  of  action  than  those  that are  merely 
external ;  for it is then pure  Right, and is unmixed with 
any prescriptions of  Virtue.  A strict Right, then, in the 
exact sense of  the term, is that which alone can be called 
wholly external.  Now such  Right is founded, no doubt, 
upon  the consciousness of  the Obligation of  every indi- 
vidual  according  to the Law ;  but if  it is to be  pure  as 
such, it neither  may nor  should  refer  to  this  conscious- 
ness as a motive  by which to determine  the free  act  of 
the Will.  For this purpose, however, it founds upon the 
principle  of  the  possibility  of  an  external  Compulsion, 
such  as  may  co-exist  with  the  freedom  of  every  one 
according to universal Laws.  Accordingly, then, where it 
is  said  that  a  Creditor  has  a  right  to  demand  from a 
Debtor  the  payment  of  his  debt,  this  does  not  mean 
merely that he can bring  him  to  feel  in his  mind  that 
Reason obliges him to do this ;  but it means  that he can 
apply an external compulsion to force any such one so to 
pay,  and that this  compulsion  is quite consistent  with 
the Freedom  of  all,  including  the  parties  in question, 
according to a  universal Law.  Right  and the  Title  to 
compel, thus indicate the Same thing. 
The Law  of  Right, as  thus  enunciated,  is repre- 
sented  as  a  reciprocal  Conipulsion  necessarily  in 
accordance with the Freedom of  every one, under the 
principle  of  a universal  Freedom.  It is thus,  as it 
were, a representative  Const?.uction of  the conception 
of  Right, by exhibiting it in a pure intuit,ive percep- 
tion  d priori,  after  the  analogy  of  the  possibility 
of the free motions of  bodies under  the physical Law 
of  the  Equality of  Action und Reaction.  Now,  as in 
pure Slat.hematics,  we cannot deduce the properties of 
its objects immediately from a mere abstract concep- 
tion, but can only discover thein by  figurative con- 
struction  or  representation  of  its conceptions; so  it 
is in like manner with the Principle  of  Right.  It is 
not so much  the  mere  formal  Conceptwn of  Right, 
but  rather  that  of  a  universal and equal reciprocal 
Compulsion  as  harmonizing  with  it,  and  reduced 
under general laws, that makes representation of  that 
conception possible.  But just  as those conceptions 
presented *in  Dynamics are founded upon  a merely 
formal representation of pure Mathematics as presented 
in Geometry, Reason has taken  care also to provide 
the Understanding as far  as  possible with  intuitive 
presentations d priori in beboof of  a Construction of 
the conception of  Right.  The Right  in geometrical 
lines (rectum) is opposed as  the Straight to that which 
is Ciirved, and to that which is Oblique.  In the first 
opposition there is involved an inner  quality of  the 
lines of  such  a  nature that there is only one straight 
or  right Line possible between two  given points.  In 
the second case,  again, the positions  of  fwo intersect- 
ing or meeting Lines  are of  such a nature that there 
can likewise be only one line called the Perpendicular, 
which is not more inclined to the one  side than the 
other,  and it divides space  on  either side into two 
equal parts.  After the manner of  this analogy, the 
Science of  Right aims at determining what every one 
shall have  as his own with  mathematical exactness ; 
but this is not to be expected in the ethical Science of 
Virtue, as it cannot but allow a certain  latitude  for 
exceptions.  But without passing into the sphere of 
Ethics, there are two cases-known  as the equivocal 
Right of  Equity and Necessity-which  claim  a juri- 
dical decision, yet for which no  one can be  found to 
give  such  a  decision, and  which,  as  regards  their 
relation  to Rights, belong, as it were, to the 'lnte9~- 
mundia'  of  Epicurus.  These we  must at the outset 
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The  Dictum  of  Equity  may  be  put  thus : 'The 
strictest  Right  is  the  greatest  Wrong ' (szb?nmz~n~  jus 
summa  injzwiu).  But  this  evil  cannot  be  obviated  by 
the forms  of  Bight  although  it relates  to a  matter  of 
Right ;  for  the  grievance that it gives  rise  to  can  only 
be  put  before  a '  Court  of  Conscience '  (forzm poli), 
nhereas every question  of  Right  must  be  taken  before 
a CIVIL COURT  (forum soli). 
11.  THE RIGHT  OB NECESSITY. 
The  so-called  Riglit  of  Necessity (Jus necessitatk) is 
the  supposed  Right  or  Title, in  case of  the  danger  of 
losing  my  own  life,  to  take  away the life  of  another 
who  has, in  fact, done me no  harm.  It is evident that, 
viewed  as  a  doctrine  of  Right, this must involve a con- 
tradiction.  For  %bis  is  not  the  case  of  a  wrongful 
aggressor  making  an  unjust  assault  upon  niy  life,  and 
whom  I  anticipate  by depriving  him  of  his  own  (jus 
imzhlpatm tutelm) ;  nor consequently is it a question merely 
of  the recommendation of  moderation which belongs  to 
Ethics  as  the Doctrine of  Virtue, and  not  to  Jurispru- 
dence as the Doctrine of  Right.  It is  a question of  the 
allowableness of  using violence against  one who has used 
none against me. 
It is  clear  that the  assertion of  such  a  Riglit  is not 
to  be  understood objectively as being in accordance with 
what;  a  Law would prescribe, bnt merely subjectively, as 
proceeding  on  the  assumption of  how  a  sentence would 
be  yroiiounced  by  a  Court in the  case.  There  can, in 
fact, be  no  Crimminal  Jazu  assigniiig the penalty of  death 
to a man who, when shipwrecked and struggling in extreme 
danger  for  his  life, and  in order  to  save  it, may thrust 
another  from  a  plank  on which he had  saved  himself. 
For  the  punishment  tlireatened  by  the Lw  could  not 
possibly have  greater  power  than  the  fear  of  the loss 
of  life in the case in question.  Such a Penal Law would 
thus fail altogether to exercise its intended effect ;  for the 
threat of  an Evil which is still zcncertain-such  as Death 
by a judicial  sentence-could not overcome  the  fear  of 
an Evil which is  certain, as Drowning is in such circum- 
stances.  An act of  violent  self-preservation, then, ought 
not  to be  considered as altogether beyond  condemnation 
(inculpabde); it is  only to  be adjudged  as exempt  from 
punishmeiit (impunibile).  Yet this suZjective condition of 
impunity,  by  a  strange  corifusion  of  ideas,  has  been 
regarded by Jurists as equivalent to objective lawfulness. 
The Dictum of  the Right  of  Necessity is put in these 
terms,  '  Necessity  has  no  Law '  (Necessitas  non  hubet 
legem).  And  yet  there cannot be a necessity that  could 
rnake what is wrong lawful. 
It is apparent, then, that in judgments relating both to 
'  Equity ' and '  the Right of  Necessity,'  the Equivocations 
involved  arise  from an interchange of  the objective aiid 
subjective grounds  that enter into the application of  the 
Principles  of  Right, when viewed  respectively by Eeason 
or  by  a  Judicial  Tribunal.  What one  rnay  have  good 
grounds  for  recognising as Right in  itself, may not  find 
confirmation in  a  Court  of  Justice ;  and what  he must 
consider to be wrong in itself, may obtain recognition  in 
such  a  Court.  And the reason of  this is, that the con- 
ception of  Right is not taken in the two cases in one and 
the Same sense. KANT's  PHILOSOPHY  OF  LAW. 
DIVISION  OF THE SCIENCE  OF RIGHT. 
A. 
GENERAL  DIVISION  OB THE DUTIES  OB RIGHT. 
' 
(Juridical Duties.) 
In this  Division  we  rnay  very  conveniently  follow 
ULPIAN,  if  his  three  Formulze  are  taken  in a  general 
sense,  which  rnay  not  have  been  quite  clearly  in  his 
mind,  but which  they  are  capable  of  being  developed 
into or of  receiving.  They are the following :- 
1.  HONESTE  VIVE.  '  Live riglitly.'  Juridical Recti- 
tude,  or  Honour  (Honestas  juridica),  consists  in 
maintaining  one's  own worth  as  a  man  in relation 
to others.  This Duty rnay be  rendered by  the pro- 
position, '  Do not make thyself  a mere Means for the 
use of  others, but be to them likewise an End.'  This 
Duty will  be  explained in the next Forrnula as an 
Obligation arising  out  of  the Right  of  Hunlanity in 
our own Person (Lexjusti). 
2.  NEMINEM  ~DE.  'Do Wrong to no  one.'  This 
Formula  rnay  be  rendered so  as  to  mean,  'Do no 
Wrong to any one, even if thon shouldst be under the 
necessity, in  observing this Duty, to cease  from all 
connection  with  others  and  to  avoid  all  Society ' 
(Lex jzcridica). 
3.  SUUM  CUIQUE  TRIBUE.  'Assign  to  every  one 
what  is his own.'  This rnay be rendered, '  Enter, if 
Wrong cannot  be avoided, into a Society with others 
in which every one nlay have secured to  him what  is 
his own.'-If  this Formula were to  be  simply trans- 
lated, '  Give every one  iLis  om,'  it would  express an 
absurdity, for we cannot give any one what he already 
21as.  If  it is  to  have  a  definite meaning, it  must 
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therefore run thus, '  Enter into a state in which every 
one  can  have what is his own secured against  the 
action of  every other '  (Lex justiticz). 
These three classical Formulze, at the same time, repre- 
sent principles which suggest  a  Division of  the System 
of  Juridical Duties into Inte~nal  DutGs, Externul Duties, 
and  those  Connecting  Duties  which  contain  the  latter 
as  deduced  from  the  Principle  of  the  forrner  by  sub- 
siimption. 
B. 
I.  Natural Right and Positive Right. 
The System of  Rights, viewed as a scientific System of 
Doctrines, is divided  into  NATURAL  RIGHT  and POSITIVE 
RIGHT.  Natural  Right  rests  upon  pure  rational  Prin- 
ciples  h priori;  Positive  or  Statutory Right  is  what 
proceeds from the Will of  a Legislator. 
11.  Innate Right and Acquired Right. 
'  The Systeni of  Rights rnay again be regarded in refer- 
ence  to  the  implied  Powers  of  dealing  morally  with 
others as  bound  by Obligations,  that  is, as furnishing  a 
legal Title of  action  in relation to thern.  Thus viewed, 
the  System  is divided into INNATE  RIGHT  and ACQUIRED 
RIGHT.  Innate Right  is  tliat  Right  which  belongs  to 
every one  by  Nature,  independent  of  all juridical  acts 
of  experience.  ACQUIRED  RIGHT  is that  Right which  is 
founded upon such juridical acts. 
Innate Right rnay also  be  called  the '  Interna1 Mine 
and  Thine ' (Meum  vel  Tuum  internum) ; for  External 
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There is only one  Innate Right, the Birthright of  Freedom. 
FREEDOM  is  Independence of  the compulsory Will of 
another ;  and  in so far  as  it can CO-exist  with the Free- 
dom  of  all  according to  a  universal  Law, it is the  one 
sole  original,  inborn  Right  belonging  to  every man in 
virtue  of  his  Humanity.  There  is,  indeed,  an  innate 
EQUALITY  belonging  to  every man which consists in his 
Right  to  be  independent  of  being  bound  by others  to 
anything more  than  that to which  he rnay also recipro- 
cally bind them.  It is,'consequently, the inborn quality 
of  every man in virtue of  which he ought to be  his  om 
master by  Right  (sui juris).  There  is, also, the natural 
quality of  JUSTNESS  attributable to a man as naturally of 
unimpeachable Right (justi), because he has done no Wrong 
to  any  one  prior  to  his  own  juridical  actions.  And, 
further,  there  is  also  the  innate  Right  of  COMMON 
ACTION  On  the part of  every man so that he rnay do towards 
others what does not  infringe  their  Rights or take away 
nnything that  is  theirs unless they are willing to appro- 
priate  it ; such  as  merely  to  communicate  thought,  to 
narrate anything, or to promise  something whether truly 
and  honestly,  or  untruly  and  dishonestly (verilopuium 
aut falsilopz~ium),  for it  rests entirely upon these  others 
whether they will believe or trust in it or  not.'  But all 
these Rights or Titles  are  already included  in the Prin- 
z  It  is customary to designate every untruth that  is spoken intention- 
nlly as such,  although it rnay  be  in a  frivoloiis manner,  a '  Lie,'  or 
Falsehood (mendaciurn), beeause  it rnay  do  harm,  at least in  so  far as 
any one who  repeats it  in good faith rnay be  made a laughing-stock of  to 
others on account of  his easy credulity.  But in the juridical sense, only 
that Untruth is called a Lie which  immediately infringes the  Right of 
another, such as a false allegation of  a Contract having been concluded, 
when the allegation is put forward in order to deprive some  one  of  what 
ciple of  Innate FREEDOM,  and are not really distinguished 
from it, even as dividing members under a higher species 
of  Right. 
The reason why such  a  Division  into separate Rights 
has been  introduced  into  the  System  of  Natural  Right 
viewed as including all that is innate, was  not without a 
purpose.  Its  object  was  to  enable  proof  to  be  more 
readily  put  forward in  case  of  any controversy arising 
about an Acquired Right, and  questions emerging  either 
with reference  to  a  fact  that  might be  in doubt, or, if 
that were established, in reference to a  Right  under  dis- 
pute.  For  the  party repudiating  an  obligation, and  on 
whom  the  burden  of  proof  (onzcs  probandi)  might  be 
incumbent,  could  thus  methodically refer  to his Innate 
Right  of  Freedom as specified under various relations in 
detail,  and  could  therefore  found  upon them equally as 
different Titles of  Right. 
In the  relation  of  Innate Right, and consequently of 
the Interna1 '  Mine '  and '  Thine,'  there  is  therefore not 
Rights,  but  only  ONE  RIUHT.  And,  accordingly,  this 
highest  Division  of  Rights  into  Innate and  Acquired, 
' which  evidently  consists  of  two  members  extremely 
unequal  in  their  contents,  is  properly  placed  in the 
Introduction; 'and  the  subdivisions  of  the  Science  of 
Right rnay be  referred  in  detail  to  the  External  Mine 
and Thiiie. 
is his (falsiloquizcrn  dolosurn).  This distinction of  conceptions so closely 
allied is not without  foundation; because  on  the occasion  of  a simple 
statement of  one's thoughts, it is always free for another to take them as 
he rnay ;  and.  yet the resulting repute that such a one is a man whose word 
cannot be  trusted, Comes  so  close  to the opprobrium of  directly calling 
him a Liar,  that the boundary-line separating what in such a case belongs 
to Jurisprudence and wliat  is Special to Etliics, can  hardly be  otherwise 
drawn. KANT'S  PHILOSOPHY  OP LAW. 
The highest Division of  the  System of  Natural Right 
should not be-as  it is frequently put-intoCiVaturaZ  Right' 
and  'Social  Right,'  but  into NATURAL  RIGHT  and  CIVIL 
RIGHT.  The first constitutes PRIVATE  RIGHT  ;  the second, 
PUBLIC  RIGHT.  For it is not the '  Social state ' but the 
'  Civil state '  that is opposed  to  the '  State of  Nature ;  ' 
for in the '  State of  Nature ' there  may well be Society 
of  some  kind,  but  there  is  no  '  civil'  Society,  as  an 
Institution  securing the Mine and Thine by public laws. 
It  is thus that Right, viewed under reference to the state 
of  Nature, is specially called Private Right.  The whole 
of  the  Principles  of  Right  will  therefore  fall  to  be 
expounded under the two subdivisions of  PRIVATE  RIGHT 
and PUBL~C  RIGHT. 
THE SCIENCE OF  RIGHT. 
PART  FIRST. 
PRIVATE RIGHT. 
THE SYSTEM OF THOSE LAWS WHICH REQUIRE 
NO  EXTERNAL PROMULGATION. PRIVATE RIGHT. 
THE  PRINCIPLES OF THE EXTERNAL MINE AND 
THINE GENERALLY. 
CHAPTEE  FIRST. 
OF THE MODE  OF  HAVING  ANYTHING  EXTERNAL 
AS  ONE'S  OWN. 
1. 
The meaning of '  Mine '  in Right. 
(Meurn Juris.) 
ANYTHING  is  Mine ' by B$ht,  or is rightfully Mine, when 
'  I am so connected with it, that if any other Person shoulld 
make use  of  it without  my consent, he would  do  me  a 
lesion or injury.  The subjective condition of  the  use  of 
anything, is Possession of  it. 
An  external  thing,  however,  as  such  could  only  Ee 
mine, if  I may assume it  to be  possible  that I can  be 
wronged  by  the  use  which  another  might  make  of  it 
whn  it  is not  actually 2%  my possession.  Hence it would 
be  a  contradiction  to  have  anything  External  as  one's 
own,  were  not  the  conception  of  Possession  capable  of 
two  different  meanings,  as  sensible  Possession  that  is 
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perceivable  only by the Intellect.  By  the former is to 
be understood a physical  Possession, and  by the  latter, a 
purely juridical  Possession of  the Same object. 
The description  of  an Object as '  external to me ' may 
signify  either  that it  is  merely  'different  and  distinct 
from  me as a Subject,'  or that it  is  also 'a thing placed 
ozstside  of  me,  and  to  be  found  elsewhere in  space  or 
time!  Taken  in  the  first  sense,  the  term  Possession 
signifies '  rational  Possession ;  ' and, in the  second  sense, 
it  must  mean  '  Empirical  Possession.'  A  rational  or 
intelligible  Possession,  if  such  be  possible, is Possession 
vigwed  upart from  physical  holding or  detention (detentio). 
Jusidical Postulate of  the Practical Reason. 
It  is possible to have  any external  object of  my Will 
ss Mine.  In  other words, a Maxim to this effect-were 
it to  become  law-that  any object  on  which  the  Will 
can be exerted  must  remain  objectively in  itself withut 
a.n owner, as '  res nullius,'  is contrary to the Principle  of 
Right. 
For an object of  any act of  my Will, is something that 
it would  be  physically  within  my power  to  use.  Now, 
suppose there were things that by right should absolutely 
not be in our  power, or, in other words, that it would be 
wrong or inconsistent with  the  freedom of  all, according 
to universal Law, to make use of  them.  On this suppo- 
sition, Freedom would  so  far be  depriving  itself  of  tlie 
use  of  its  voluntary  activity,  in  thus  putting  useable 
objects out  of  all possibility of  use.  In practical  rela- 
tions, this would be to  annihilate them, by making them 
res nullizu, notwithstanding the fact  that acts of  Will in 
relation to  such things would formally harmonize, in the 
actual  use  of  them,  with  the  external  freedom  of  all 
according  to  universal  Laws.  Now  the  pure  practical 
Reason  lays  down  only  formal  Laws  as  Principles  to 
regulate the exercise of  the Will ;  and therefore abstracts 
from the matter of  the act of  Will, as regards  the  other 
qualities of  the object, which  Zs  considered  only in so far 
as it is an object  of  the  activity  of  the  Will.  Hence  the 
practical Reason cannot contain, in reference to  such  an 
object,  an  absolute  prohibition  of  its use,  because  this 
would  involve a  contradiction  of  external freedom with 
itse1f.-An  object of my free Will, however, is one which 
I have the physical capability of  making some use of  at 
will, since its use  stands in my power (in  potentia).  This 
is  to  be  distinguished  from  having  the  oyect  brought 
under my disposal (in potestatem  meaw redwctum), which 
supposes not  a  capability merely,  but  also  a  particular 
act  of  the free-will.  But in order to consider  something 
merely as an object of  my Will as such, it is sufficient to 
be  conscious that I have  it  in  my power.  It  is there- 
fore  an assumption d priori  of  the practical  Reason, to 
regard  and  treat  every  object  within  the  range  of  my 
free exercise  of Will as  objectively a  possible  Mine  or 
Thine. 
This  Postulate may  be called  'a Permissive  Law' of 
the practical  Reason, as  giving us a  Special  title which 
we could not evolve out of the mere conceptions of  Right 
generally.  And  this  Title  constitutes  the  Right  to 
impose upon  all  others  an obligation, not  otherwise laid 
upon them, to abstain from the use of  certain  objects  of 
our  free  Choice,  because  we  have  already  taken  them 
into  our  possesaion.  Reason  wills  that  this  shall  be 
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Reason;  and  it is enabled  by  meails  of  this  Postulate 
d p~yiori  to enlarge its range of  activity in practice. 
3. 
Possession and Ownership. 
Any one who would assert the Right to a thing as his, 
must be in possession of  it as an object.  Were  he not 
its actual possessor  or  owner, he could  not  be  wronged 
or  injured  by the use which  another  might  make of  it 
without his  consent.  For,  should  anything  external to 
him, aiid in no way connected with  him  by Right, affect 
this object, it could not  affect  himself  as a  Subject, nor 
do  him  any  wrong,  unless  he  stood  in  a  relation  of 
Ownership to it. 
4. 
Exposition of  the Conoeption of  the External Mine and 
Thine. 
There can  only be  three  external Objects  of  my Will 
in the activity of  Choice: 
(1) A Corporeal Thing external to me ; 
(2) The F~ee-will  of  another in the performance  of  a 
particular act (prmstatio) ; 
(3)  The Stute of  another in relation to myself. 
These correspond to the categories  of  Substance, Cam- 
nlity,  and  Reciprocity;  and  they  form  the  practical 
relations between  me  and  external  objects, according  to 
the Laws of  Freedom. 
A. I can only call a  corporeal thing or  an object 
in qace '  mine,'  when, even  altitough  not  in physical 
possesswn  of  it, I  am able to assert  that I am iii 
possession  of  it in another  real  non-physical  sense. 
Thus, I am not entitled to call an apple nzine  merely 
because I  hold it in my hand or possess it physically ; 
but  only when I am entitled to say, 'I possess  it, 
although I have laid it out of  my hand, and wherever 
it may lie.'  In like manner, I am not  entitled to 
say of  the ground, on which  I may have  laid myself 
down, that therefore it is ?nnine;  but only when I cari 
rightly assert that it still remains in my possession, 
although I may have left the spot.  For any one wlio, 
in  the  former  appearances  of  empirical  possession, 
might wrench the apple out of  my hand, or drag me 
away from my resting-place, would, indeed, injiire me 
in respect  of  the her  'Mine'  of  Freedom, but not 
in respect  of  the  external  'Mine,'  iinless  I  could 
assert that I  was in the possession of the Object, even 
when  not actually holding it physically.  And if  I 
coiild not do this, neither could I call the apple or the 
spot mine. 
B.  I cannot call the performance  of  something by 
the  action  of  the Will of  another  'Mine,'  if I can 
only say 'it has come into ruy possession at the sama 
time  with a  promise'  (pactum re  iqzitum) ;  but only 
if I am  able to assert 'I am  in possession  of  the 
Will of  the  other,  so  as  to  determine  him  to the 
performance of  a particular act, although the time for 
the  performarice  of  it has  not  yet  come.'  In the 
latter  case,  the  promise  belongs  to  the  nature  of 
things actually helcl  as possessed, and  as an 'active 
obligation'  I  cari  reckon  it mine ; and  this  holds 
good  not only if I have the thingpronzised-as  in the 
first case-already  in  my possession, but even although 
I do  not  yet possess  it in fact.  Hence, I must  be 
able  to regard myself  in thought  as independent  of 
that empirical form of  possession that is limited by 
the condition of  time,  and as being nevertheless  in 
possession of  the object. 
C.  I cannot  call a  Wife, a  Child, a  Domestic, or, 
generally, any other  Person '  mine ' merely becaiise I command them at present as belonging  to my house- 
hold, or because I have  them  under  control, and in 
my  power  and  possession.  But I  can  call  them 
mine,  if,  although  they may have  withdrawu  them- 
selves from my control and I do not therefore possess 
them  empirically, I can  still say '  I possess  them by 
my mere Will, provided they exist anywhere in space 
or time;  and, consequently, my possession of  them is 
purely juridical.'  They belong, in fact, to my posses- 
sions, only when and.so far as I can assert this as a 
matter of  Right. 
5. 
Definition of  the conception of  the external Mine and Thine. 
Definitions are nominal or real.  A nominal Definition 
is sufficient merely to dhthgzcish the object  defined froin 
all other  objects, and it  spriiigs out of  a  complete  and 
definite  exposition of  its conception.  A  real  Definition 
further suffices for a Deduction of  the conception defined, 
so as to furnish a knowledge of  the reality of  the object. 
The  nominal  Dejnition of  the external '  Mine '  would 
thus  be:  'The  external  Mine  is  anything  outside  of 
myself, such  that any hindrance  of  my use of  it at will, 
would be doing me an injury or wrong as an infringement 
of  that  Freedom  of  mine  which  may  coexist  with  the 
freedom of all others according to a universal Law.'  The 
real Dejnition of  this conception  may be put thus : '  The 
external Mine is anything  outside  of  myself, such  that 
any prevention of  my use of  it  would be a wrong, althozcgh 
I  may not  be  in possession of  it so as to be actually hold- 
ing it as an object.'-I  must be in some kind of  posses- 
sion of  an external object, if  the object is to be regarded 
as mine;  for, otherwise,  any  one  interfering  with  this 
object  would  not,  in doing  so,  affect  me;  nor,  conse- 
quently, would  he  thervby  do  me  any  wrong.  Hence, 
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according  to  5  4,  a  rational  Possession  (possessio  nou- 
rnalzon)  must  be  assuined  as possible, if  there  is to  be 
rightly an externnl '  Mine and Thine.'  Empirical Posses- 
sion  is  thus  only  phenomenal  possession  or  holding 
(detention)  of  the  object  in  the  sphere  of  sensible 
appearance  (possessio  phenomenon),  although  the  object 
which I possess is not regarded in this  practical  relation 
as itself  a Phenomenon,-according  to  the exposition of 
the  Transcendental  Analytic  in  the  Chtique  of  Pure 
Reason-but  as a  Thing  in itself.  For in the CTZtipzce 
of  Awe  Reason  the interest  of  Reason  turns upon  the 
theoreticc6l  knowledge of  the Nature of  Things, and  how 
far Reason cail go in such knowledge.  But here  Reason 
has to deal with the practical determination of  the action 
of  the Will according  to  Laws of  Preedom, whether the 
object is  perceivable through the senses or merely think- 
able by the pure Understanding.  And Right, as under con- 
sideration, is a pure practical conception of  the Reason in 
relation to the exercise of  the Will under Laws of  Freedom. 
And,  hence,  it  is  not  quite  correct  to  speak  of 
'possessing'  a Riglit  to  this or that  object, but it should 
rather  be  said  that  an  object  is  possessed  in a pwely 
juridical  way ;  for a Kiglit is itself the rational possession 
of  sin  Object, and to '  possess  a  possession,'  would be an 
expression without meaning. 
Deduction of  the conception of  a purely juridical 
Possession of an External Object. 
(Possessio noumenon.) 
The  question, '  How  is an external  Mine  nnd  IThine 
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is a merely jzu%dical or gmtional  Possession possible?'  And 
this second question resolves itself again into a third, 'How 
is a synthetic proposition in Right possible 6 priori ? ' 
All Propositions of  Right-as  juridical  propositions- 
are Propositions 6 priori,  for  they are practical Laws of 
Reason  (Dktcbmina rationis).  But  the  juridical  Pro- 
position  6  priori  respecting  empirz'cal  Possession  is 
cmaly2icnl;  for it  says  nothing  more  than what  follows 
by the principle of  Contradiction, from the  conception of 
such  possession;  namely, that  if  I am  the holder of  a 
thing in the way of  being  physically  connected with  it, 
any one  interfering with it without  my consent-as,  for 
instance, in wrenching an apple out of  my hand-affects 
and detracts from my freedom as that which is internally 
Mine; and  consequently the maxim  of  his  action  is  in 
direct  contradiction  to  the Axiom  of  Right.  The pro- 
position expressing the principle of  an empirical  rightful 
Possession, does  not  therefore  go  beyond the Right of  a 
Person in reference  to himself. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Proposition  expressing  the 
possibility of  the Possession of  a  thing  external  to. me, 
after abstraction of all the  conditions of  empirical posses- 
sion  in  space  and  time-conseqiiently  presenting  the 
assumption of  the possibility of  a Possessio  Noumenon- 
goes beyond tliese limiting  conditions ; and  because  this 
Proposition  asserts  a  possession  even  without  physical 
holding, as  necessary  to  the  conception  of  the external 
Mine  and Thine, it is synthetical.  Aild  thus it  becomes 
a problem  for Reason  to  show  how stich  a  Proposition, 
extending its range  beyond the  conception  of  empirical 
possession, is possible d priori. 
In this  manner,  for  instance,  the  act  of  taking 
possession of  a  particular  portion of  the soil, is a  mode 
exercising  the private  free-will without  being  an act of 
tcsz~rpatz'on. The possessor founds iipon the innate Right 
of  common possession  of  the surface of  the earth, and upon 
the  universal  Will  corresponding  h p~iori  to  it,  which 
allows a private  Possessz'olz of  the soil ; because what are 
mere things would be otherwise  made in themselves  and 
by  a  Law,  into  unappropriable  objects.  Thus  a  first 
appropriator  acquires  originally by primary possession  a 
particular portion  of  the ground ;  and by Right (jure)  he 
resists every other  Person who would  hinder him in the 
private  use  of  it, although  while  the 'state of  Nature' 
continues,  this  cannot  be  done  by  juridical  means  (de 
jure), because a public Law does not yet exist. 
And although a piece of  ground  should be regarded as 
free, or declared to be such, so as to be for the public use 
of  all without  distinction, yet it cannot be said that it is 
thus  free  by  nature  and  o~iginally  so,  prior  to  any 
juridical  act.  For there would be a real relation already 
incorporated  in such a piece  of  ground by the very fact 
that  the possession  of  it was  denied  to  any  particular 
individual; and  as  this  public  freedoin  of  the ground 
w6uld be a prohibition of  it to every particular individual, 
this presupposes a cornmon possession of  it which cannot 
take effect without a Contract.  A piece of  ground, how- 
ever, which  can  only become  publicly  free  by  contract, 
must actually be in the possession of  all those associated 
together, who inutually interdict  or  suspend  each  other, 
from any particular or private use of  it. 
This  o~iginal  Community  of  the soil  ar~d  of  the 
things  upon  it  (eommu?zio  fu7zdi  originuria), is  an 
idea  which  has  objective  and  practical  Juridical 
reality,  and is entirely  different  from  the idea of  a 
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For the latter  would  have had  to be fomded  as a 
form of  Society, and  must have taken its rise from a 
Contract by which all renounced the Right of  Private 
Possession, so that by uniting the property owned by 
each  into a  whole, it  was  thus transforilied  into a 
common  possession.  But had  such an  event taken 
place, History must have presented some evidence of 
it.  To regard such a procedure as the original mode 
of  taking  possession, and to hold  that the particular 
possessions of  every individual may and ought to be 
grounded upon it, is evidently a contradiction. 
Possession  (possessio) is to be  distinguished  from 
habitation  as  mere  residente  (sedes) ; and  the  act 
of  takirig possession  of  the soil  in the intention  of 
acquiring  it  once for  all, is also to be distinguished 
from  settlement  or  donzicile  (incolatus), which  is  a 
continuous  private  Possession  of  a  place  that  is 
dependent on the presence  of  the individual upon it. 
We have not here to deal with the question of  domi- 
ciliary Settlement, as that is a secondary juridical act 
which may follow upon possession, or may not occur 
at all; for  as such  it could  not involve an original 
possession,  but only  a  secondary  possession  derived 
from the consent of others. 
Simple physical Possession, or holding  of  the soil, 
involves  already  certain  relations  of  Right to the 
thing, although it is certainly not sufficient to enable 
me to regard it as Mine.  Relative  to  others, so far 
as they know, it appears as a first possession in har- 
mony with the law  of  external freedom ;  and, at the 
Same  time, it is embraced  in the universal original 
possession which  contains h priori  the fundamental 
principle  of  the possibility  of  a  private  possession. 
Hence  to  disturb  the  first  occupier  or  holder of  a 
portion  of  the soil  in his  use  of  it, is  a  lesion  or 
wrong done to hiin.  Tlie  first  taking  of  Possession 
has  therefore  a  Title  of  Right  (tiklus possessionis) 
in its favour,  which  is simply  the  principle  of the 
original  common  possession;  and  the  saying  that 
'It is  well  for  those  who  are in  possession'  (beati 
po~sdentes),  when  one  is not bound  to  authenticate 
his possession,  is a  principle  of  Natural  Right that 
establishes  the juridical act of  taking possession, as R 
ground of  acquisition upon which every first possessor 
may found. 
It has been  shown  in the Critique of  Pure Reason 
that in theoretical  Principles  Zc priori, an intuitional 
Perception  a p?-io?.i  must be supplied in connection 
with any given conception;  and,  consequently, were 
it a  question of  a  purely theoretical Principle, some- 
thing would  have to  be added  to the conception  of 
the possession of  an object to make  it real.  But in 
respect  of  the practical  Principle  under considera- 
tion,  the  procedure  is  just  the  converse  of  the. 
theoretical process ;  so that all the conditions of  per- 
ception  which  form  the  foundation  of  empirical 
possession  must  be  abstracted  or  taken  away  in 
order to extend  the range of  the juridical Conception 
beyond  the empirical sphere, and in order  to be  able 
to  apply the Postulate, that every external  object  of 
the free  activity  of  my Will, so far as I have. it in 
my power, although not in  the possession  of  it, may 
be reckoned as juridically Mine. 
The possibility  of  such  a  possession,  with  conse- 
quent Deduction of the conception of  a non-empirical 
possession, is founded upon the juridical Postulate of 
the Practical Reason, that '  It is a juridical Duty so 
to act towards others that what is  external and useable 
niay come into the possession or become the property 
of  some orie.'  And this Postulate is conjoined with 
the exposition  of  the Conception that what is exter- 
nally  one's own, is founded upon a possession, that is 
not  physical.  The  possibility  of  such  a  possession, 
thus conceived, cannot,  however, be proved  or com- 
prehended  in itself,  because it is a  rational concep- 
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furnished;  but  it  follows  as  an immediate  conse- 
quence from  the Postulate that has been enunciated. 
For,  if  it  is  necessary  to  act  according  to  that 
juridical  Principle,  the rational  or  intelligible  con- 
dition of  a  purely juridical  possession must also  be 
possible.  It need  astonish  no  one, then,  that the 
theoretical  aspect  of  the Principles  of  the .external 
Mine  and Thine, is lost from  view  in the rational 
sphere of  pure Intelligente, and presents no extensiori 
of  Knowledge; for the conception of  Freedom  upon 
which  they  rest  does  not admit  of  any  theoreticctl 
Deduction  of  its  possibility,  and  it  can  only  be 
inferred from the practical Law of  Reason, called the 
Categorical Imperative, viewed as a fact. 
Application  of  the  Principle  of  the  Possibility  of  an 
external Mine and Thine to Objects of  Experience. 
The  conception  of  a  purely  juridical  Possession,  is 
not an empirical conception  dependent  on  conditions  of 
Space  and  Time,  and  yet  it has practical reality.  As 
such  it must  be  applicable to objects of  experience, the 
knowledge  of  which  is  independent  of  the  conditions 
of  Space  and  Time.  The rational process by which the 
conception  of  Right  is  brought  into  relation  to  such 
objects so as to constitute a  possible esternal Mine  and 
Thine,  is  as  follows.  The  Conception  of  Right,  being 
contained  merely  in  Reason,  cannot  be  immediately 
applied  to  objects  of  experience, so as to give the con- 
ception  of  an  empirical  Possession, but must  be  applied 
clirectly  to  the  mediating  conception  in  the  Under- 
standing,  of  Possession  in general ; so  that,  instead  of 
physical holding (Detentio) as an empirical representation 
of  possessioil,  the  formal  conception  or  thought  of 
'  Having;  abstracted  from  all  conditions  of  Space  and 
Time, is  conceived  by  the  mind, and  only  as implying 
that  an object  is in my  power  and  at my  disposal (in 
potestate  rnea  positum  esse).  In this  relation, the  ternl 
'external'  does  not  signify  existence  in  another  place 
than where  I  am, nor  iny resolution  and  acceptance  at 
another time than the monlent in which I have the offer 
of  a thing:  it signifies  only an object  dzyerent  from  or 
other  than  myself.  Now  the practical  Reason  by  its 
Law of  Right  wills,  that I  shall  think  the  Mine  and 
Thine in application  to  objects, not according to sensible 
conditions, but  apart from these  and from the Possession 
they  indicate;  because  they  refer  to  determinations  of 
the activity of  the Will that  are in accordance with the 
Laws  of  Freedom.  For  it is only  a  cowptiolz  of  the 
Ulzderstanding  that  can  be  brought  under  the  rational 
Conception of  Right.  I may therefore say that I possess 
a field, although it is in quite n different place from that 
on which I actually find  myself.  For the question  here 
is not  concerning  an intellectiial  relation  to  the object, 
but I have the  thing practically in  my power  and at my 
disposal, which is a  conception of  Possession  realized by 
the Understanding and independent of  relations of  space ; 
and it is mine, because my Will in determining itself  to 
any particular  use of  it, is not  in confiict with the  Law 
of  external Freedom.  Now it is just in abstraction froin 
physical  possession of  the  object  of  my  free-will in the 
sphere of  sense, that  the Practical Reason  wills  that  a 
rational  possession  of  it shall  be  thought, according  to 
intellectual  conceptions  which  are  not  empirical,  but 
contain  d priori  the  conditions  of  rational  possession. 
Hence it is in this fact, that we  found the ground of  the 
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(possessio  nounzenon)  as  the  principle  of  a  univei.sally 
valid Legislation.  For such a Legislation  is implied aiid 
contaiiled  in  the  expression,  'This  external  object  is 
rnilbe,'  because an Obligation is thereby imposed  upon all 
others in respect  of  it, who  would  otherwise  not  have 
beeil obliged to abstain from the use of  this object. 
The mode, then, of  having something External to myself 
as  Mine,  consists  in a  specially  juridical  connection  of 
the Will of  the Subject with  that  object, independently 
of  the e~npirical  relations to it in Space and in Time, and in 
accordance with the  conception of  a  rational  possession. 
--A  particular spot on the earth is not  externally Mine 
because I occupy  it with  my  body;  for  the  question 
here discussed refers  only to my external  Freedoni,  and 
coiisequently  it  affects  only  the  possession  of  niyself, 
which is not a thing  external to me, and  therefore  only 
involves  an  internal  Right.  But  if  I continue  to  be 
ii~  possession  of  the spot, although I have  taken  myself 
away froin it and gone to another  place, only under that 
condition is my external  Right  concerned  in  connection 
with it.  And to make the continuous possession of  this 
spot  by  my  Person  a  condition  of  having  it as mine, 
must either be to assert  that it is not  possible  at all to 
have anytliing External as one's  own, which  is  contrary 
to tlie Postulate  in  2, or  to require, in  order that this 
external Possession  may be  possible, that I shall  be  in 
two places at the Same time.  But  this  amounts to say- 
ing that I niust be in a place  and  also  not  in it, which 
is contradictory and absurd. 
This  position  may be  applied to the  case  in which I 
have accepted a promise ; for my Having and  Possession 
in respect of  what has been promised, become established 
on tlie ground  of  external  Right.  This  Right is not to 
be  aiinulled  by  the fact  that  the promiser  having said 
at one time, '  This thing shall be  yours,' again at a  sub- 
sequent  time  says,  'My  will  now  is  that  the  thing 
shall not be  yours.'  In  such relations of  rational  Right 
the conditions hold just the Same as if  the promiser had, 
without any illterval of  time between them, made the two 
declarations of  his Will, '  This  shall  be  yours,'  and  also 
'  This  shall not be yours ;  ' which  manifestly coiltradicts 
itself. 
The  Same  thing  holds, in like  mailner,  of  the Con- 
ception of  the juridical  possession of  a Person as belong- 
ing to  the '  Having' of  a  subject, wliether it be a Wife, 
a Child, or a Servant.  The  relations  of  Right  involved 
in a  household, and  the  reciprocal  possession  of  all  its 
members, are not  annulled  by the  capability of  separat- 
ing from  eacli other in spacc ;  because it is by jzwidical 
relatioris  tliat  they  are  connected,  and  the  external 
'  Mine'  and  'Thine,'  as  iii  the  former  cases,  rests 
entirely  upon  the  assumption  of  the  possibility  of  a 
~urely  rational possession, without the accompaniment of 
physical detention or holding of  the object. 
Reason  is forced  to a  Critique  of  its juridically 
Practical  Function  in  Special  reference to the con- 
ception  of  the  external  Mine  and  Thine,  by  the 
Antinomy  of  the propositions  enunciated  regarding 
the possibility of  such a form of Possession.  For these 
give rise to a.n inevitable Dialectic, in which  a Thesis 
and an Antithesis set up equal  Claims to the validity 
of  two  conilicting  Conditioris.  Reason  is thns con1- 
pelled, iii its practical function in relation to Right,- 
as it was in its theoretical function,-to  make a  dis- 
tinction between Possession  as a pkenomenal appear- 
ance presented to the senses, and that Possession which 
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THESIS.-The  Thesis, in this case, is, 'lt  is possiblr: 
to have something external  as mine, although I arn 
not in possession of  it.' 
ANTITHESIS.-The Antithesis  is, '  It  is not possible 
to have anything external as  mine,  if  I an1 not in 
possession of  it.' 
SOLUTION.  -  The  Solution  is, '  Botli  Propositions 
are true;'  the former when I mean empirical  Yosses- 
sion (possessw phnomenon), the latter when I under- 
stand by the same term, a  purely rational Possession 
(  possessw  noumenon). 
But  the possibility of  a  rational  possession,  and 
consequently of  an  external Mine and Thine, cannot 
be  comprehended  by  direct  insight,  but  must  be 
deduced  from  the Practical  Reason.  And  in this 
relation it is specially noteworthy that the Practical 
Eeason  without  intuitional  ~ierceptions, and  even 
withoiit requiring such an element h priori, cari extend 
its range  by  the mere elintination of  empirical con- 
ditions, as justified  by  the law of  Freedom, and can 
thus establish synthetical  Propositions h priori.  The 
proof  of  this in the practical  coniiection, as will be 
shown  afterwards,  can  be  adduced in an analytical 
rnanner. 
To  have anything  External  as one's  own  is only possible 
in  a  Juridical  or  Civil  State of  Society under  the 
regulation of  a public legislative Power. 
If, by word  or  deed,  I  declare  my Will  that  some 
external thing  shall be mine, I make  a  declaration  that 
every other person is obliged to abstain  from  the  use  of 
this object of  my exercise  of  Will ;  and this imposes an 
Obligation whicli no  one  would  be  under, without  such 
a juridical act on  my part.  But the assumption of  this 
Act, at the Same time involves the admission  that I ani 
obliged reciprocally to observe a similar abstention towards 
every other in respect of  what is externally theirs ;  for the 
Obligation  in  question  arises  from  a  universal  Rule 
regulating the external juridical  relations.  Hence I an1 
riot  obliged  to  let  alone  what  another  person  declares 
to  be  externally his,  unless  every other person  likewise 
secures me  by a  giiarantee  that  he will  act  in relation 
to what  is mine, upon  the same Principle.  This  guar- 
antee  of  reciprocal  and  mutual  abstention  from  wliat 
belongs to others, does not require a Special juridical  act 
for  its  establishment,  but  is  already  involved  in  the 
Conception of  an external Obligation of  Right, on account 
of  the  universality  and  consequently  the  reciprocity of 
the obligatoriness arising  from  a  universal  Ru1e.-Now 
a Single Will, in relation to an external and consequently 
contingent  Possession, cannot serve as a compulsory Law 
for  all,  becaiise  that  would  be  to  do  violence  to  the 
Freedom  which  is  in accordance  with  universal  Laws. 
Therefore  it is only a Will that binds  every one, and  as 
such  a  comxuon,  collective,  and  authoritative Will, that 
can  furnish  a  guarantee  of  security  to  all.  But  the 
state  of  men  under  a  universal,  external,  and  public 
Legislation, conjoined with authority and power, is called 
the  Civil  state.  There  can  therefore  be  an  external 
Mine and Thine only in the Civil state of  Society. 
CONSEQUENCE.-It  follows, as a Corollary, that if  it is 
juridically  possible  to  have  an external object  as  one's 
own, the individual Subject of  possession must be allowed 
to compel  or constrain  every person, witl-i whom a dispute 
as to  the Mine  or Thine of  such a possession may arise; 
to enter  along with himself  into the relations  of  a  Civil 
Constitu  tion. 9. 
There  may,  however,  be  an  external  Mine  and  Thine 
found  as  a  fact  in  the  state  of  Nature,  but it is 
only provisory. 
Natural Right in the state of  a Civil Constitution, means 
the forins of  Right which may be deduced from Principles 
b priori as the conditions  of  such a Cotistitution.  It is 
therefore not to be infringed by the statutory laws of  such 
a  Constitution;  and  accordingly  the juridical  Principle 
remains in force, that, '  Whoever proceeds upon a Maxim 
by wliich it becomes impossible for me.  to have  an object 
of  the  exercise of  my Will as Mine, does me a lesion  or 
injury.'  For  a  Civil  Constitution  is  only  the juridical 
condition  iinder ~vhich  every one  has  what  is  liis  owri 
merely  secnred  to  him,  as  distinguised  from  its being 
specially  assigned  and  determined  to  him.-All  Guar- 
antee, therefore, assumes that every one to whom a thing 
is  secured,  is  already  in possesion  of  it  as  his  own. 
Hence, prior  to  the Civil Constitiition-or  apart from it 
-  an  exteriial  Mine  and  Thine  must  be  assumed  as 
possible, and  along with it a Right  to  compel  every one 
with whom we  could come into any kind  of  intercourse, 
to  enter with  us  into a  constitution  in which  what  is 
Mine  or  Thine  can  be secured.-There  rnay thus  be  a 
Possession  in expectation  or  in preparation  for  such  a 
state of  security, as can only be established  on  the Law 
of  the  Common Will ;  and  as it is therefore  in accord- 
ance with  the possibility of  such a  state, it constitutes  a 
provisory  or  temporary  juridical  Possession ;  whereas 
that  Possession  which  is  found  in reality  in  the Civil 
state of  Society will  be  a  peremptorg or giiaranteed Pos- 
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session.-Prior  to  entering into this  state, for which  he 
is  naturally  prepared,  the individual  rightfully  resists 
those who will not adapt themselves to it, and who would 
disturb  him  in his provisory possession;  because  if  the 
Will of  all  except himself were imposing  upon  him  an 
obligation  to  withdraw  from  a  certain  possession,  it 
would  still be  only a  one-sided  or  unilateral Will,  and 
consequently  it would  have  just  as little  legal  Title- 
which  can  be  properly based  only on  the  universalized 
Will-to  contest  a  claim  of  Right ; as he  would  have 
to  assert  it.  Yet  he  has  the  advantage  on  his  side, 
of  being  in accord with  the conditions  requisite  to  the 
introduction  and  institution of  a civil  form  of  Society. 
In a word, the mode in which anything external  may be 
helcl  as  one's  own in the state of  Nature, is just  physical 
possession with  a presumpiion  of  Right  thus  far  in its 
favour, that  by union  of  the WilIs  of  all  in  a  public 
Legislation, it will  be  made jzc.ridical;  and  in this  ex- 
pectation  it holds  comparatively, as  a  kind  of  potential 
jiiridical  Possession. 
This Prerogative OE Riglit, as  arising from the fact 
of  empirical  possession,  is  in  accordsnce  with  the 
Formula, '  It  is well for those who are in possession ' 
(Beati possidentes).  It does not  consist; in the  fact 
that because  the Possessor  has  the  presumption  of 
being  a  rightfirl  man, it is iinnecessftry for  him  to 
bring  forward  proof  that he possesses a certain thing 
rightfully, for  this position  applies only to a case of 
disputed Right.  But it is because it accords with the 
Postulate  of  the Practical Reason, that every one is 
invested with the faculty of  having  as his  own  any 
external object upon which  he has exerted his Will ; 
and,  conseqnently,  all  actual possession  is  a  state 
whose rightfulness is established upon  that Postulate by an antesior act of Will.  And such an act, if  tliere 
be no prior possession of  the sarue object  by another 
opposed to it, does, therefore, provisionally justify and 
entitle me, according to the Law of external Freedom, 
to restrain any one who refuses to enter with me into 
a  state of  public legal Freedom, from  aIl pretensioii 
to the use  of  such an object.  For such a procedure 
is  requisite, in  conformity with the Postulate of Reason, 
in order  to  subject  to my proper iise a  thing whicli 
~vould  otherwise be practically  anniliilated, as regarcls 
all proper iise of  it.  CHAPTER  SECOND. 
The general Principle of External Acquisition. 
I ACQUIRE a thing wlien I act (eficio) so  that it becomes 
nt,ine.-An  external thina is originally  mine, when  it is  ? 
iriiiie  even  without  the  intervention  of  a juridical Act. 
An Acquisition  is  original  and p~imary,  when it is not 
derived from what another had already niade his own. 
There  is  nothing External that  is as  such  originally 
niine ; but anything exterrial  may be  originally  acpzciretl 
when  it is an object that iio other  Person  has  yet  made 
his. -A  state  in whicli  the  Mine  and  Thine  are  iri 
coinnion,  caiinot  be  conceived  as  having  been  at  any 
tinie  original.  Such a state of  things would  have to be 
acquired by an external juridical Act, although there may 
be an original and common possession of  an external ob- 
ject.  Even if  we tliink hypothetically of  a state in which 
the  Mine  and Thine would  be  originally in cominon  as 
a  ' Co~nmzcnio  mei et  tz~i  or.igina?.in,'  it would  still have 
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a~zazio  prinzceva)  with  things  in  coniinon,  sometimes 
supposed  to  be  founded  in  tlie  first  period  of  tlie 
relations  of  Right  among  men, and which  coiild not  be 
regarded  as based  upon Principles  like  the  former, but 
only  upon  History.  Eveii  nnder  that  condition  the 
historic  Com17zztni0,  as  a  siipposed  primeval  Community. 
would  always  have  to  be  viewed  as  acquired  aiid 
derivative (Conznzz~nio  de~ivativct). 
The  Principle  of  exterilal  Acquisition,  tlien,  my  be 
expressed  thus : '  Whatever  I bring  nilder  my  power 
according  to  the  Law  of  external  Freedom,  of  whicli 
as  an  object  of  my  free  activity  of  Will I have  the 
capability of  making  use  according  to  the Postulate  of 
the Practical Reason,  and which I will  to  become  miile 
in conformity with the Idea of  a possible united conimon 
Will, is mine.' 
The  practical  Elements  (Momenta  attendenda)  con- 
stitutive of  the process of  original Acquisition are :- 
1. PREHENSION  or Seizure  of  an object whicll belongs 
to  no  one;  for if it belonged already to  sorne  one  the 
act would  conflict  with  the  Freedom  of  others  that  is 
according to universal Laws.  This is the taking possession 
of  an object of  my free activity of Will in Space and Time ; 
the Possession, therefore, into which I thus put myself is 
sensible or physical possession (possessio phenonzenon) ; 
2.  DECLARATION  of  the  possession  of  this  object  by 
formal  designation and the act  of  my free-will in inter- 
dicting every other Person from using it as his ; 
3.  APPROPRIATION,  as the act, in Idea, of  an exterrially 
legislative  conimon  Will,  by  which  all  arid  each  are 
obliged  to  respect and act in conformity with  my act  of 
Will. 
l'he  validity  of  the last  element  in  the  process  of 
Acquisition,  as thslt  oll wliich  the  conclusion  that '  tho 
external  object  is iliiiie ' rests, is what  inakes  the  pos- 
session valid as a purely rational aiid jzbridical  possession 
(possossio nozunenolz).  It  is founded upon the  fact  that 
RS  a11  these Acts are ju~,idical,  they consequently proceecl 
from  the Practieal Reaso~i,  aild  therefore in the question 
as  to  what  is  Eight,  abstraction  may  be  made  of  the 
empirical  conditions  involved,  and  the conclusion '  the 
external  object  is miiie ' thus  becomes  a  correct  infer- 
ence  from  the external fact of  sensible possession to  the 
internal Eight of  rational Possession. 
The  original  pl-inzary  Acquisition  of  an  external 
object  of  the actioil  of  the Will,  is called  OCCUPANCY. 
It can  only  take  place  in  reference  to  Substances  or 
Corporeal  Things.  Now  when  this  Occupation  of  an 
external object does take place, the Act presnpposes as a 
conditioil of  such enipirical possession, its  Priority in time 
before  tlie  act  of  any other who mny also be willing to 
enter  upon  occupation  of  it.  Hence  the legal maxim, 
'  pz~i  prb~  tenzpore,  potio~  jure.'  Such  Occupation  as 
original or primary is, f~irther,  the effect only of  a  single 
or milateral Will; for were  a  bilateral  or  twofold Will 
requisite for it, it would  be  derived  from  a  Contract  of 
two or more persons with  each  other,  snd  consequently 
it would  be  based  upon  what  another  or  others  had 
already made their owi1.-It  is not easy to See  how such 
an act of  free-will as this would  be, could  really form a 
foundation for every one liaving his own.-However,  the 
Jirst Acquisition of  n thing  is on  that account not quite 
exactly the Same as the original  Acqiiisition  of  it.  For 
the Acquisition  of  a  public  jixridical  state  by union  of 
the Wills of  all in a iiniversal Legislation, would be such 
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could prececle it, ancl  yet  it would  be  clc!~,iz.crl from  tlie 
particillar Wills of  all the indi-viduals, and consequently 
becoine  all-sidecl or  oaznilateml;  for a properly p~il,za?:3/ 
Acquisition  can only proceed from an individual  or  uni- 
lateral Will. 
~IVISIOX  OJ?  THE SUBJPCT  OP TIIE ACQUISITION  OF TIIE 
EXTEItXAL  MINE  AND TIIINE. 
I. Iii respect of  the MATTER  or Object of  Acquisitiori, 
I acquire either  a  Corporeal  THING  (Substance),  or  the 
I'ERFORMANCE  of  something  by  another  (Causality),  or 
this  other  as a  PERSON  in  respect  of  his  state,  so  far 
as I have a Iiight to dispose of  the sarne (in  a relation of 
Reciprocity with him). 
11.  In respect  of  the  FORM  or  Mode of  Acquisition, 
it is  either  a  REAL RIGHT (jus ~ec~le),  or  a  PERSONAL 
RIGHT  (~ZLS  pemonale),  or  a  REAL-PERSONAL  RIGHT  (jus 
~ealiter  pe~sonale),  to the possession, although  not  to the 
use, of  another Person as if he were a Thing. 
111.  In respect of  the  Ground of  Right or THE TITLV 
(titulus)  of  Acqiiisition-which,  properly, is not  a  par- 
ticular menlber  of  the  Division  of  Rights, but  rather  a. 
constituent element of  the mode of  exercising thern-any 
thing  External  is  acquired  by  a  certain  free  Exercise 
of  Will  that  is  either  t~nilate~ctl,  as  the act of  a single 
Will (facto),  or bilc(tc~n1,  as the act of  two Wills (pacto), 




What is a Real Right ? 
The  iisual  Definition  of  Real  Right,  or '  1:iglit  in  8 
Thing ' (jzu  qeenle,  jzu  in  re),  is that '  it is a  Eight  as 
ugcbinst  eveq possessor  of  it.'  This is a correct  Nominal 
Definition.  But what is  it that entitles me to claim an 
external  object  froni  any  one  who  may  appear  as  its 
possessor, and  to  compel  him, per  vindicationem, to put 
ine again, in place  of  himself, into possession of  it  ?  1s 
this  external  juridical  relatioil  of  my  Will  a  kind  of 
immediate relation to an external thing ?-If  so, whoever 
might  thinlc of  his  Right  as referring  not  immediately 
to  Persons  but  to  Things, would  have  to  represent  it, 
although  only  in  an  obscure  way,  somewhat  thus.  A 
Eght on one side has  always a Duty corresponding to it 
on  the  other,  so  that an external thing, although away 
from  the  liands  of  its first  Possessor,  continues  to  be 
still connected with him by a continning obligation ; and 
thus  it refuses  to  fall  nnder  the  claim  of  any  other 
possessor,  because  it is  already bound  to  another.  In 
this  way  my Right, viewed  as a  kind  of  good  Genius 
accompanying a thing and preserving it from all external 
attack, would  refer  an  alien  possessor  always  to me ! 
It is,  however,  absurd  to  thinlc  of  an  obligation  of 
Persons towards Things, and conversely ; although it may 
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13. 
Every  part of  the  Soil  may be  originarily acquired;  and 
the Principle of  the possibility of  such Acquisition  is 
the original Community of  the Soil generally. 
The  first  Clause  of  this  Proposition  is founded  iipoli 
tlie Postulate  of  the Yractical  Reasoil (5 2) ; the second 
is established by the following Proof. 
AI1 Men are originally and before any juridical  act  of 
Will in rightful possession of  the Soil; that is, tliey have 
;L  Right  to be  wherever  Nature  or  Chance  has  placed 
them without their wilI.  Possession (po&essio), whicli  is 
t.o be distingnished from residential settlement (sedes) as a 
voluntary,  acquired,  and  permanent  possession,  becomes 
common  possession,  on  account  of  the connection  witli 
each other of  all the places on the siirface of  the Earth as 
a globe.  For, hacl tlie surface of  tlie earth been an infinite 
plain,  men  could  liave  been  so  dispersed  upon  it that 
they might not have come into any necessary communioii 
with each otlier, and a  state of  social  Comnlunity would 
not have been a ilecessary consequence of  tlieir existente 
iipon the Earth.-Now  that Possession proper to all men 
iipon  the  earth  which  is  prior  to  all  their  particular 
jiiridical  acts, constitutes an oryinnl possession in colnnzo9b 
(Conzmunio  possessionis  originnria).  The  conception  of 
such  ,211  original,  common  Possession  of  things  is not 
clerived  from  experience, nor  is it dependent  on  concli- 
tions  of  time,  as  is  the  case  with  the iinaginary  aiid 
inclemonstrable fiction of  U prinzmval C'o~onzmzmity  of  posses- 
sioiz  in actual history.  Hence it is a practical conception 
of  Reason, involving in itself  the only Principle according 
to whicli  Men  may iise the placc tliey happeii to occnpy 
oll the siirface of  the Earth, in accordance with  Laws  of 
I!ight. 
14. 
The  juridical  Act of  this original Acquisition is 
Occupancy. 
The  Act  of  taking  possession  (cpprelhcnsio),  as being 
ilt its beginning the physical  appropriation of  a corporeal 
thing  in space (possessionis pl~ysicm),  can accord with the 
Law  of  the  external  Freedoin  of  all,  under  no  other 
condition  than  that  of  its Priority in respect  of  Time. 
In this relation it must  have  the characteristic of  a first 
RC~  in the way of  talring possession, as a free  exercise  of 
Will.  The activity of  Will, hovever, as determining that 
the thing-in  this case a definite  separate  place  on  the 
surface  of  the  Earth-shall  be  mine,  being  an  act  of 
Appropriation, cannot be otherwise in the case of  original 
Acquisition  than  individual  or  &lateral  (volz~ntas  zmni- 
lnterctlis  s.  propria).  Now,  OCCUPANCY  is  the  Acqui- 
sition of  an exteriial object by an individual  act of  Will. 
The  original  Acquisition  of  stich an object  as a limited 
portioii  of  the Soil, can  therefore  only  be  accomplished 
by an act of  Occupation. 
The possibility of  this mode of  Acquisition  cannot  be 
intnitively apprehended by pure Beason  in  any way, nor 
established by  its Principles, but  is  an  immediate conse- 
quence from the Postulate of  the Practical Reason.  The 
Will  as  practical  Reason,  liowever,  cannot  justify  ex- 
ternal Acquisition otherwise than only in so far  ns  it  is 
itself  included  in an  absolntely authoritative Will, witli 
which  it is  iinited  by  implication ; or,  in other  worcls, 
only in so far  as  it is  contained within  a  union  of  tHe 
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other.  For  an  individual,  unilateral  Will -  and  tlie 
same applies to a Dual or other  particular Will-cailnot 
impose on all an Obligation wliich is contingent  in itself. 
This reqnires an omnilate.ia1  or  universal Will, wliicli  is 
not  contingent,  but  h  priori,  and  whicli  is  therefore 
iiecessarily  united  and legislative.  Only  in accordance 
with  such  a  Principle  can  there  be  agreement  of' the 
active  free-will  of  each  individual  with  the  freedoin  of 
all,  and  consequently  Rights  in  general,  or  eveii  tlie 
possibility of  an external Mine and Thine. 
It is only within  a  Civil  Constitution  that  anything  oan 
be  acquired  peremptorily,  whereas  in  the State  of 
Nature Acquisition can only be provisory. 
A  Civil  Constitution  is  objectively  necessary  as  i~ 
Duty,  although  subjectively  its  reality  is  coiitingent. 
Hence,  there  is  connected  with  it a  real  natural  Law 
of  Right, to which all external Acquisition is subjected. 
The empirical  Title of  Acqulisition  has  been  shown  to 
be constitiited by the taking  physical  possession (Ap11.ie- 
hensio phzjsica)  as fonnded upon an original community of 
Right  in  all  to the Soil.  Allel  because a possession  ~IL 
the phenomenal sphere of  sense, can only be subordinated 
to that Possession  which  is in accordance with  rational 
conceptions  of  right,  there  must  correspond  to  this 
physical  act  of  possession  a  rational  mode  of  taking 
possession by elimination  of  all the empirical conditioils 
iii  Space  and  Time.  This  rational  form  of  possession 
establishes the proposition, that '  whatever I bring under 
my power in accordance with Laws of  external  Freedoiii, 
aild will that it shall be niine, becomes miiie.' 
The  rational  fitlc  of  Acquisition  can  therefore  only 
lie  origirially  in  the  Idea  of  the  Will  of  all  uilited 
implicitly,  or  necessarily  to  be  nnited,  which  is  here 
tacitly  assumed  as  an indispensable  Condition (C07zditio 
sine  qua  non).  For  by  a  single  Will  there  cannot  be 
iniposed upoii  others  an obligation by which they would 
not have been otherwise bound.-But  the fact formed by 
Wills  actually  and  universally  united  in  a  Legislntioii, 
constitutes the Civil state of  Society.  Hence, it is only 
in conformity with  the idea  of  a Civil  state of  Society, 
or  in  reference  to  it and  its realization,  that  anything 
External  can  be  acquired.  Before  such  a  state  is 
realized,  and  in  anticipation  of  it,  Acquisition,  whicli 
would otherwise  be  derived, is  consequently  only p~ovi- 
so-.  The  Acquisition, which  is peremptory, finds  place 
oiily iii the Civil state. 
Nevertheless, such provisory Acquisition is real Acqui- 
sition.  For, according to  the Postulate of  the juridically 
Practical Reason, the possibility of  Acquisition in whaterer 
state men may happen to be living beside one another, and 
therefore in the State of  Nature as well, is a Principle of 
Private Right.  And  in accordance with  tliis  Principle, 
every one is justified  or entitled to exercise that compul- 
sion by which it alone becomes possible to pass out of the 
state of  Nature, and to enter into that state of  Civil Society 
which alone caii malte all Acquisition peremptory. 
It is a questioii  as to how  far tlie  right of  taking 
possession of  the Soil extends ?  The  nnswer is, So 
far as the capability of  having  it under  one's  power 
extends, that is, just  as far as lie who wills to appro- 
priate it can defend it, as if  t.he Soil u7ere to 'say, ' If 
you  cannot  protect  me,  neither  c:tn  you  comn~aiid 
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stitntes a frec  or closed  Sea niiist be decicled.  Th~is, 
witliin the range of  a cannon-sliot  no  olle has a right 
to  intrude  on  the coast  of  a  country tliat already 
belongs  to a certain  State, iii  order  to fisli  or gather 
amber  on  the  shore,  or  such  like. -  Fiirther,  tlie 
question is put, '  1s Cultivation  of  tlie Soil, by build- 
ing,  agric~~lture,  drainage, etc.,  necessary  in  order  to 
its Acquisition ?'  No.  For,  as  these  processes  as 
forms of  specification are only Accidents, tliey do not 
constitute objects  of  immediate  possession, and can 
only belong to the Subject in so  far as the substance 
of them has been already recognised as his.  When it 
is a question  of  the first  Aquisition of  a  thing, the 
cultivation  or  modification  of  it  by  labour  forms 
nothing more than an external sign of  tlie fact that it 
has been taken into possession, and this cari  be  indi- 
cated by many other signs that cost  less  troub1e.- 
Again,  'May  any  one  be  hindered  in  t,lie Act  of 
taking  possessioii,  so  that  neither  orie  nor  other of 
two Competitors shall acquire tlie Right of  Priority, 
and the Soil in consequence may remain for  all tinie 
free  as belonging to no  one ? '  Not  at nll.  Such a 
hinclrance cannot  be  allowed  to take place,  because 
the second of  the two, in order to be  enabled  to do 
this, would himself  have to be upon some neighbour- 
ing  Soil,  where  he  also,  in this  manner,  could  be 
Iiiridered  from  being,  and  such  absolz~te  Hinde~iny 
would  involve  a  Contradiction.  It would,  however, 
be quite consistent with the Right of  Occupation, iii 
tlie case of  a certain intervening piece of  the Soil, to 
let it lie unused  as a nez~tral  ground for the separa- 
tion  of  two  neighbouring States; but  under  such a 
condition, that ground would actiially belong to them 
130th in comnioii, and would not be withoiit an owner 
(res  nzcllius), just becanse it would be zued  by both  in 
orcler  to  form  a  separation  between  them.-Again, 
'  May one have a +,hing  as his, on  a  Soil of  which  no 
one has appropriated any part as his own ? '  Yes.  In 
lforigolia, for example, any one  niay let lie wliatever 
Laggage he has, or bring back  the horse tEiat has riiil 
away from him into his possession as his own, because 
the whole  Soil beloilgs  to tlie people generally, and 
the use of  it  accordingly belongs to every individual. 
Eut that any one  can  have a  moveable thing on the 
soil of  another as his own, is only possible by Contract. 
-Finally,  there  is the question: :  May  one  of  two 
neighbouring Nations  or TriDes resist  another wheii 
atteinpting to inipose upon  thern  a  certain mode  of 
iising  a  particular  Soil; as,  for  instance, a  tribe  of 
Iiunters  making  such  an  attempt in  relation  to a 
pastoral  people, or  tlie latter  to  agriculturists  and 
sucli like ? '  C'e~tai~zly. For tlie mode in which such 
peoples  or  tribes  may  sattle  themselves  upon  the 
surface of  the earth, provided they keep within  tlieir 
ou7n bouridaries, is  a  matter of  niere  pIeasure  and 
choice on their own part (res ?ncrm facul~ntis). 
As a  furtlier question, it may be asked : Wliether, 
\~rlieii  neither Nature nor Chance, but merely our own 
T\'ill,  brings  us into the neiglibourhood of  a  people 
tliat gives  no  promise  of  a  prospect of  entering into 
Civil Union with us, we are to be coiisidered entitled 
in any case to proceed witli force in tlie  intention of 
fuiiriding sucli a Union, and bringinp into a juridical 
state such men  as  the savage American Indians, the 
Hottentots, and  the  New  Hollanders;  Or-and  tlie 
case is not rnuch  better-whether  we  may establish 
Colonies by deceptive purchase, and so become owners 
of  their soil, and, in general, withoiit regard to tlieir 
first possession, make use at will of  oiir superiority in 
relation to theni ?  Further, may it not  be  held  thnt 
Nature  herself,  as  abhorring  a  vacuum,  seems  to 
demand such a  procedure, and tliat  large  regions in 
other Continents, that are now rnagnificently peopled, 
would otherwise have  remained iinpossessed by civil- 
ised  inhabitants, and might have for ever remained 
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beeii fisiisti.atecl  ?  It  is alinost uiinecessary to answer ; 
for  it is  easy to See  thraugh  all this flimsy veil of 
injustice,  which  just  anlounts  to  the Jesuitisin  of 
rnalring n  good  End justify  any Means.  This mode 
of  acqiiiring the Soil is, therefore, to be repudiated. 
The Indefiniteness of  esternal acquirable oh.jects in 
respect  of  their  Quantity, as well  as their  Quality, 
makes  the  problem  of  the  sole  prirnary  external 
Acquisition of  them one of  the niost dificult to solve. 
There must, however, be  sonie olle  first Acquisition 
of  an external object ; for  every  Acquisition  cannot 
be derivative.  Hence, the problem is not to be given 
iip as  insoluble,  or in itself  as impossible.  If it is 
solved by reference  to t$he Original Contract, unless 
this Contract  is extended so as to include the whole 
human  race, Acquisition under it would  still rernain 
biit provisional. 
16. 
Exposition of  the Conception of  a Primary Acquisition of 
the Soil. 
All men are originally in a comnzort  collectiuc posssssion 
of  the Soil  of  the whole  Earth (Commzcnio fundi orifi- 
naria), and  they  have  naturally  each  a  Will  to  use  it 
(lcx jzwti).  But on account of  the opposition  of  the free 
Will  of  one  to  that of  the other in the sphere of  action, 
tvhiclz  is inevitable  by  nature, all use of  the soil would 
he  preveiited  did  riot  every  will  contain  at  the Same 
time a Law for tlie regulatiori of  the relation of  all Wills 
in action, according  to which  a particular posscssion cail 
be determined to every one upon the comrnon soil.  This 
is the juridical  Law (la  juridica).  But  the distributive 
Law of  the  Mine and Thine, as applicable  to  each indi- 
vidual  on  tlie  soil, according  to the Axiom  of  external 
Frevdon~,  cannot proceed otherwise than from a prirnarilp 
united  Will  C?,  prio9-i-which  does  not  presiippose  any 
juridical  act  as requisite for  this union.  This Law can 
only tage form  in the  Civil  State  (lex jzlstitim  dZStrib2~- 
tiva);  as  it  is  in  this  state  alone  that  the  nnitecl 
common Will determines what is rigl~t,  what is rifiqzbl, and 
what is the constitution of  Right.  In  reference to this state, 
however,-and  prior to its establishment and in view of  it, 
-it  is p~ovisol-ily  a Dhty for every one to proceed  accord- 
ing to tlie Law of  external Acquisition; and accordingly it 
is a juridical procedure on the part of  the Will to lay every 
one under  Obligation  to recognise tlie  act  of  possessing 
and appropriating, although it be only unilaterally.  Hence 
a  provisory Acquisition of  the Soil, with all its juridical 
consequences, is possible in the state of  Nature. 
Such  an  Acquisition,  however,  requires  and  also 
obtains the  favozw  of  a  Permissive  Law (Lcx permzksiva), 
in respect  of  the  determination  of  the limits of  juridi- 
cally possible  Possession.  For  it precedes the juridical 
state,  and  as  merely  introductory  to  it  is  not  yet 
pereniptory;  and  this  favour  does  not  extend  farther 
than  the  date  of  the consent  of  the  other  CO-operators 
in the  establishment  of  the Civil  State.  But  if  they 
are  opposed  to  entering  into the  Civil  State, as long as 
this  opposition  lasts it carries  al1 the  effect of  a  guar- 
anteed juridical Acquisition with  it, because  the advance 
from  tl-ie  state  of  nature  Lo  the Civil  State is founded 
ripon  a Duty. 
17. 
Deduction  of  the Conception of  the original Primary 
Acquisition. 
We have found the Titk of Acquisition in a  universal 
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aii  external  Acquisition  in  space ; and  tlie  Mode  of 
Acquisition  is contained  in the einpirical fact of  takiag 
possession (App~eJ$ensio),  conjoined with the Will to have 
an external object as one's own.  It is further necessary 
to  unfold  from  tlie  Principles  of  tlie  pure  juridically 
Practical Reason involved in the conception, the juridical 
Acquisition  proper  of  an object,-that  is,  the  external 
Mine  and  Tliine  tliat  follows  from  tlie  two  previous 
conditions, as Rational Possession (possessio rnoz~uzenon). 
The  jusidical  Conceptiort  of  the externnl  Mine  aiid 
Tliine, so  far  as  it involves  the category  of  Substance, 
cannot  by '  that which  is extc~nal  to  nle' mean  merely 
'  in a 2~lace  other than  that in which I afn ;' for it is  ;L 
mtional  conception.  As under  tlie  conceptions  of  the 
Reason only intellectual conceptions can be embraced, tlie 
espression  in  question  can  only signify 'something  that 
is different  and distinct from me' according to the idea 
of  a  non-empirical Possession througli, as it were, a  cori- 
tinuous activity in taking possession of  an external object; 
and it involves  only the notion of  '  I~nving  sometlbing  in 
~12y po2ue1;'  which  indicates  the coniiection  of  an  object 
with myself, as a  subjective  condition  of  the  possibility 
of  making  use  of  it.  This forins  a  purely intellectual 
conccption  of  tlie  Understandin;.  Now  we  can  leave 
out  or  abstract from  the sensible  conditions  of  Posses- 
sion, as relations  of  a  Person  to  objects  which  have  no 
obligat.ion.  This  process  of  elimination  jiist  gives  the 
rational relation  of  a  Person  to  Pemons;  and it is such 
that  lie  can  bind  them al1 by an obligation in reference 
to tlie use of  things through his act of  Will, so far  as  it 
is coiiformable  to  the  Axio~~z  of  Freedolil, the Postz~latu 
of  Rigl~t,  aiid  the universal  Ltgiskation  of  the  common 
Mrill conceived as united  a priori.  This is tlierefore  tlie 
rational intelligible possession  of  things as  by pure Riglit, 
altliongh they are objects of  sense. 
It  is evident that the first  modification, limitatiori, 
or  trc~~zsfo~~lzation  generally of  a  portion  of  the Soil 
cannot  of  itself  furnish  a  Titlt? to  its Acquisition, 
since possession of  an Accident does not form a ground 
for legal possession  of  the Substance.  Rather, con- 
versely, the inference as to the Mine and Thine must 
Be  drawn from owiiership of  the Substance accordinp 
to the rule,  Accessnriunt  sequitur  sz~um  pri~zcipab.' 
Hence one who has spent labour on a piece of  ground 
that was  not already liis own, has  lost his effort and 
work  to  the  former  Owner.  This  position  is  so 
evident of itself, that tlie olcl  opinion  to the oppbsite 
effect, that is still spread far and wide, can hardly be 
ascribed  to any  other  than  the prevailing  illusion 
which  unconsciously leads  to the Yersonification of 
things; and, then, as if they  coiild be  bound  under 
an obligation  Ily  the laboiir  bestowed upon them to 
be  at the Service of  the Person who does the labour, 
to regard  them as his by immediate Right.  Other- 
wise it is probable that the natural question-already 
discussed-would  not have been  passed  over with so 
light a  tread, namely, 'How  is a  Riglit  in  a  thing 
possible?'  For,  Right  as  against  every  possible 
possessor  of  a  Thing,  means  only  the  claim  of  a 
particular  Will to the  use  of  an object  so far as it 
may be included in the All-comprehending  universal 
Will, and can be thought as in harmony with its law. 
As regards  bodies  situated iipon a piece of groiind 
whicli is already mine, if they otherwise belong to no 
other Person, they belong to me without my requiring 
any particular  juridical  act for  the purpose  of  this 
Acq~iisition  ;  they are mine  not fc~cto,  biit lege.  For 
they may be  regarded  as Accidents  inhering in the 
Snbstance  of  the Soil,  and they are thus niine ju~e 
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wliich  is  so  connected with  anything  of  mine,  tliat 
it cannot be  separated  from  wliat  is mine  withont 
altering  it  substantially.  Examples  of  this  are 
Gilding 011  an object, Mixtiire of  a material belonging 
to  me with  other  things,  Alluvial deposit,  or  even 
Alteration of  the adjoining bed of  a streani or river in 
my favour  so  as to produce  an increase of  my land, 
etc.  By the sanle principles  tlie  question must also 
be  decided  as  to  whether  the acquirable  Soil rnay 
extend fartlier  than the existing land, so  as even to 
include part of the bed of  the Sea, with  the Right. to 
fish  on my own  shores, to gather Amber  and  such 
like.  So  far  as I have  the mechanical  capability 
from my own Site, as the place I occupy, to secure my 
Soil frorn the attack  of  others-and,  therefore, as far 
as Cannon  can carry from the shore-all  is includecl 
in my possession, and the sea is thus far  closed (mare 
clausum).  But  as there is no  Site  for  Occupation 
upon  the wide  sea itself, possible  possession  cannot 
be  extended  so  far, and  the Open  sea  is free (rnnre 
liberz~m). But in the  case  of  men,  or  things  that 
belong to them, becoming st?-anded  on the Shore, since 
the fact  is not voluntary,  it cannot be  regarded  by 
the  owner  of  the shore  as  giving  him  a  Right of 
Acquisition.  For  shipwreck  is not an act of  Will, 
nor  is its resiilt a lesion  to him; and things which 
may have come thus upon his Soil, as still belonging 
to some one, are not to be treated as being without an 
Owner  or Res nullius.  On the other hand, a  River, 
so  far  as  possession  of  the bank  reaches,  may  be 
originally  acquired,  like any other piece  of  ground, 
under  the  above  restrictions,  by  one  mho  is  in 
possession of  both its banks. 
PBOPERTY  (don~iniz~17~)  of  that  Person  to  whom  all  tlie 
Rights in it as a thing belong, like the Accideilts inlierina 
in a  Substance, and which, therefore, Iie as the Yroprietor 
(~Zo~?zinz~)  can  dispose  of  at will  (jus disponendi  de  Te 
sun).  Eut from  t,liis it  follows  at  once,  that such  an 
object  can  only  be  a  Corporeal  Thing  towards  which 
theie  is  no  direct personal  Obligation.  Heiice  a  mall 
nlay  be  131s  OWN  MASTER  (sz~i  jzc~is) but  not  the  Pro- 
prietor  of  hi~nself (szci  c701ninzbs),  so  as  to  be  sble  to 
dispose  of  himself  at will,  to  say nothing  of  tlie  possi- 
bility of  such  a  relation  to  other  men; because  he is 
responsible to Huinanity in his own Person.  This point, 
however, as belonging to the Right of  Humanity as such, 
rather than to that of  individual men, would not be dis- 
cussed  at its proper  place  here,  but  is  only mentioned 
incidentally for the better  elncidation  of  what  has just 
been said.  It  may be further  observed  that  there  rnay 
be two full Proprietors of  one and the same thing, with- 
out  there  beii~g  a  Mine and Thine in common, but only 
in so far as they are common Possessors of  what belongs 
only to one  of  them  as  his own,  In  such  a  case  the 
whole  Poesession without  the  Use  of  the thing, belongs 
to one  only of  the  Co-proprietors  (condonzini);  while  to 
the other belongs all the Use  of  the thing along with its 
Possession.  The former as the direct Proprietor (domintu 
directzls),  therefore, restricts  the  latter  as  the Proprietor 
in use (clonzinus utilis)  to the conclition of  a certain  con- 
tinuoi~s  performance, with  reference  to  the  tliiilg  itself, 
without limiting him in the use of  it. 
An external Object, which, in respect of  its Substance, 
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SECOND  SECTION. 
18. 
Nature and Acquisition of  Personal Right. 
Tlie  possession  of  tlie  active  free -will  of  anotlier 
Person, as the power  to  determine  it by  nly Will  to  t~ 
certain action, according to Laws of  Freedom,  is  a  forri~ 
of  Right  relating  to  the external Mine  and  Thine,  as 
affected  by  the Causality .of  anotlier.  It is  possible  to 
l-iave several such Rights in reference to the same Persoii 
or  to  different  persoiis.  The  Principle  of  the  Systeni 
of  Laws, according to whicli I can be in such possession, 
is that  of  Personal  Riglit,  and  there  is  only one such 
Principle. 
The  Acquisition  of  a  Personal  Right  can  never  be 
primary  or  arbitrary ;  for  such a  mode  of  acquiring  it 
would  not  be  in  accordance witli  the Principle  of  the 
harmony of  the  freedom  of  my  will  with  the  freedoni 
of  every other, aiid  it wonld  therefore  be  wrong.  Nor 
can such a Eiglit be acquired by means of  any un~kst  act 
OE  aiiother  (facto injj(,sti alterius), as  being  itself  con- 
trary to  Right ; for if  siich  a wrong  as it implies wert.. 
perpetrated on  me, and I coiild demand satisfaction froni 
the other,  iii  accordance with  Riglit, yet  in such a Cast.. 
I would onIy be entitled  to niaintain undiminished  what 
was  mine, aiid  not  to  accliiire anything n~ore  thnil wliat 
I formerly had. 
Acquisition  by  means  of  the  actiorl  of  ailotlier,  to 
whicli I determine  his Will according to Laws of  Piigit, 
is therefore always  derived  from what  that  other has as 
liis own.  This derivation, as  a  Juridical act, canilot be 
effected by a mere negative relinquishment or rerunciation 
of  wliat  is  his  (per  de?.elictionent  az~t  renun,ciatione?)t)  ; 
because  such  a  negative  Act would  only  amount  to a 
cessation  of  his  Right, and not  to the acquirement of  a 
Right  on  the part of  another.  It is  therefore only by 
positive TRANSFERENGE  (translatio), or  CONVEYANCE,  that 
R  Personal  Iiight  can  be  acquired;  and  this  is  only 
possible  by  means  of  a  comrnoii Will,  through  which 
objects conie into the power of  olle  or  other,  so  that  as 
one  renounces  a  particular  thing which  lie  holds under 
the common  Right, the Same  object  when  accepted  by 
another,  in  consequence  of  a  positive  act  of  Will, 
becomes his.  Such  transference  of  the Pv-operty of  one 
to  another  is termed  its ALIENATIOX. The  act of  the 
iinited Wills of  two  Persons, by which what belonged to 
one passes to the other, constitutes CONTRACT. 
Acquisition by Contract. 
In every  CONTRAGT  tliere  are fozlr  Jzcridical Acts  of 
Will involved ;  tzvo  of  them  being preparatorg  Acts, and 
two of  them constitutive -4cts.  The two Preparatory Acts, 
as  forms  of  treating  in  the  Transaction,  are  OFFER 
(oblatw) and  APPBOVAL  (app~obatio);  the t;wo  Constitu- 
tive Acts, as the forms of  conclzt.ding  the transaction, are 
PHOMISE  (  promissz~m)  and ACCEPTANCE  (acceptatio).  For 
an  offer  cannot  constitiite  a  Promise  before  it can  be 
judged  that the thing offered (oblatzcm) is something that 
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much  is  sliown  by  the  first  two  declaratioiis ; but  by 
them alone there is nothing as yet acquired. 
Further,  it is neither  by  the particz~lar  Will of  the 
Promiser  nor  that  of  the Acceptor  tliat the property of 
the  former  passes  over to  the latter.  This is effected 
only by the conzbined or united Wills  of  both,  and  con- 
sequently so far only as the Will  of  both  is declared  at 
the  Same  time  or  simultaneously.  Now,  such  simul- 
taneousness  is  impossible  by empirical  acts of  declara- 
tion, which can only follow  each other  in time,  and  are 
never  actually  simultaneous.  For  if  I have  promised, 
and  another  Person  is now  merely  willing  to  accept, 
during  the interval  before  actual  Acceptance,  liowever 
short  it  may  be,  I may retract my offer, because  I am 
thus far  still free;  and, on the other side, the Acceptor, 
for  the same  reason,  may likewise  hold  hiniself  not to 
be  bound,  up  till  the  mornent  of  Acceptance,  by  his 
counter-declaration  following upon  the  Promise. -  Tlie 
external  Formalities  or  Solemnities  (solemnia)  on  tlie 
conclusion  of  a  Contract,-  such  as  shalcing  hands  or 
breakirig a straw (stipula)  laid hold of  by two persons,- 
and all tlie various modes of  confirmiiig the Declarations 
on eitlier  side, prove  in  fact  the  embarrassment  of  the 
contracting parties as to  how and in what way they may 
represent  Declarations,  which  are  always  successive,  as 
existing sinzultaneozlsly at the Same  moment;  and these 
forms  fail to  clo  tliis.  They are,  by their very nature, 
Acts  necessarily  following  each  other  in time,  so  that 
when the one Act is, the other either is not yet  or  is no 
longer. 
It  is only the philosophical  Transcendental  Deduction 
of  the  Conception  of  Acquisition  by  Contract, that  can 
remove  all  these  dificulties.  In a jz~ridical external 
relation, niy taking possession of  the free-will of  anotlier, 
as  tlie  czluse  that determined it to a certain Act, is  con- 
ceived  at  first  empirically by means  of  the declaratior~ 
and  counter-declaration  of  the  free-will  of  each  of  us 
in time, as the sensible  conditions  of  talring  possession ; 
and the two juridical  Acts must  necessarily  be regnrded 
as following  one  another  in  time.  But  because  this 
relation, viewed  as juridical,  is purely Rational in itself, 
the Will  as a  law-giving  faculty  of  Reason  represents 
this  possession  as  intelligible  or  rational  (possessio 
nownlenon),  in  accordailce with  coriceptions of  Freedoin 
and under abstraction of  those empirical conditions.  And 
now, the two  Acts  of  Proniise  and  Acceptance  are  not 
regarded as following  one  another  in  time,  biit,  in tlie 
nlanner  of  a pnctunz  re  initum,  as  proceeding  from  a 
conzmon Will, which is expressed by tlie term '  at the sanle 
time,'  or '  simultaneous,'  and  the object  promised  (pm 
n~issuqn)  is  represented,  undei  elimination  of  empirical 
conditions, as acquired according  to tlie Law of  the pure 
Practical Reasoii. 
That t,his is the true and only possible Deduction 
of  the idea of  Acquisition  by Contract, is suficiently 
attested by the laborious yet always futile striving of 
rvriters  on  Jurisprudence-such  as Moses  Mendels- 
sohn  in his  Je~*usalen~-to  adduce  k  proof  of  its 
rational possibi1ity.-The  qiiestion is put thus : '  Why 
o~ght  I to lteep  my Promise? ' for it is assumed  as 
understood  by all that I ought to do so.  It is, how- 
ever, absolutely impossible  to g!ve  any further proof 
of  the Categorical  Imperative implied ;  jnst  as it is 
impossible  for  the Geometrician 60 prove by rational 
Syllogisms  that  in  order  to construct  a  Triangle, I 
must  take three  Lines -so  far  an Analytical Pro- 
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be greater than the third-a  Sgnthetical Proposition, 
and like the former C?,  priori.  It  is a Postulate of  the 
Pure Reason  that we ought to abstract from  all the 
sensible conditions of  Space and Time in reference to 
the conception of  I-light;  and the theory of  the pos- 
sibility  of  such  Abstraction  from  these  conditions 
without taking away  the reality  of  the Possession, 
just  constitutes  the Transcendental Deduction of  the 
Conception  of  Acquisition  by Contract.  It  is quite 
nkin to what was presented under the last Title, as the 
Theory of  Acquisition by Occupation of  tlie external 
object. 
What is acquired by  Contract ? 
But  what  is  that, clesignated  as  'External,'  which  I 
acquire  by  Contract ?  As it  is  only the  Causality  of 
the active Will of  another, in respect of  the Performance 
of  something  promised  to  me,  I  do  not  immediately 
acquire  thereby  an external  Thing, but  an Act  of  the 
Will  in  question, whereby a Thing is brought  rinder my 
power  so  that I mnke it mine.-By  the Contract, there- 
fore, I acquire  the Promise of  another, as  distinguished 
from  the Thing promised ; and yet something is thereby 
adaed  to  my Having  and  Possession.  I have  become 
the richr in  possession.  (loczpletior) by the Acquisition  of 
an active  Obligation  that I can bring to bear  upon  the 
Freedom  and  Capability of  another. -  This  my  Right, 
however, is only a personal  Right, valid only to the effect 
of  acting upon a particulur physical Person arid specially 
upon the  Causality of  his Will, so  that he shall perfornt 
something  for  me.  It  is not  a Rcnl  Eight  upon' that 
Moral  Person, which  is identified with  the  Idea  of  the 
united  Will of  All  viewed  Zc  priori,  and  through  which 
nlone I can  acqiiire a Right 2:c~licl  agciinst every Posscssor 
of  the  Thing.  For, it is iii this that all Eight in  n Thing 
consists. 
The  Transfer  or  transmission  of  mliat  is mine  to 
another  by  Contract, takes  place  according  to  tlie 
Law of  Continuity (Lex Co?zlinui).  Possession of  the 
object  is not interriipted for a  moment  during this 
Act; for, otherwise, I would acquire an object in this 
state as a Thing that had no Yossessor, and it tvoiild 
thiis be  acquired originally ;  wliich is corltrary to the 
iclea  of  a  Contra&.-This  Continuity,  however,  ini- 
plies that it is not  the particular Will of  either the 
Prorniser  or  the Acceptor, but  their  united  Will i~i 
common, that transfers what is mine to another.  And 
Iicnce  it is not accomplished in such a manner  that 
the Promiser  first  relinquishes  (derelinquit)  his  1'0s- 
session for the beriefit  of  aiiother,  or  renounces  his 
Right  (ren.ilncint), and thereupoii  the  other  at  the 
snme time enters upon it ;  or conversely.  ,The Trans- 
fer  (translntio)  is therefore  an  Act  iri  which  tlie 
object  belongs for a moment ut the sa?ne time to both, 
just  as in the parabolic path of a projectiIe the object 
on reaching  its highest  point may be regarded  for a 
i~ioment  as at tl~e  snme  tinze both rising and falling, 
and as thus passing iii fact from the ascending to the 
falliiig rnotion. 
Acceptance and Delivery. 
d  thing  is  ilot acquired  in a case of  Contract  by the 
ACCEPTANCE  (ncceptatio) of  the Promise, but  only by the 
DELIVERY  (trnditio)  of  the  object  proniised.  For  sll 
l'romise  is  relative  to  Pc~formance ;  and  if  what  was 
promised  is  a  Thirig,  the  Performance cannot  be  exe- 
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is put by the Promiser into possession of  tlie Thiilg ; and 
tliis is Delivery.  Before tlie Delivery and tlle Reception 
of  tlie  Thing, the Performance of  the  act  reqiiired  has 
not  yet taken place ; tlie Thing  has not yet passed from 
tlie  one  Person  to the other, and  consequently has  not 
beeil  acquired  by that  other.  Hence  the Riglit arising 
frorn  a  Contract, is  only a Personal Right ; ancl  it only 
becomes a Real Right by Delivery. 
A  Contract  upoii  wliich  Delivery  immediately 
follows (pactzcm  re initum) excludes  ariy interval  of 
time between its concliision and its execution ;  and as 
such it requires no further particular act in the future 
by which  one persoii  rriay transfer to anotlier what is 
his.  But if  there is a time-definite  or  indefinite- 
agreed  upon  between  them  for  the  Delivery,  the 
question then  arises, Whether the Thing has  already 
before that time become the Acceptor's by the Con- 
tract, so that his Right is a Right  in the Thing; or 
whether  a  further  special  Contract  regarding  the 
Delivery  alone  nlust  be  entered  upon,  so  that the 
Right that is acquired by  mere Acceptance  is oiily 
a Personal Right, and thus it does not become a Right 
in the Thing until Delivery ?  That the relation rnust 
be determined according to the latter alternative, will 
be clear from what follows. 
Suppose I conclude a Contract about a Thing that 
I wish to acqiiire,-such  as a Horse,-and  that I take 
it immediately into my Stable, or otherwise  into my 
possession ;  then it is mine (vi pacti re initi), and niy 
Right is a Right in the Thing.  But if  I leave it in 
the hands  of  the Seller witliont arranging witli him 
specially  in  whose  physical  possession  or  holding 
(detentio)  this  Thing shall be before my taking pos- 
Session  of  it  (apprehelzsio),  and  consequently  before 
the actual Change  of  possession, the Korse is not yet 
rnine ;  and the Right which 1 acquire is only a Right 
against a particular Person-namely,  the Seller of  the 
Horse-to  beput into possessio~~  of  the object (  poscendi 
traditio7~em)  as the subjective condition of  any use  of 
it at my  will.  My  Right  is thus only  a  Personal 
Eight to demand from tlie Seller the pe~formance of 
his  promise  (prmstatio) to put  me into possession of 
the thing.  Now, if  the Contract does not contaiii the 
condition of  Delivery at the sawze  time,-as  a pactunz 
re  initum,-and  consequently an interval of  time in- 
tervenes between  the conclusion of  the Contract  and 
the taking possession  of  the object  of  acquisition, I 
cannot  obtain  possession  of  it during  this  interval 
otherwise  than by exercising tlie  partlcnlar juridical 
activity called a possesso~y  Act  (uctzcm  possessorium) 
which  constitntes a special  Coritract.  Tliis Act con- 
sists in my saying, ' I will send to fetch the horse,'  to 
wllich  the  Seller  has  to agree.  For  it is not  self- 
evident  or  universally reasonable,  that any one  will 
take a  Thing destined for the use of  another into his 
Charge  at his  owri  risk.  On the contrary, a  special 
Contract  is necessary for this arrangement, according 
to wliich the Alienator of  a  thing continues to be  its 
owner during a certain de$nite  time, and must bear the 
risk of wliatever may happen to it ;  while the Acquirer 
can only be regarded by the Seller as the Owner, when 
he  has  delayed  to enter irito  possession  beyond  the 
date  at which  he agreed to take  delivery.  Prior  to 
the  Possessory  Act,  therefore,  all  that  is acquired 
by the  Contract  is only  a Personal .light;  and the 
Acceptor  can  acquire  an  external  Thing  oiily  by 
Delivery. KANT'S  PHILOSOPHY OB LAW. 
THIED SEOTION. 
(Jus realiter personale.) 
22. 
Nature of  Personal Right of  a Real Kind. 
Personal  Right  of  a  real  kind  is the  Right  to  the 
possession.  of  an esternal  object AS  A  THING,  and  to  the 
use of  it AS  A  PERSON.-T~~  Mine  and  Thine  embraced 
under  this  Eight  relate  specially  to  the  Family  and 
Household ; and  tlie relations involved are those  of  free 
beings  in  reciprocal  real  interaction  with  each  other. 
Througli  their  relations  and influence  as  Persons  upoii 
one another, in accordance with the principle of  external 
Freedom  as  the cnzbse  of  it,  they form  a  Society  com- 
posed  as  a  whoie  of  members  stailding  in commuiiity 
with  each  other  as  Persons;  and  this  constitutes  the 
HOUSEHOLD.-The  mode  in  which  tliis  social statiis  is 
acquired by individuals, and  the functions which  prevail 
within  it, proceed  neither  by arbitrary individual  action 
(fitcto), nor  by mere Contract (paeto), but  by Law (lege). 
And this Law as being not only a Right, but also as con- 
stituting  Possession  in reference  to a Person, is  a  Eight 
rising above all mere Real and Personal Right.  It  nliist, 
in fact, form the Right of  Humanity in our own Person ; 
and, as such, it  has  as its consequence  a  natural  Per- 
missive  Law,  by the favour  of  which  such  Acquisition 
becomes possible to us. 
What is acquired in the Kousehold ? 
Tlie Acquisition that is fouiided  upon  tliis  Law is, as 
regards its objects, threefold.  The Man acquires a WIFE  ; 
tlie Husband and Wife acquire  CHILDREN,  constituting a 
Family ;  ancl  the Family acquire DOMESTICS. All  these 
objects, while acquirable, are inalienable ; and  tlie  Riglit 
of  Possession in these objects is tlte  most  st~ictly  perso~tnl 
of  nll Rights. 
THE RIGHTS  OF THE FAMILY AS  A  DOMESTIC 
SOCIETY. 
TITLE FIRST. 
CONJUGAL  RIGHT. 
(Husband  and  Wife.) 
24. 
The Natural Basis of  Marriage. 
The domestic Relations are  founded  on 'Marriage, alid 
Marriage  is  fouiided  upon  the  natural  Reciprocity  or 
iiitercommunity (conzmercizint) of  the Sexes.'  This naturaI 
1  Commerciztm sextbale est  ZLSZCS  membrorum  et facultatum  scx~tali~i~it, 
alterias.  This  'USUS'  is  either  natiiral,  by  which  hiiinan  beings  may 
reprodiice their  own  kind, or iinnatural, which, again, refers either to a 
persoii  of  the same  Sex  or to an animal  of  another  species than niari. 
These  transgressions  of  all  IAaw,  as '  crimina  carnis contra naturam,' 
are even '  not to be named ;  ' and as urongs against all Hiimanity in tlie 
Person they caniiot  be  saved, by  aiig limitatioii  or exception whate~er, 
froiii entire rcprobation. 11  0  KANT'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF LAW. 
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iinion of  the  sexes proceecls either accordiiig to the mere 
animal  Nature  (zaga  libido,  venqu  vulgioagn,  for?zicatio), 
or  according  to  Law.  The latter is MARRIAGE  (nzatri- 
~noniz~m),  which is tlie Union of  two Persons of  digerent 
sex  for  life - long  reciprocal  possession  of  their  sexual 
facu1ties.-The  End of  producing and educating chilclren 
may be regarded  as  always  the End  of  Nature  in im- 
planting mutual desire and inclination in the sexes ; biit 
it is not necessary for  the rightfulness  of  marriage that 
those  who  marry  should  set  tliis  before  themselves  as 
the End  of  their  Union,  otherwise  the Marriage would 
be  dissolved  of  itself  when  tlie  production  of  children 
ceased. 
And even  assuming that  eiijoyment in the reciprocal 
use  of  the sexual  endowments  is  an end  of  marriage, 
yet  the  Contract  of  Marriage  is  not  on that account a 
matter of  arbitrary will, but  is a  Contract  necessary  in 
its  nature  by  the Law  of  Humanity.  In other words, 
if  a  man  and  a  woman  have  the  will  to  enter  on 
reciprocal  enjoyment  in  accordance  with  their  sexual 
nature,  they  must  iiecessarily  marry  eacli  other;  ancl 
this  necessity  is in  accordance with  the juridical  Laws 
of  Pure Eeason. 
25. 
The Rational Right of  Marriage. 
For,  this  natural '  Commercium'-as  a  '  zuus  mem- 
brorurn sexz~alium  alteritu '-is  an enjoyment  for which 
the one Person is given up to the other.  In this  rela- 
tion the human individual makes himself  a '  res,'  whicli 
is contrary to the Right of  Humanity in his own  Person. 
This, however, is  only possible  iinder  the one condition, 
that as the olle  Person is acquired by the other as a TL'S, 
that same Person also equally acquires  the other recipro- 
cally,  and  thus  regains  and  re-establislies  tlie  rationa! 
Personality.  The Acquisition  of  a  part  of  the human 
organism beiiig, on account of  its unity, at tlie sarne tiiiic 
the acquisition  of  tlie whole Person, it follo~vs  that  tlie 
surrender and  acceptation  of, or  by, one sex in relatioii 
to the otlier, is not  only pernzissible  uiider  the  condition 
of  Marriage,  but  is  further  only  really possible  under 
that condition.  But tlie Persoiial Right thcls acquired is 
at the same time,  real  in kind;  and  tliis  characteristic 
of it is establislied by the fact that if  one of  the married 
Persons run away or enter into the possession of  another, 
the other  is entitled, at any time, and incontestably, to 
bring such a one back to the  former  relation, as  if  that 
Person were a Thing. 
Monogamy and Equality in Marriage. 
For  the sarne  reasons,  tlie  relation  of  the Married 
Persons  to  each  other  is  a  relation  of  EQLJALITY  as 
regards  the  mutual  possession  of  their  Persons,  as 
well  as  of  their  Goods.  Consequently Marriage is only 
truly  realized  in  MONOGAMY;  for  in  the  relation  of 
Polygamy  the  Person  who  is  given  away  011  the  one 
side, gains only a  part  of  the  one  to whom that Person 
is given up, and therefore becomes  a  mere  res.  Biit  in 
respect of  their Goods, they have severally the Right  to 
renounce the use  of  any part of  them, although only by 
a special Contract. 
From the Principle thus stated, it also follou~s  that 
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urider  a  Contract of  Right, as the hiring of a pcrson 
on any one occasion, in tlie way  of  a pactzmn forni- 
cationis.  For,  as  regards  such a  Contract  as  this 
latter relation  would  imply, it must be  admitted by 
all that any one wlio might enter into it could not Be 
legally held to the fulfilment of  tlieir prornise if  they 
wisbed to resile from it.  And as regards the former, 
a  Contract  of  Concubinage  would  also  fall  as  a 
pnctz~?~z  tzhrpe;  becaiise  as  a  Contract  of  tlie  hive 
(locntio, condzlctw), of  a part for  the iise of  another, 
on  account  of  tlie inseparable iinity of  tlie  members 
of  a  Person, any one  entering into such  a  Contract 
would be actiially surrendering  as  a  res to the arbi- 
trary Will of  another.  Hence  any party may annul 
a  Contract  like this if  entered  into with any other, 
at any time  and  at pleasure;  aiid  that other woiild 
have no ground, in the circumstances, to complain  of 
a  lesion  of  his  Rig11t.  The snme holds likewise of  a 
morganatic  or  '  left-hand ' Marriage  contracted  in 
order to turn the iriequality in the social status of the 
two parties  to advantage  in the way of  establishing 
the social supremacy of  the one over  the other ;  for, 
in fact, such  a  relation  is not really different  from 
Concubinage, according to the principles  of  Natural 
Right,  and  therefore  does  not  constitute  a  real 
Marriage.  Hence  the question  may be raised as to 
whether it is not contrary to the Equality of  rnarried 
Persons when tlie Law says  in any way of  the Hus- 
band in relation to the Wife, '  he shall be thy master,' 
so that he is represented as tlie one who  comniands, 
and she as the one who obeys.  This, however, cannot 
be regarded  as contrary to the natural Equality of  a 
human  pair,  if  such legal Supremacy is basecl  only 
iipon  the natural superiority of  tlie faculties  of  the 
Husband compared with the Wife, in the effectuation 
of  the comnion interest of  the household ;  and if the 
Riglit to command,  is based rnerely upon  this fact. 
For this Right  map  tlius  be  deduced from the very 
duty of  Unity  aiid  Equality in relation  to the End 
involved. 
27. 
Fulfilment of the Contract of Marriage. 
The  Contract of  Marriage  is  completed  only by coii- 
jugal  cohabitation.  A  Contract  of  two  Persons  of 
different  Sex,  with  the  secret  understanding  either  to 
abstain from conjugal cohabitation or with the conscious- 
ness  on  either  side  of  incapacity  for  it, is a  simulatcd 
Contract ;  it does  not  constitute a marriage, and it may 
be dissolved by either of  the parties at will.  But if the 
incapacity only  arises  after marriage,  the Right  of  tlie 
Contract  is not annulled or diminished  by a contingency 
that cannot be legally blamed. 
The  Acquisition of  a  Spouse  either as a  Husband or 
as a Wife, is therefore  not constituted facto-that  is, by 
Cohabitation-without  a  preceding  Contract ;  nor  even 
pacto-by  a  mere  Contract  of  Marriage, without subse- 
quent Cohabitation ; but  only lege, that is, as a juridical 
consequence  of  the obligation  that  is  formed  by  two 
Persons entering into a sexual Union solely on  the  basis 
of  a reciprocal Possemion of  each other, which  Possession 
at  the  same  time  is  only  effected  in reality  by  the 
reciprocal '  usus facultatum sexualium alterius.' RIGHTS  OF THE FAMILY  AS  A  DOMESTIC 
SOCIETY. 
TITLE  SECOND. 
YAKENTAL  RIGHT. 
(Parent and Child.) 
The Relation of  Parent and Child. 
From  the  Duty  of  Man  towards  himself-that  is, 
towards  the  Humanity in his  own  Person-there  tlius 
arises  a  personal  Right  on  the part of  the Members of 
the  opposite  sexes,  as  Persons,  to  acquire  one  another 
really  and  reciprocally  by  Marriage.  In like  manner, 
from  the  fact  of  P~ocreation in  the  union  thus  con- 
stituted, there follows the Duty of  preserving and rearing 
Childrcn  as  the  Pioducts  of  this  Union.  Accordingly 
Children, as  Persons, have, at the Same time, an original 
congenital  Right-distinguished  from  mere  hereditary 
1Zight-to  be  reared  by  the care  of  their  Parents  till 
they are capable of  maintaining themselves ;  and this pro- 
vision  becomes immediately  theirs  by Law, without  any 
particnlar juridical Act being required to determine it. 
For  what  is  thus  produced  is  a  Person,  and  it is 
impossible  to think  of  a  Being  endowed with  personal 
Freedom as produced merely by a physical process.  And 
lience, in the  practical  relation, it is  quite a correct and 
even  a  necessary Idea to regard the act of  generation as 
a  process  by  which  a  Person  is brouglit  without  his 
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consent  into  the world, and  placed  in it by the respon- 
sible free will of  others.  This Act, therefore, attachw an 
obligation to the Parents to make their Children-as  far 
as  their  power goes-contented  with  the condition  thus 
acquired.  Hence  Parents  cannot  regard their  Child as, 
in a  manner, a  Thing  of  tiiei~  own  snaking, for a Beiilg 
endowed  with  Freedom  cannot  be  so  regarded.  Nor, 
conseqiiently,  have  they a  Right to  destroy it as  if  it 
were  their  own  property, or  even  to leave it to chance; 
because  they have  brought  a  Being  into the world who 
becomes  in fact  a  Citizen  of  the world, and  they have 
placed that Being in a state which they cannot be left to 
treat  with  indifference,  even  according  to  the  natural 
conceptions of  Right. 
We cannot  even conceive how  it is possible  that 
GOD  ccbn  create  FREE Beings ;  for it  dppears as if ail 
their  future  actions,  being  predetermined  by  that 
first act, would  be  contained in the chain of  natural 
necessity, and that, therefore, they could not be free. 
But as men we  are free in fact, as is proved  by the 
Categorical  Imperative  in  the  moral  and  practical 
relation  as an authoritative decision of  Beason ;  yet 
reason cannot make the possibility of  such a relation 
of  Cause to Effect  conceivable from  the theoretical 
point  of  view, because they  are both  suprasensible. 
All that  can  be  demanded  of  Reason  under  these 
conditions,  would  merely  be to prove  that there  is 
no  Contradietion  involved  in  the  conception  of  a 
CREATION  OB BRXE BEINGS;  and tbis may be  done by 
showing  that Contradiction  only arises  wheri,  along 
with the Category of  Causality, the Condition of  Time 
is transferred to the relation of  suprasensible  Things. 
This condition, as implying that the cause of an effect 
must  precede  the effect  as  its reason,  is  inevitable 
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another ;  and if this conception of  Causality were to 
have objective  reality  given  to it  in the theoretical 
bearing,  it  would  also  have  to  be  referred  to  the 
suprasensible sphere.  But the Contradiction vanishes 
when  the  pure  Category,  apart  from  any  sensible 
conditions, is applied from  the moral and practical 
eensible  point of  view, and consequently as in a  non-, 
relation to the conception of  Creation. 
The philosophical  Jurist will not  regard  this in- 
vestigation,  when  thus  carried  back  even  to  the 
ultimate Principles of  the Transcendental I'hilosophy, 
as an unnecessary subtlety in a Metaphysic of  Morals, 
or as losing itself in airnless obscurity, when he takes 
into consideration the difficulty of  the problem to be 
solved, and also the necessity of  doing justice in this 
inquiry to the ultimate relations of  the Yrinciples of 
Right. 
29. 
The  Rights of the Parent. 
From  the  Duty thus  indicated,  there  further  rieces- 
sarily arises  the  Right  of  the  Parents to THE  MANAGK- 
MENT  AND  TRAINIXG  OB THE  CHILD,  SO long as it is itself 
incapable  of  making  proper  use  of  its  body  as  an 
Organism, and  of  its mind  as an  Understanding.  This 
involves its nourishmeilt and the  care  of  its Education. 
This  includes, in  general, tlie  function  of  forming  and 
developing  it practically, that  it  may  be  able  in  the 
future to maintain and advance itself, and  also its moral 
Culture  and  Development,  the  guilt  of  neglecting  it 
falling upon the Parents.  All this  training is to be con- 
tinued till the Child reaclies the  period  of  Emancipation 
(emancipatio), as the age of  practicable self-support.  The 
Parents  then  virtually  renounce  the  parental  Right  to 
command,  as well  as  all  claim  to  repayment for  their 
previous care  and  trouble;  for which  care  and  trouble, 
after the process of  Education is complete, they can only 
appeal  to  the  Children  by  way  of  any  claim,  on  the 
ground  of  the  Obligation of  Gratitude  as  a  Duty  of 
Virtue. 
From  the  fact  of  Personality  in  the  Children,  it 
fiirther  follows  that  they can  never  be regarded as the 
Yroperty of  the Parents, but  only as  belonging to them 
by way of  being in their possessiom,  like other things that 
are held apart from the possession of  all others and  that 
can be brought back even against the will of  the Subjects. 
Hence  the  Right  of  the  Parents is not  a  purely  Real 
Right, and it is not alienable (juspersonalissimum).  But 
neither  is  it a  mcrely  Personal  Right ;  it is a  Personal 
Right  of  a  real  kind, that  is, a  Personal  Right that is 
constituted  and  exercised  after  the  nzanwr  of  a  Real 
Right. 
I£ is  therefore  evident that  the  Title  of  a  Personul 
Right  of  a aal  Kind  must  necessarily be  added, in the 
Science  of  Right,  to  the  Titles  of  Real  Right  and 
Personal  Right,  the Division  of  Rights  into  these  two 
being not complete.  For, if  the Right of  the Parents to 
the  Children were  treated  as  if  it were  merely a  Real 
Right  to  a  part  of  whnt  belongs  to  their  house,  they 
could not found only upon  the  Duty of  the  Children to 
return  to  them  in claiming  them when they run away, 
but  they would  be  then  entitled  to  seize  them and to 
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This  Contract,  then,  of  the  Master  of  a  Household 
with his Domestics, cannot be  of  such a nature  that the 
use  o£ them could ever rightly become an abuse  of  them ; 
and the judgment as to what  constitutes  zlse  or  abuse in 
such circumstances is not left  merely to  the Master, but 
is also competent to the Servants, who  ought never to be 
held in bondage  or  bodily servitude  as  Slaves or  Serfs. 
Such a Contract cannot, therefore, be  concluded  for  life, 
but in all  cases  only for a definite  period, within which 
one  party  may  intimate to  the  other  a termination  of 
their  connection.  Children, however, including even the 
children  of  one  who  has  become  enslaved  owing  to  a 
Crime,  are  always  free.  For  every man  is  born  free, 
because he has at birth as yet broken no Law ;  and even 
the  cost  of  his  education till  his  maturity,  cannot  be 
reckoned as a debt which  he  is  bound to pay.  Even  a 
Slave, if it were in his power, would be bound to educate 
his children without being entitled  to  count and  reckon 
with them  for  the  cost;  and  in view  of  his  own inca- 
pacity  for  discharging this function, the Possessor  of  a 
Slave, therefore, enters upon the Obligation which he has 
rendered the Slave himself  unable to fulfiL 
Here, again, as under the first two Titles, it is clear 
that there is a Personal Right of  a Real kind, in the 
relation of  the Master of  a House to his Domestics. 
For he can legally demand them as belonging to what 
is externally his, from  any other possessor  of  them ; 
and he is entitled to  fetch them  back  to his house, 
even  before  the reasons  that may have led them  to 
run away, and their particular  Ilight in the  circum- 
stances, have been judicially investigated.  [See SZL~ 
plementary Expkc~nntion.~,  I. 11.  111.1 
SYSTEMATIC DIVISION 
Division of  Contracts.  Juridical Conceptions of  Money 
and A Book. 
It is reasonable to demand that a metaphysical Science 
of  Right  shall  completely and  definitely  determine  the 
lnembers of  a logical Division of  its Conceptions b priori, 
and  thus  establish  them  in  a  genuine  System.  All 
empirical Division, on the other hand, is merely fragnzen- 
tnry  Partitwn,  and  it leaves  us  in  uncertainty  as  to 
whether there may not  be  more  members  still required 
to complete the whole  sphere  of  the divided Conception. 
A Division that is made according to a Principle b priori 
inay be  called, in  contrast  to  all  empirical  Partitions, a 
dogmatic Division. 
Every  Contract,  regarded  in  itself  objectively, consists 
of  two juridical Acts : the PROMISE  and  its ACCEPTANCE. 
Acquisition by the latter, unless it be a pactum re iilzitum 
which requires Delivery, is not apart, but the juridically 
necessary Consepuence of  the Contract.  Considered again 
sz~bjectively,  or as to whether the Acpuisition, which  ought 
to  happen  as  a  necessary  Consequence  according  to 
Reason,  will  aIso  follow,  in  fact,  as  a physical  Conse- 
quence, it is evident that I have no Security or Guarantee 
that this will happen by the mere Acceptance  of  a  Pro- 
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connected with the mode of  the Contract, in reference to 
the certainty of  Acquisition by it ;  and  this  can  only be 
some  element  completing  and  determining  the  Means 
necessary  to  the attainment  of  Acquisition  as realizing 
the  purpose  of  the  Contract.  And  in his  connectioii 
and behoof, three Persons are required to intervene-the 
PROMISER,  the ACCEPTOR,  and  the CAUTIONER  or  Surety. 
The importance of  the Cautioner  is evident; but  by his 
iiitervention and his special Contract with  the  Promiser, 
the Acceptor gains  nothing in respect  of  the Object, but 
the nieans of  Compulsion that enable him to obtain what 
is his own. 
According to these rational Principles  of  logical Divi- 
sion, there are properly only three pure and  simple Modes 
of  Cont~act.  There  are,  however,  innumerable  mixed 
and empirical Modes, adding  statutory  and conventional 
Forms to the Principles of  the Mine  and  Thine  that are 
in accordance with rational Laa7s.  But  they lie  outside 
of  the circle of  the Metaphysical Science of  Right, whose 
Rational Modes of  Contract can alone be indicated liere. 
All Contracts are founded upon a purpose  of  Acquisi- 
tion, and are either 
8. GRATUITOUS  CONTRACTS,  zuith  z~nilateral  Acquisi- 
tion;  or 
B. ONEROUS  CONTRACTS,  with reciprocal AcquGti0n;  or 
C.  CAUTIONARY  CONTRACTS,  &th  no  Acpuisition, 
but  only  Guarnntee  of  what  has  been  already 
acqz~ired.  These  Contracts niay be gratuitous 
on  the one  side, and  yet,  at the  Same  time, 
onerous on the other. 
A. THE  GRATUITOUS  CONTRACTS  (pacta gratuita) are- 
1. Depositation  (depositum),  involving  the  Preser- 
vation of  some valuable deposited in Trust. 
2. Commodate  (cow~modatum),  a Loan  of  the use  of 
a Thing. 
3.  Donation (donatio), a free Gift. 
B.  THE ONEROUS  CONTRACTS,  are  Contracts  either  of 
Permutation or of  Hiring. 
I.  CONTRACTS  OB  PERMUTATION  OR  RECIPROCAL 
EXCHANGE  (permutatio late dc  dicta) : 
1.  Barter,  or strictly real  Exchange  (permutatio 
stricte sie dicta).  Goods exchanged for Goods. 
2.  Purohase  and  Sale  (emptio  venditio).  Goods 
exchanged for Money. 
3..  Loan  (mutuun~).  Loan  of  a  fungible  under 
condition  of  its  being  returned  in kind : 
Corn for Corn, or Money for Money. 
11.  CONTRACTS  OF  LETTING  AND HIRING  (Iocc~tio  con- 
ductio) : 
1.  Letting of  a Thing  on  Hire to another person 
who  is to make  use of  it (locatio rei).  If 
the Thing can  only be restored in specie, it 
may  be  the  subject  of  an Onerous  Con- 
tract conibining the consideration of  Interest 
with it (pactm wurarium). 
2.  Letting  of  Work  on  Hire  (locatio  operas?). 
Consent  to  the  use  of  my  Powers  by 
another  for  a  certain Price  (merces).  The 
Worker  under  this  Contract  is  a  hired 
Servant (mercenarius). 
3. Mandate (mandaturn).  The Contract of  Man- 
date  is  an  engagement  to  perform  or 
execute a certain business  in place  and  in 
name of  another  person.  If  the  action  is 
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not,  at tlze  Same  time,  in his  name,  it is 
performance  without  Comnzission  (gestio 
negotii) ; but  if  it is (rightfully) perforined 
in name  of  the  other, it constitutes  Man- 
date, whicli as a Contract  of  Procuration is 
an onerous Contract (mandatum olzeroszcm). 
C.  TIIE CAUTIONARY  CONTRACTS  (caz~tiones)  are :- 
1.  Pledge  (pignus).  Caution  by  a  Moveable 
deposited as security. 
2.  Suretyship  (fidt$ssio).  Caution  for  the ful- 
filment of  the promise of  another. 
3.  Personal  Security (prmtatio obsidis).  Guar- 
antee of  Personal Performance. 
This  List  of  all the  modes in which  the  property of 
one  Person  may be transferred  or  conveyed  to  another, 
includes  conceptions  of  certain  objects or  Instruments 
required for such transference (t7-anslatio).  These appear 
to  be  entirely  empirical, and  it  may  therefore  seem 
questionable whether  they  are  entitled  to  a  place  in a 
Jfetaphysical  Science  of  Right.  For, in  such a  Science 
the  Divisions  must  be  made  according  to  Principles  d, 
priori;  and  hence  the  matter  of  the  juridical  relation, 
which may be conventional, ought to be left out of  account, 
and only its Form should be  taken into consideration. 
Such  conceptions  may  be  illustrated  by  taking  the 
instance  of  Money,  in  contradistinction  from  all  other 
exchangeable  things  as Wares  and  Merchandise;  or  by 
the case of  a  Boolc.  And  considering  these  as  illustra- 
tive  examples  in  this connection, it will  be  shown  that 
the  conception of  MONEY  as the greatest and most  useable 
of  all the Means of  human  intercommunication through 
Things, in  the way of  Purohase  and  Sale  in  commerce, 
as well as that of  Books as the greatest  Means of  carry- 
iiig  on  the  interchange  of  Thought, resolve  themselves 
into  relations  that are  purely intellectnal  and  rational. 
And hence it will be made evident that such Conceptions 
do not really detract from the purity of the given Schenie 
of  pure Rational Contracts, by empirical admixture. 
ILLUSTRATION  OF RELATIONS  OF CONTRACT  BY  THE 
COXCEPTIONS  OF MONEY  AND A BOOK. 
I.  What is Money P 
MONEY  is  a thing which  can only be  mslde zbse  of, by 
being  nlienated  or exchanged.  This  is  a  good  Nominal 
Definition, as given by Achenwall ;  and it is sufficient to 
distinguish  objects  of  the Will  of  this  kind  from  all 
other  objects.  But it gives us no information regarding 
the  rational  possibility  of  such  a  thing  as  money  is. 
Yet we  See  thus  much  by the Definition: (1) that the 
Alienation in this  mode  of  human  intercommunication 
and exchange is not viewed as a Gift, but is intended  as 
a mode of  reciprocal Acquisition by an Orierous Contract ; 
and  (2) that it is regarded as a mere means  of  carrying 
on  Comrnerce,  universally  adopted  by  the  people,  but 
liaving  no value  as  such  of  itself, in  contrast  to  other 
Things  as  mercantile  Goods  or  Wares  which  have  a 
particular  value  in  relation  to  Special  wants  existing 
among  the  people.  It  therefore ~epresents  all exchange- 
able things. 
A bushel  of  Corn  has  the  greatest direct value  as  a 
means  of  satisfying  human  wants.  Cattle  may be  fed 
by it; and  these  again are  subservient  to  our  nourish- 
ment and  locomotion, and they even labour in oiir stead. 
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ported,  who  not  only  act  again  in  reprodiicing such 
natural  products,  but  also  by  other  artificial products 
they  can  come  to  the  relief  of  all  our  proper  wants. 
Thus  are  men  enabled  to  build  dwellings, to  prepare 
clothing, and  to supply  all  the ingenious  comforts  and 
enjoyments which make up the  products  of  industry.- 
On  the  other hand, the value of  Money is only indirect. 
It cannot  be  itself  enjoyed,  nor  be  used  directly  for 
enjoyment ;  it  is, however, a Means towards this, and of 
all outward things it is of  the highest utility. 
We may  found  a Real  Definition  of  Money  provi- 
sionally  upon  these  considerations.  It  may  thus 
be  defined  as  the  universal  means  of  car~ying  on  the 
INDUSTRY  of  men  in exchanying intercomrnunicatiolzs zuith 
euch  other.  Hence national Wealth, in so  far  as it  can 
be  acquired  by means  of  Money,  is  properly  only  the 
sum of  the Industry or applied  Labour with which  men 
pay  each  other, and which  is represented  by the Money 
in circulation among the people. 
The  Thing which  is  to be  called  Money  must, there- 
fore, have  cost  as much Industry to produce  it, or  even 
to  put  it into the hands of  others, as may be  equivalent 
to  the  Industry or  Labour  reqiiired  for  tlie  acquisition 
of  the  Goods  or  Wares  or  Merchandise, as  natural  or 
artificial  products,  for  wliich  it is  exchanged.  For  if 
it were  easier  to  procure  the material which  is called 
Money than  the goods that are required, there would be 
more  Money in the market  than goods  to  be  sold ;  and 
because  the  Seller  would  then  have  to  expend  more 
labour upon his goods than the Buyer on the equivalent, 
the Money coming  in  to  him  more rapidly, the Labour 
applied to the preparation of  goods and Industry generally, 
with the industrial procluctivity which is the source of  the 
public Wealth, would  at the same time  dwindle  and  be 
cut  down. -Hence  Bank  Notes  and  Assignations  are 
not to be  regarded as Money although they may take its 
place  by  way of representing  it for a  time ;  because it 
costs almost no  Labour to prepare thein, and  their value 
is  based  merely upon  the  opinion  prevailing  as to the 
further  continuance of  the previous possibility of  chang- 
ing  them  into Ready Money.  But on its being  in any 
way found  out that  there is not  Ready Money in suffi- 
cient quantity for easy and safe conversion of  such Notes 
or  Assignations,  the  opinion  gives  way,  and  a  fall  in 
their  value  becomes  inevitable.  Thus  the  industrial 
Labour of those who work the Gold and Silver Mines  in 
Peru and  Mexico-especially  on account of  the frequent 
failures in  the application of  fruitless efforts to  discover 
new veins  of  these  precious  nletals-is  probably  even 
greater  than what  is  expended  in  the  manufacture  of 
Goods  in  Europe.  Hence  such  mining  Labour, as  un- 
rewarded  in  the  circumstances, would  be  abandoned  of 
itself, and the countries mentioned would in consequence 
soon  sink  into poverty, did not the Industry of  Europe, 
stimulated  in  turn  by these  very  metals, proportionally 
expand  at  the  Same  time  so  as  constantly to keep  up 
the  zeal of  the Miners  in  their work  by the articles  of 
luxiiry  thereby  offered  to  them.  It is  thus  that  the 
concurrence of  Industry  with  Industry, and  of  Labour 
with Labour, is always maintained. 
But  how  is  it possible  that what  at  the  beginning 
constituted  only  Goods  or  Wares,  at  length  became 
Money ?  This  has happened  wherever  a  Sovereign  as 
a great and powerful consurner of  a particular substance, 
which  he  at  first  used  merely for  the  adornment  and 
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tribiite of  his subjects in this kind of  material,  Thiis it 
may have  been  Gold, or  Silver, or  Copper, or  a  species 
of  beautiful  shells called Cow~ies,  or even a sort  of  mat 
called  Malczltes, as in  Congo ;  or  Ingots  of  Iron,  as  in 
Senegal; or Negro Slaves, as on the Guinea Coast.  Wherl 
the  Ruler  of  the  country demanded such things as im- 
posts, those whose  Labour  had  to  be  put in motion  to 
procure  them were also  paid  by rneans of  them, accord- 
ing to certain regulations of  commerce then established, as 
in a Market or Excliange.  As it appears to me, it is oiily 
thus that a  particular species of  goods came to be  made 
a legal means of  carrying on the indnstrial labour of  the 
Subjects in their commerce witli  each other, and thereby 
forming  the medium of  the national Wealth.  And thus 
it practically becanle MONEY. 
The  Rational Conception of  Money, under which  tlie 
empirical  conception  is  embraced,  is  therefore  that  of 
a thing wliich, in  the  Course  of  the public permutation 
or  Exchange  of  possessions  (pmmutatio publiea), deter- 
mines the Price of  all the other things that form prodiicts 
or  Goods -  under  wliich  term  even  the  Seiences  are 
included, in so far as they are not taught g~utis  to others. 
The  quantity  of  it  anlong  a  people  constitutes  their 
Wealth  (opulentia).  For  Price  (pretium)  is the public 
judgment  about  the  Vnlzce of  a thing, in relation  to the 
proportionate  abundance  of  what  forms  the  universal 
representative  means  in circixlation  for  carrying on  the 
reciprocal  interchailge  of  the  products  of  Industry  or 
Labour.'  The precious metals, when tliey are not merely 
1  Hence  whcre  Commerce is estensive  neither  Gold  nor  Copper  is 
specially used as Money, bnt only as constitiiting wares ;  because there is 
too little of  the first and too niiicli of  the second for them  to be easiIy 
broiight  iuto circulation,  so  as at once to have the former in such small 
tvcighed  but  also  stamped  or  provided  with  a  sigii 
indicating how mucli  they are wortli, form  legal  Moiiey, 
and are called Coilt. 
According  to  Adam  Smith, '  Money  has  become, in 
nll  civilised  nations,  the  universal  instrunient  of  Com- 
merce, by the  intervention of  which  Goods  of  all  kincis 
are bouglit and sold or exchanged for one another.'-Tliis 
Definition  expands  the empirical  conception  of  Money 
to  the  rational idea of  it, by taking  regard  only to  the 
implied  form  af  the  Reciprocal  Performances  in  tlie 
Onerous Contracts, and thus abstracting from their matter. 
It  is  thus  conformable to  the  conception  of  Right  ii~ 
the Permutation and Exchange of  tlie  Mine  and  Thine 
generally  (commzrtatio  late  sic  dicta).  The  Definition, 
therefore, accords with  the  representation  in  the  above 
Synopsis of  a Dogmatic Division of  Contracts  C%  prio~i, 
qnd  consequently  with  the  Metaphysical  Prineiple  of 
Right in general. 
11.  What is a Book ? 
A  Book  is  a  Writing  which  contains  a  Discourse 
addressed  by  some  one  to  the  Public,  through  visible 
signs of  Speech.  It is a  matter  of  indifference  to  the 
present  considerations whether it is written  by a pen  or 
imprinted by types, and on few or many pages.  He who 
speaks to  the  Public  in Iiis  own  name, is  the AUTHOK. 
pieces as are necessary in paymeiit  for particular  goods and not to have 
tho  latter in great qiiantity in case of the smallest acquisitions.  Hence 
SILVER  -  more  or  less  alloyed  with  Copper -  is  taken  as the  proper 
material of  Money, and the Measure of  the calculation of all Prices in tlie 
great commercial intercommunications of  the world ;  aiid the other Metals 
-and  still more non-metallic substances-can  only take its place  in che 
case of  a people of  limitcd commerce. THE PRINCIPLES  OF PRIVATE  RIGHT.  13  1 
He who  addresses the writing to the Public in the name 
of  the  Author,  is the PUBLISHER.  When  a  Publisher 
does this with the permission or authority of  the Author, 
the act is in accordance with  Itight, and he is the  right- 
fix1 Publisher ; but if  this is  done without  such  permis- 
sion or authority, the act  is  contrary  to  Right,  and  the 
Publisher is a counterfeiter or unlawful Publisher.  The 
whole  of  a  set  of  Copies  of  the  original  Document,  is 
called an Edition. 
The unauthorized Publishing of Books is contrary to the 
Principles of Right, an'd  is rightly prohibited. 
A  Writing is not an immediate direct  presentation of 
a conception, as is the case, for instance, with an Engrav- 
ing  that  exhibits  a  Portrait, or  a  Bust  or  Caste  by  a 
Sculptor.  It  is  a  Biscourse  addressed  in  a  particular 
form to the Public ; and the Author may be said to speak 
publicly  by  means  of  his  Publisher.  The  Publisher, 
again, speaks by the aid of  the Printer  as his  workman 
(operarius), yet  not in his  own  name,-for  otherwise he 
would be the Author,-but  in the  name of  the Author ; 
and he is only entitled to do so in virtue of  a MANDATE 
given him  to that  effect by  the Author.-Now  the  un- 
authorized Printer  and  Publisher  speaks by an assumed 
authority in his Publication ; in the  iiame  indeed of  the 
Author,  but without  a  Mandate  to  that effect (gerit  se 
mandatarium  abspzie  mandato).  Consequently  such  an 
unauthorized Publication is a wrong  committed upon the 
authorized and only lnwful  Publisher, as it amounts to a 
pilfering of  the Profits which  the  latter was entitled and 
able to draw  from the use of  his proper  Right (fz~rtz~m 
usus).  Unauthorized Printing and  Publication of  B001is 
ia  therefore forbidden-as  an act Coiinterfeit and Piracy 
-on  the ground of  Riglit. 
There seems, however, to be an  impression  that  tliere 
is a sort of  common  Right to  print  and  publish  Books ; 
but the slightest  reflection  must  convince  any one  that 
this would be a great injustice.  The reason of  it is found 
simply in the fact that a Book, regarded  from  one  point 
of  view, is an external product  of  mechanical art  (opus 
ntechaniczcm), that  can  be  imitated by  any one who may 
be in rightful  possession of  a Copy ;  and  it  is therefore 
his by a Real Right.  But  from anothcr point of  view, a 
Book is not merely an external  Thing, bi~t  is a Discourse 
of  the Publisher to the public, and he is only entitled to 
do this publicly under the Mandate of  the Author (pratz- 
statio operce) ;  aiid this constitutes a Personal Rig7zt.  The 
error  underlying  the  impression  referred  to,  therefore, 
arises from  an  interchange  and  confusion  of  these  two 
lzinds of  Right in relation to Books. 
Confusion  of Personal Right and Real Right. 
The confusion of  Personal Right with Real  Right may 
be  likewise  shown  by reference  to  a  difference of  view 
in connection  with  another  Contract, falling  under  the 
head of  Contracts of  Hiring  (B. 11.  I), namely, the Con- 
tract of  LEASE  (jus incolatus).  The question is raised as 
to whether  a  Proprietor wlien he lias. sold  a  house or a 
piece of  ground 'held  on  lease, before  the  expiry of  the 
period of Lease, was  bound  to  add  the  condition of  the 
continuance of  the Lease to tlie Contract of  Purchase ;  or 
whether it sliould  be  held  that '  Purchase  breaks Hire,' 
of Course under reservation of  a period of  warning  deter- 
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former view, a house or farm would be regarded as having 
a Bzerden lying upon it, constituting a Real Right acquired 
in  it  by  the  Lessee;  and  this  might  well  enough  be 
carried  out' by  a  clause  merely indorsing  or  ingrossing 
the Contract  of  Lease in the  Deed  of  Sale.  But  as  it 
would no longer then be a simple Lease, another Contract 
would  properly  be  required  to  be  conjoined,  a  matter 
which  few  Lessors  would  be  disposed  to  grant.  The 
proposition, then, that '  Purchase  breaks  Hire ' holds  iil 
principle;  for the full Right in a Thing  as  a  Property, 
overbears  all Personal  Right which  is inconsistent with 
it.  But there remains  a  Right  of  Action to the Lessee, 
on  the ground  of  a  Personal  Right  for  indemnification 
on  account  of  any  loss  arising  from  breaking  of  the 
Contract.  [See  Suplementary Eqlanations, IV.] 
EPISODICAL  SECTION. 
THE  IDEAL  ACQUISITION  OF EXTERNAL  OBJECTS  OF 
THE WILL. 
The Nature and Modes  of  Ideal Acquisition. 
I call that mode  of  Acquisition  ideal which  involves 
no  Causality in time, and which is founded upon  a mere 
Idea of  pure  reason.  It is  nevertheless  actz~al,  and  not 
merely imaginary  Acquisition ; and it is not  called  real' 
only because  the  Act of  Acquisition  is  not  empirical. 
This character of  the Act arises from the  peculiarity that 
the Person acquiring, acquires from ailother who either is 
not yct,  nnd  who can only be regarded as a possible Ceing, 
or who is fist  ceasiy to  be,  or who no  longe~  is.  Heiice 
siich  a  mode of  attaining to Possession is to be  regarcled 
as a mere practical Idea of  Reason. 
There are three Modes of  Ideal Acquisition :- 
I.  Acquisition by USUCAPION  ; 
11.  Acquisition by INHERITANCE  or SCTCCESSION  ; 
111.  Acquisition  by  UNDYING  MEKIT  (me~.itz~n~  im- 
mortale), or the Claiin by  Right to a good name at Deatli. 
These  three  Modes  of  Acquisition  can,  as  a  matter 
of  fact, only have  effect  in  a  public  juridical  state  of 
existente,  but  they  are  not  founded  merely  upon  the 
Civil  Constitution  or  iipon  arbitrary Statutes; they are 
already contained h priori  in the conception of  the state 
of  Nature, and  are  thus  necessarily conceivable prior to 
their empirical manifestation.  The Laws regarding them 
in the Civil  Constitution  ought  to  be  regulated  by that 
rational Conception. 
33. 
I.  Acquisition by Usucapion. 
(Acquisitio per Usucapioneni.) 
I may acquire the Property of  ailother merely by lony 
possession  and  use  of  it (Usucapio).  Such  Property  is 
not  acquired,  because  I may  legitimately preszcme  that 
his  Consent  is  given  to  this effect  (per consensztm  prg- 
sz~mptzcm)  ; iior because I can assume that as he does not 
oppose  my Acquisition of  it, he has relinquisiled or aban- 
doned it as his (rem derelictum).  But  I acquire it thus, 
because  even  if  there  were  any one  actually  raising  a 
claim to  this  Property as  its  true Owner, I inay exclude 
him  on  tlie  ground  of  my long  Possession of  it, ignore 
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during the time of  my Possession as a  mere  abstraction, 
although I may have  been  subsequently  apprized  of  his 
reality as well  as  of  his  claiin.  This Mode of  Acquisi- 
tion  is  not  quite  correctly  designated  Acquisition  by 
Prescription. (per prmscription.en~)  ; for  the  exclusion  of 
all other claimants is to  be  regarded  as  only the Conse- 
quence of  the Usucapion ; and the process of  Acquisitioii 
must  have  gone  before  the  Right  of  Exclusion.  The 
rational  possibility  of  such  a  Mode  of  Acquisition, has 
now to be proved. 
Any one who does not exercise a coiltinuous possesso~y 
activity  (actzu possessorizu)  in relation to a Thing  as his, 
is regarded with good Right as one who  does  not  at all 
exist as its Possessor.  For he cannot complain of  lesioii 
so lorig as he does not qualify himself with a Title  as its 
Possessor.  And even  if  he  should afterwards lay claini 
to the Thing when another  has  already taken  possessioii 
of  it, he only says  he was  once  on  a  time Owner of  it, 
but  not  that he  is  so  still,  or  that  his  Possession  has 
continued  without  interruption  as  a  jiiridical  fact.  It 
can, therefore, only be  by a juridical  process  of  Posses- 
sion, that has  been  maintained without  interruption and 
is  proveable  by  documentary  fact,  that  any  one  can 
secure  for  himself what  is  his  own  after  ceasing  for  a 
long time to make use of  it. 
For, suppose that the neglect  to exercise  this  posses- 
sory  activity had  not  the effect  of  enabling  another  to 
found upon  his  hitherto lawful, uildisputed and bona jicle 
Possession, an irrefragable  Right  to  continue  in its pos- 
session so Lhat  he may regard  the thing  that is thus  in 
his Possession as acquired  by him.  Then no Acquisition 
would  ever  become  peremptory  and  secured,  but  all 
Acquisition would only be provisory aild teinporary.  This 
is  evident  on  the ground  that  there  are  no  historical 
Records  available  to  carry  the investigation  of  a  Title 
back to  the first Possessor and  his act of  Acquisition.- 
The  Presumption  upon which Acquisition  by Usucapioii 
is  fonnded  is,  therefore,  not  merely  its  coilformity  to 
Right as allowed  and just,  but  also  tlie presumptioii  of 
its being  Right (prmsutntio  juris  et  de jzbre),  and its being 
assumed  to  be  in  accordance  with  compulsory  Laws 
(nppositio  legalis).  Any  one  who  has  neglected  to 
embody  his  possessory Act in a  documentary Title, has 
lost his Claim  to the Right  of  being  Possessor for  the 
time ; and the length of  the period  of  his  neglecting  to 
do so-which  need not necessarily be particularly defined 
-can  be referred to only as establishing the certainty of 
this neglect.  And  it would  contradict the  Postulate of 
the  Juridically  Practical  Reason  to  maintain  that  olle 
hitherto  unknown  as  a  Possessor, and whose  possessory 
activity  has  at  least  been  interrupted,  whether  by  or 
without fault  of  his own, could  always  at any time  re- 
acquire  a  Property;  for  this  would  be  to  make  all 
Ownership uncertain (Dominia rerum incerta face~e). 
But if he is a member  of  the  Commonwealth or Civil 
Union,  the State may  maintain  his  Possession for  him 
vicariously,  although  it  may  be  interrupted  as private 
Possession;  and in  that  case  the actual  Possessor  will 
not be  able to  prove a Title of  Acquisition  even  from a 
first  occupation, nor to fourid  upon a Title of  Usucapion. 
But  in the state of  Nature  Usucapion  is universally  a 
rightful  ground  of  holding,  not  properly  as a  juridical 
mode of  requiring  a  Thing, but  as  a  ground  for  main- 
taining  oneself  in possessioii  of  it  where  there  are  no 
Juridical Acts.  A release from juridical  claims  is com- 
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the  older  Possessor,  therefore, belongs  to  the  sphere of 
Natural  Right  (est  jw& natz~rm).  [See  S~tpplernenta- 
Explawtions, VI.] 
34. 
11.  Acquisition by Inheritance. 
(Acquisitio hcereditatis.) 
INHERITANCE  i~ constituted by the transfer (tra?alatio) 
of  the  Property  or  goods  of  one  who  is  dying  to  a 
Suxvivor, through the consent of  the Will of  both.  The 
Acquisition  of  the HEIR  who  takes  thc Estate  (haredis 
instituti) and  the Relinquishment  of  the  TESTATOR  who 
leaves  it,  being  the acts  that  constitute  the  Exchange 
of  the Mine and Thine, take  place  in the  sanie  moment 
of  time-&  articulo mortis-and  just when the  Testator 
ceases  to  be.  There  is  therefore  no  special  Act  of 
Transfer  (tra~zslatio) in  the  empirical  sense;  for  that 
would  involve two  successive  acts,  by  which  the  one 
would first divest himself of  his Possession, and the other 
would  thereupon  enter  into  it.  Inheritance  as  con- 
stituted  by a  simultaneous  double Act  is, therefore,  an 
ideal Mode of Acquisition.  Inheritance is inconceivable 
in the State of  Nature without  a  Testamentary  Disposi- 
tion  (dispositio  zdtimce  voluntatk) ; and  the  question 
arises as to whether  this  mode  of  Acquisitioii is  to  be 
regarded as  a  Contract  of  Succession, or  a  z~nilnteral  Act 
instituti.fig an fiir by  a  Will  (testamentzinz).  The deter- 
mination of  this question depends on the further cluestion, 
Whether  and  How, in  the very Same  moment  in which 
one  individual  ceases  to  be, there can be a transition of 
his  Property to  another  Person.  Hence  the problem as 
to how a mode of  Acquisition  by Inheritance  is possible, 
must be  investigated independently of  the varioiis possible 
forms-in which  it is  practically  carried  out, and which 
can have place only in a Commonwealth. 
'It  is  possible  to  acquire  by  being  instituted  or 
appointed  Heir in a Testamentary Disposition.'  For the 
Testator  Caius  promises  and  declares in his last Will to 
Z'itius,  who  knows  nothing  of  this  Promise, to  transfer 
to him his Estate in case  of  death, but  thus  continuing 
as  long  as he  lives  Sole  Owner of  it.  Now  by a mere 
unilateral act of  Will, nothing can in fact be transmitted 
to  another  Person, as in  addition  to the Promise of  the 
one party there is required Acceptance (acceptatio) on the 
part  of  the  other,  and  a  simultaneoiis bilateral  act of 
Will (volz~ntas  simultnnea) which, however, is here awant- 
ing.  So  long  as  Caius  lives,  Titius  cannot  expressly 
accept  in  order  to  enter  on  Acqiiisition, because  Caius 
has  only  promised  in  case  of  death;  otherwise  the 
Property  would  be  for  a  moment  at least  in  commori 
possession, which is not the Will of  the Testator.-How- 
ever,  Titius  acquires  tacitly  a  special  Right  to  the 
Inheritance as a Real Right.  This  is constituted by the 
Sole and exclusive  Right  to accept the Estate (jus in re 
jacente),  which is therefore called at that point  of  time a 
hareditas jacens.  Now as every man-because  he must 
always  gain  and never lose  by it-necessarily,  althoiigh 
tacitly,  accepts  such  a  Right,  and  as Titius  after  the 
cleath  of  Caiirs  is  in  this  position, he  may acquire  the 
succession as Heir by Acceptance  of  the Promise.  And 
the Estate  is  not  in the meantime  entirely without an 
Owner (res  nullius), but  is  only  in abeyance  or  vacant 
(vacm) ;  because he has exclusively the Right  of  Choice 
as  to  whether  he  will  actually  malte  the  Estate  be- 
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Hence  Testament,~  are  valid  according  to  mere 
Natural  Right  (sqcnt  jurh naturap).  This  assertion, 
however, is to be understood  in the sense that they 
are  capable  and  worthy  of  being  introduced  and 
sanctioned in the Civil state, whenever it is instituted. 
For it is only the Common  Will in the Civil state 
that maintains  the possession  of  the Inheritance  or 
Succession,  ~vhile  it  hangs  between  Acceptance  or 
Rejection  and  specially  belongs  to  no  particular 
individual.  [See Szcpplementc~ry  Explnnations, VII.] 
111.  The continuing Right of  a good Name after Death. 
(Bona fama Defuncti.) 
It  would be absurd to think that a dead Person  coulcl 
possess  anything  after  his  death,  when  he  no  loiiger 
exists  in the eye  of  the Law, if  the matter in question 
were  a  mere  Thing.  But  a good Name is a congenital 
and  external,  although  merely  ideal  possession,  which 
attaches  inseparably  to  the  individual  as  a  Person. 
Now we can and must abstract here from all consideration 
as to whether the Persons cease to be  after death or still 
continue as  such  to esist; because  in considering their 
juridical  relation  to  others,  we  regard  Persons  merely 
according to their humanity and as rational Beings (homo 
noz~menon).  Hence  any  attempt  to  bring  the  Reputa- 
tion or good Name of  a Person into evil and false  repute 
after deatli, is always questionable, even although a well- 
founded charge may be allowed-for  to  that  extent the 
br~card  'Be  nzortuis  nil  nisi  bene ' is wrong.  Yet  to 
spread  cliarges  against  one  who  is  absent  and  cannot 
defend himself, shows at least a want of  magnanimity. 
Ry a blameless  life and a deatli  thnt worthily ends it, 
it is  admitted  that  a  man  may acqiiire  a  (negatively) 
good  reputation  constituting  something  that is his own, 
even when he no longer exists in the world of  sense as a 
visible  Person  (homo  phanonienon).  It is further held 
that his Survivors and  Successors-whether  relatives  or 
strangers-are  entitled  to defend  his  good  Name  as  a 
matter of  Itight, on the ground that unproved  accusations 
subject them all to the danger of  similar  treatnlent after 
death.  Now  that  a  Man  when  dead  can  yet  acquire 
such a Right is a  peculiar  and, nevertheless,  an undeni- 
able  manifestation  in fact,  of  the  d  priori  law-giving 
Reason thus extending its Law of  Command  or  Prohibi- 
tion beyond the liinits of  the present  life.  If  some  one 
then  spreads  a  charge  regarding  a  dead  person  that 
would have dishonoured hirn when  living, or  even  made 
hirn  despicable, any  one  who  can  adduce  a  proof  that 
this  accusation  is  intentionally  false  and  untrue,  may 
publicly declare  hirn  who  thus  brings  the  dead  person 
into ill repute to  be  a  Calumniator, and affis  dishonour 
to hirn in turn.  This would  not  be  allowable  unless  it 
were  legitimate  to  assume  that  the  dead  person  was 
injured  by the accusation, althougli  he is dead, and that 
a certain just satisfaction was done to hirn by an Apology, 
although  he  no  longer  sensibly  exists.  A  Title  to act 
tlie  part  of  the Vindicator  of  the dead person does not 
require  to  be  established;  for  every  olle  necessarily 
claims  this  of  himself, not  ~nerely  as a  Duty of  Virtue 
regarded  ethically, but  as a  Right  belonging  to  hirn  in 
virtue  of  his  Humanity.  Nor  does  the  Vindicator 
require to show any Special personal damage, accruing  to 
hirn as a friend or relative, from  a stain on the character 
of  the Deceased, to justify hirn  in proceeding  to censure 
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itight in an individual  after  death against survivors, is 
thus  actually  founded,  cannot,  therefore,  be  disputed, 
although the possibility of  such a Right is not capable of 
logical Deduction. 
There is no ground for drawing visionary inferences 
from what has just been stated, to the presentiment of 
a future life and invisible relations to departed souls. 
For the considerations connected with this Right, turn 
on nothing more than the purely moral and juridical 
I-elation  which  subsists  among  men  even  in  the 
present life, as Rational Beings.  Abstraction is, how- 
ever, made from all that belongs physically to their 
existence  in  Space  and  Time;  that  is,  men  are 
considered logically apart from these  physical  con- 
comitants  of  their nature, not  as to their state when 
actually deprived of  them, but only in so far as being 
spirits they are in a condition that might realize the 
injury  done  them  by  Calumniators.  Any  one who 
rnay  falsely  say  something  against  me  a  hundred 
years  hence, injures me  even now.  For in the pure 
juridical  Relation,  which  is  entirely  rational  and 
suprasensible, abstraction  is made from the physical 
conditions of  Time, and the Calumniator is as culpable 
as if  he had  committed the  offence  in my lifetime; 
only this will not be tried  by a Criminal Process, but 
he will only be punished with that loss of  honour he 
would have caused to another, and this is inflicted upon 
him by Public  Opinion according to the Lex  tulionis. 
Even a PlagZurism from  a dead Author, although it 
does not tarnish the honour of  the Deceased, but only 
deprives him of  a part of  his property, is yet properly 
regarded as a lesion of  his human Right. 
PRIVATE  RIGHT. 
OHAPTER  THIED. 
ACQUISITION  CONDITIONED BY  THE SENTENCE  OF  A  PUBLIC 
JUDICATOIZY. 
How  and what Acquisition is subjectively conditioned 
by  the Principle of a Pnblic Court. 
NATURAL  RIGHT,  understood  simply as that Right whicli 
is not statutory, and which  is knowable  pureIy b p-iori, 
by every man's  Reason, will  include Distributive Justice 
as well  as Commutative  Justice.  It  is  manifest  that 
the  latter  as  constituting  the  Justice  that  is  valid 
between  Persons  in  their  reciprocal  relations  of  inter- 
Course with  one  another, must  belong to Natural  Right. 
Biit  this holds also of  Distributive  Justice, in so  far  as 
it can  be  lrnown  b priori ;  and  Decisions or Sentences 
regarding  it,  must  be  regulated  by  the  Law of  Natural 
Right. 
Tlie  Moral  Person  who  presides  in  the  sphere  of 
Jiistice and administers it, is called the COUICT  of  Justice, 
aiid as engaged  in  the process of  official duty, the Judi- 
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(judicium).  All  this  is  to  be  here  viewed  d  prior.i, 
according  to  the  rational  Conditions of  Right, withont 
taking into consideration how such a  Constitution  is  to 
be actually established or organized, for which  particular 
Statutes,  and  consequently  empirical  Principles,  are 
requisite. 
The question, then, in  this  connection, is  not  merely 
'  What  is  ryht in itself!  in the  sense  in which  every 
man  must  determine  it  by  the Judgment of  Reason; 
but '  What  is  ~ight  as  applied  to  this case ?'  that is, 
what  is right  and just  as  viewed  by  a  Court 2  The 
rational and the judicial points of  view, are therefore to be 
distinguished ; and there are four  Cases in which the two 
forms of Judgment have  a  different and  opposite  issue. 
And  yet  they  may  coexist  with  each  other,  because 
they are delivered  from  two  different,  yet  respectively 
true  points  of  view:  the  one  from  regard  to  Private 
Right, the other from  the  Idea of  Public  Right.  They 
are:  I.  THE CONTRACT  OB  DONATION  (pactum  dolza- 
tionis), 11.  THE CONTRACT  OB  LOAN  (commodatum), 111. 
THE ACTION  OB  REAL  REVINDICATION  (vindicatio),  and 
IV.  GUARANTEE  BY  OATH  (juramentum). 
It  is a  common  error on the part of  the Jurist to 
fall here into the fallacy of  begging  the  question, by 
a tacit assumption (vitium subreptionis).  This is done 
by assuming  as objective and  absolute the juridical 
Principle which a Public Court of  Justice is entitled 
and even bound to adopt in its own behoof, aiid only 
from  the  subjective  purpose  of  qiialifying  itself  to 
decide  and judge  upon  all the Rights pertaining  to 
individuals.  It is therefore of  no  small importance 
to make this  specific difference intelligible, and  to 
draw attention to it. 
37. 
I.  The Contract of Donation. 
(Y  actum donationis.) 
The  Contract  of  Donation  sigilifies  the  grntz~itotis 
alienation  (g~atis)  of  a  Thing  or  Eight  that  is  Mine. 
It involves a relation between me as the Donor (donans), 
and  another  Person  as  the  Donatory  (donatarhs),  in 
accordance with the Principle of  Private Right, by which 
what is mine  is  transferred  to  the latter, on his  accept- 
ance of  it, as a  Gift (donunz).  However, it is not to be 
presumed that I have voluntarily  bound  myself  thereby 
so as  to  be  conzpelled  to  keep  my Promise, and that I 
have  thus  given  away my Freedonz  gratuitously, and, as 
it  ulere, to  that  extent  throwii  inyself  away.  Nemo 
szmm  jactare  prwwmitur.  But  this  is  what  woiild 
Iiappen,  under  such  circumstances,  according  to  the 
principle  of  Right in the Civil state ;  for  in  this spl~ere 
the  Donatory can  compel  me,  under  certain  conditions, 
to perform my Promise.  If, then, the  case conies before 
a Court, according to  the conditions  of  Yublic  R'ight, it 
must  either  be  presumed that the Donor  has  consented 
to siich Compulsioii, or  the Court would  give  no  regard, 
in the  Senteiice,  to  the  consideration  as  to whether he 
intended to  reserve  the  Right to resile from his Promise 
or not ; but would  only refer  to what is certain, namely, 
the condition of the Promise  and  the  Acceptance of  the 
Donatory.  Although the  Promiser, therefore, thought- 
as may easily be supposed-tliat  he  could not be bound 
by his Promise in any case, if  he '  rued' it before it was 
actually carried out, yet the Court assumes that he ought 
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rnind,; and  if  he  did  not make such an express reserva- 
tion, it will be held that he can  be  compelled  to  imple- 
ment his Promise.  And  this  Principle  is assumed  by 
the Court, because the administration  of  Justice would 
otherwise be  endlessly impeded,  or  even  made  entirely 
impossible. 
38. 
11.  The Contract of  Loan. 
(Commodatum.) 
In the  Contract  of  Commodate-Loan (commodatum) I 
give  some  orie  the gratuitous  use  of  something that is 
mine.  If  it is a  Thing that is given on  Loan, the con- 
tracting Parties agree that the  Borrower will restore  tl~e 
very Same  th+g  to the power  of  the Lender.  But  the 
Receiver  of  the  Loan  (commodatariz~s) cannot,  at  the 
Same  time,  assume that  the  Owner  of  the Thing  leiit 
(commodans)  will  take  upon  himself  all risk  (Casus)  of 
any possible loss bf  it, or of  its useful quality, that may 
arise  from  having  given  it  into  the  possession  of  the 
Receiver.  For  it is  not to be understood of  itself, that 
the Owner, besides  the ?M  of  the Thing, which  he has 
granted  t,o  the  Eeceiver,  and  the  detriment  that  is 
inseparable  from  such  use,  also  gives  a  Gua~antee  or 
Warrandice against all damage that may arise from such 
use.  On  the  contrary,  a  special  Accessory  Contract 
woiild  have  to be  entered  into  for  this  purpose.  The 
only  question,  then,  that  can  be  raised  is this:  1s it 
incumbent  on  the  Lender  or  the  Borrower  to  add 
expressly the condition of  iiildertaking the risk that inay 
accrue to  the Thing lent ; or, if  this  is  not done, which 
of  the  Parties is to  be  presunied  to  have consented  and 
nyreed  to  gutirantee  tlie  progerty  of  the  Lender, up  to 
restoration  of  the  very Same  Thing or  its  equivalent ? 
Certainly  not  the  Lender;  because  it  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed  that he  has  gratuitously  agreed  to  give  more 
than  the  mere  use  of  the  Thing, so that he  cannot  be 
supposed to have also undertaken the risk of  loss  of  his 
property.  But  this may be assumed on the side  of  the 
Borrower ; because  he thereby undertakes  and  performs 
nothing more than what is implied in the Contract. 
For  example, I enter  a  house  when  overtaken  by  a 
shower  of  rain,  and  ask  the  Loan  of  a  cloak.  But 
through  accidental  contact  with  colouring  matter,  it 
becomes  entirely spoiled while  in my possession; or  on 
entering  another  house, I lay it aside  and  it is stolen. 
Under  such  circumstances,  everybody  would  think  it 
absurd  for me  to  assert  that I had  no further concern 
with  the  cloak  but  to  return it  as it was,  or,  in the 
latter case,  only to mention  the  fact  of  the  theft ;  and 
that, in any case, anything  more  required would  be  but 
aii  act  of  Courtesy  in  expressing  sympathy  with  the 
Owner  on  account  of  his  loss,  seeing  he  can  claim 
nothing  on  the  ground  of  Pjght.-It  would  be  other- 
wise,  however,  if  on  asking  the  use  of  an  article,  I 
discharged myself beforehand from  all  responsibility, in 
case  of  its  coming  to  grief  among  my  hands,  on  the 
ground  of  my being poor, and unable to comperisate any 
incidental loss.  No  one  could  find  such  a  condition 
superfluous  or  ludicrous,  unless  the Borrower  were,  in 
fact, known  to  be  a  well-to-do  and well-disposed  man; 
becanse in such a case it would  almost  be  an insult  not 
to act  on  the presumption  of  generous compensation for 
any loss sustained. 
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damage  (caszcs)  whicll  the  Thing  lent  may  undergo 
canilot be  exactly determined in any Agreement.  Com- 
modate  is  therefore  aii  uncertain  Contract  (pactziw 
$ncertum), because the coilsent  can  only  be  so  far  pre- 
sumed.  The  Judgment,  in  ariy  case,  deciding  upon 
whom the incidence  of  any loss  must fall, cannot there- 
fore  be  determined from the conditions  of  the  Contract 
in itself,  but  only  by  the P~inciple  of  the  Court before 
which it  comes,  and  which  can  only  consider  what  is 
certain  in  the  Contract ; and  the  only  thing  certain 
is always the fact as to the  possession  of  the  Thing  as 
property.  Hence the  Judgment  passed  in the  state of 
Nature,  will  be  different  from  that  given  by  a  Court 
of  Justice  in the  Civil state.  The Judgment from  the 
standpoint  of  Natural  IZight  will  be  deterniined  by 
regard  to the inner  rational  quality of  the Thing, and 
will run thus : '  Loss  arising  from  damage accruing to a 
Thing  lent  falls  upon  the Borrower ' (casum sentit cont- 
modataritis) ;  whereas the Sentenee of  a Court of  Justice 
in the Civil  etate will  run thus : '  The Loss  falls upon 
the Xen&.i. ' (casz~m semtit  dominz~s).  The latter Judg- 
ment  turns  out  differently  froni  the  former  as  the 
Sentence  of  the  mere  sound  Reason, because  a  Public 
Judge  cannot  found  upon  presumptions  as  to  what 
either party may  have thought ;  ar~d  thus  the  one  who 
has not  obtaiiled  release  from all loss in the Thing by a 
special Accessory Contract, must  bear  the 1oss.-Hence 
the difference between the Judgment  as the Court  must 
deliver  it,  and  the  form  in  which  each  individual  is 
entitled to hold  it for himself  by his private Reason, is ;1 
matter of  importance, and is not to be overlooked in tlie 
consideration of Juridical Judgments. 
111.  The Revindication of what has been Lost. 
(Vindicatio.) 
It is  clear  from what  has  been  already  said  that  a 
Thing  of  mine which  contiilues  to  exist, remains  miile 
although I may not be in continuous occupation of  it ;  and 
tliat it does not cease to be mine without a Juridical Act 
of dereliction  or alienation.  Further, it is evident that a 
Right in this  Thing  (jz~s  reale) belongs  in  eonsequence 
to me (jus pe~sonale),  against  every holder of  it, and not 
merely against some Particular Person.  But the question 
now arises as to whether this Right must be regarded by 
eveyy  other Person  as a  continuous  Right  of  Property 
23er  se,  if  I have not in any way renounced  it,  although 
the Thing is in tlle possession of  another. 
A Thing may be lost (res  a~lzissa),  and thus  eome into 
other hands  in an honourable  bond  fide  way as a  sup- 
posed '  Find ;  ' or it rnay come  to me  by formal  transfer 
on the part  of  one who  is in possession  of  it, and who 
professes to be  its Owner, although he is not so.  Taking 
the  latter  case,  the  questioii  arises, Whether,  since I 
cannot  acquire a Thing  from  one who is not  its Owner 
(a noit  dontino), I am excluded by tlie fact from all Right 
in the  Thing  itself, and  have  merely  a  personal  Right 
against a wrongful  Possessor ?  This  is manifestly so, if 
tlie Acquisition  is judged  purely according  to  its inner 
justifying grounds and  viewed  according to  the State of 
Nature, and not  according to tl~e  convenience of a Court 
of  Justice. 
For  everything  alienable  niiist  be  capable  of  being 
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however, rests entirely upon the form in accordance with 
which  what  is  in  possession  of  another, is  transferred 
to me  and  accepted  by  me.  In other  words,  rightful 
Acquisition  depends  upon the  formality of  the  juridical 
act of  commutation or interchange between the Possessor 
of  the Thing  and  the Acquirer  of  it, without  its  being 
required to ask how the former came by it ; because this 
would  itself  be  an  injury, on the  ground  that  Quilibet 
pmsumitzcr  bonzu.  Now  sqppose it turned out  that the 
said Possessor was  not  the  real Owner, I cannot  admit 
that  the  real  Owner  is  entitled  to  hold  me  directly 
responsible, or  so  entitled  with  regard  to  any one  who 
might  be  holding the Thing.  For I have myself  taken 
nothii~g  away  from  him,  when, for  example,  I bought 
his  horse  according  to  the  Law  (titulo empti  venditz) 
when it was  offered for sale in the public  market.  The 
Title  of  Acqiiisition is therefore  unimpeachable  on  my 
side ;  and as Buyer I am not bound, nor even have I the 
Right,  to  investigate  the  Title  of  the  Seller;  for  this 
process  of  investigation  would  have  to  go  on  in  an 
ascending  series ad  2fi.fiitum.  Hence  on  such grounds 
I ought to be regarded, in virtue of  a regular and  formal 
pnrchase, as not  merely the pzdative, but  the real  Owner 
of  the horse. 
But  against this position,  there  immediately start up 
the  following  juridical  Principles.  Any  Acquisition 
derived from one who is not  the Owner of  the Thing in 
question, is null and void.  I cannot derive from another 
anything more than what he himself  rightfiilly has ;  and 
although  as  regards  the  form  of  the  Acquisition-the 
modus acquirendi-I  rnay proceed in accordance with all 
the conditions of Right when I deal in a stolen horse ex- 
posed  for sale in  the  marlcet, yet a real Title warranting 
the Acquisition was awanting ;  for the.  horse was not really 
the property of  the Seller in question.  However I may 
be a bond fide  Possessor of  a Thing under such conditions, 
I am still only a pwtative  Owner, and the real Owner has 
the  Right  of  Yindicatiolz against  me  (rem szeam  vindi- 
candi). 
Now, it rnay be again asked, what is right and just in 
itself regarding the Acquisition of  external  things  among 
men in their intercourse with one another-viewed  in the 
state  of  Nature-according  to  the  Principles  of  Com- 
mutative  Justice ?  And  it must  be  admitted  in  this 
connection,  that  whoever  has  a  purpose  of  acquiring 
anything, must  regard it  as  absolutely necessary  to  in- 
vestigate whether  the Thing which he wishes  to acquire 
does not already belong to another person.  For although 
he rnay carefully observe the  formal  conditions  required 
for  appropriating what  rnay  belong  to  the  property  of 
another, as  in  buying  a  horse  according to  the usual 
terms in a market, yet he can, at the  most, acquire  only 
a Personal  Right in relation  to  a  Thing (jus ad  rem) so 
long as it is still unknown to  him whether  another than 
the Seller rnay not be  the  real Owner.  Hence, if  some 
other  person  were  to  come  forward,  and  prove  by 
clociimentary evidence a  prior  Right  of  property in the 
Thing, nothing would  rernain for the putative new Owner 
but the  advantage which  he  has  drawn  as  a  bond  fide 
Possessor of  it up to that nioment.  Now it is frequently 
impossible to discover the absolutely first original Owner 
of  a Thing in the series of  putative Owners, who  derive 
their Rights from one another.  Hence no mere exchange 
of  external  things, however well  it rnay agree with the 
formal  conditions  of  Commutative  Justice,  can  ever 
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Here, however, the juridically law-giving Reason Comes 
in agairi with  the Principle of  Dist?.ibutive  Jzcstice;  and 
it adopts as a criterion of  the Rightfulness of  Possessioii, 
not what it is in eitself  in reference  to  the  Private Will 
of  each  individual in  the  state of  Nature, but  only the 
consideration of  how it would be  adjudged by a Court of 
.h~stice in a Civil  state, constituted  by  the united  Will 
of  all.  In this connection, fulfilment of  the formal con- 
clitions of  Acquisitioii that  in themselves  only  establish 
a Personal  Right, is  postulated  as  sufficient ; and  they 
stand as an eqixivalent for tlie material  conditions which 
properly  establish  the  derivation  of  Property  from  n 
prior  putative Owner, to the  extent  of  making what  is 
in  itself only a Personal Right, valid  before  n  Cot~rt,  as a 
Real  Right.  Thus  the  horse  which  I  bought  wheii 
exposed for sale  in the  public  market  under  conditions 
regulated  by  the Municipal  Law, becomes  my property 
if  all  tlie  conditions of  Purchase  and  Sale have  been 
exactly  observed  in  the transactioil ; but  always under 
the  reservation  that  the real  Owner  continues  to  have 
the Right of  a clairil against the Seller, on the  ground of 
his prior unalienated possession.  My otherwise Personal 
Right is thus transmuted into a  Real Right, according to 
which  I  rnay  take  and  vindicate  the  object  as  mine 
wherever  I  may  find  it, without  being  responsible for 
the way  in which  the  Seller  had  come  into  possessiori 
of  it. 
It  is  therefore  oiily in behoof  of  the requirements  of 
jiiridical decision in a Court (in  fuvorent jzcstiti~  disZribz6- 
tivce) that the Right  in  respect of  a  Thing  is  regardecl, 
not as Personal, which it is in,  &elf,  but as Real, because 
it can thus be most easily ancl  certainly adjuclged; and it 
is  thus  accepted  and  dealt  with  according  to  a  pure 
Principle d priori.  Upon this Principle various Statutory 
Laws come to be  fouiicled which  specially aim at laying 
down  the  conditions  under  which  aloiie  a  mode  of 
Acquisition  shall be  legitimste, so  that  the Judge  rnay 
be  able to assign every one his own as easily and certainly 
RS possible.  Thas,  in  the  brocard,  'Purchase  breaks 
Hire,'  what by the nature of  the subject is a Real Right- 
nameIy the Hire-is  taken to hold as a  merely Personal 
Eight ; and, conversely, as in the case  referred to  above, 
what is in itself  merely a Personal Right  is  held  to  be 
valid as a Real Right.  And this is done  only when  the 
question arises as to the  Principles  by which a Court  of 
Justice in the Civil  state  is  to  be  guided,  in  order  to 
proceed with  all possible  safety  in  delivering jud,pent 
on the Rights of  inclividuals. 
IV. Acquisition of Seonrity by the taking of an  Oath. 
(Cautio juratoria.) 
Only one  ground  can  be  assigned  on which  it  could 
be held that men are bound  in  the juridical  relation, to 
believe and to confcss that there are Gods, or that there is 
a God.  It is that they rnay be  able  to  swear an Oath; 
and  that  thus  by  the  fear  of  an  all-seeing  Suprerne 
Power, whose  revenge  they must  solemnly invoke  upon 
thernselves  in case their utterance  should  be  false, they 
may  be  constrained  to  be  truthful  in  statement  and 
faithful  in  promising.  It is not  Morality  but  merely 
blind Superstition that is  reckoned upon in this process ; 
for  it is  evident  it  implies that  no  certainty  is to  be 
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Right  before a Court, although  the  duty of  truthfulness 
must have always appeared self-evident to all, in a matter 
which  concerns the Holiest  that  can be  among men- 
namely,  the Right  of  Man.  Hence  recourse  has  been 
had  to  a  motive  founded  on  mere  myths  and  fables 
as imaginary  guarantees.  Thus  among  the  Rgangs,  a 
heathen people in Sumatra, it is  the custom-according 
to the testimony of  Marsden-to  swear by the  bones  of 
their  dead  relatives, although  they have  no  belief  in a 
life after death.  In like manner  the negroes  of  Guinea 
swear by their Petish, a bird's feather, which they iinpre- 
cate under the belief  that it will break their neck.  And 
so in other cases.  The  belief  underlying  these  oaths is 
that an invisible  Power-whether  it  has Understanding 
or not-by  its very nature possesses  magical  power that 
can  be  put  into  action  by  such  invocations.  Such  a 
belief-which  is  commonly  called  Religion,  but  which 
ought  to  be  called  Superstition-is,  however, indispens- 
able for the  administration  of  Justice;  because,  without 
referring  to  it,  a  Court  of  Justice  would  not  have 
adequate means to ascertain facts  otherwise kept  secret, 
and to determine rights.  A  Law making  an Oath obli- 
gatory, is therefore only given in behoof  of  tlie judicial 
Authority. 
But then the question arises as to what  the obligation 
could  be  founded  upon, that would  bind  any  one  in  a 
Court of Justice to accept the Oath of  another person, as 
a  right  and valid  proof  of  the  truth of  his  Statements 
which are to put an end to all dispute.  In other words, 
What  obliges  me  juridically  to  believe  that  another 
person when  talcing an Oath  has  any Religion at all, so 
that I  should  subordinate  or  entrust my  Right  to his 
Oath?  And,  on  like  grounds,  conversely,  Can  I  be 
bound at all to talce  an Oath ?  It  is  evident  that both 
these questions point to what is in itself morally wrong. 
But in relation  to a Court  of  Justice-and  genekally 
in the Civil state-if  it be  assumed  there  are no  other 
means of  getting to the truth in certain cases than by an 
Oath, it must be adopted.  In regard  to Religion, under 
the supposition that every one  has it, it may be  utilized 
as a necessary means (Zr,  causzc ~zeeessz'tatzk),  in  behoof  of 
the  legitimate  procedure  of  a  Court  of  Justice.  Tlie 
Court  uses  this  form  of  spiritual  compulsion  (torturn 
spi~itualis)  'as an available means, in conformity with tlie 
superstitious  propensity  of  mankind,  for  the  ascertain- 
ment  of  what  is  concealed;  and  therefore  holds  itself 
justified  in so  doing.  The  Legislative  Power, however, 
is fundamentally wrong in assigning this authority to the 
Judicial  Power,  because  even  in  the  Civil  state any 
compuIsion  with  regard  to  the  taking of  Oaths  is  con- 
trary to the inalienable Freedom of  Man. 
OFFICIAL  OATHS, which  are  usually  p~om.issory, 
being taken on entering upon  an Office  to the effect 
tliat the individual has sincere intentioon to administer 
his  functions dutifully,  might well  be  changed into 
assertory Oaths, to be  taken  at the end of  a year  or 
more of  actual administration, the official swearing to 
the faithfulness of  his discharge of  duty during that 
time.  This would  bring  the  Conscience  more into 
action than the Promissory Oath, which always gives 
room  for  the  internal  pretext  that,  with  the  best 
intention, the difficulties that arose during the admini- 
stration  of  the  official  function  were  not  foreseen. 
And, further, violations  of  Duty, under  the prospect 
of  their  being  summed up by future Censors, would 
give  rise  to more  anxiety as to censure  than  when 
they are merely represented, one after the other, and 
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As regards an Oath taken concerning a matter  of 
Belief (de credulitate), it is evident that no such Oath 
can be  deriianded by a  Court.  1. For, j~st,  it coii- 
tains  in itself  a  Contradiction.  Such  Belief,  as 
intermediate between  Opinion and Knowledge, is a 
thing  on which  one  might ventiire  to lay a  wage?. 
but not to swear an Oath.  2.  And, second, the Juclge 
who imposes an Oath of  Belief, in order to ascertaiii 
anything pertinent to his own purpose or even to the 
Common Good, commits  a  great offence against the 
Conscientiousness  of  the party talcing such  an oath. 
This he does in regard  both to the levity of  miiid, 
whicli  he  thereby  helps  to  engender,  and  to  the 
stings of  conscience which a man miist feel who to-day 
regards  a  subject from a  certain  point of  view, but 
who  will  very  probably  to-morrow  find  it  quite 
improbable from  another  point  of  view.  Any  one, 
therefore, who is cornpelled to take such an Oath, is 
subjected to an injixry. 
TRANSITION 
REOM THE  MINE AND  TRINE  IN  THE  STATE  OF NATURE 
TO  THE  MINE  AND  THINE  IN  THE JURIDICAL  STATE 
GENERALLY. 
41. 
Public Justice as related to the Natural and the Civil 
state. 
The Juridical state is that relation of  men to one another 
which  contains  the conditions, under  which  it  is alone 
possible  for  every  one  to  obtain  the  Right that  is his 
due.  The formal Principle  of  the possibility of  actually 
participating in such Right, viewed  in accordance  with 
the  Idea  of  a  universally  legislative  Will,  is  PUBLIC 
JUSTICE.  Public Justice may be  considered  in relation 
either to the Possibility, or Actuality, or Necessity of  the 
Possession  of  objects -  regarded  as  the  matter  of  the 
activity of  the Will-according  to laws.  It may  thiis 
be  divided  into  Protective  Jz~tice  (justitia  testatrix), 
Commutatiw  Justice  (justith commutativa),  and Distri- 
bzctive  Justice (jdtia  distributiva).  In  the @t  mode of 
Justice, the Law declares merely what Relation  is  inter- 
nally riglzt  in respect  of  Form (lm justi) ; in the second, 
it declares whnt  is likewise  externally in accord with a 
Law  in respect  of  the Object,  and  what  Possession  is 
rightful (Lex  juridica) ; and  in the third, it declares what 
is right,  and  what  is jast,  and  to what  extent,  by  the 
Jiidgment  of  a  Court  in  any  particular  case  coming 
rinder the given Law.  In this latter relation, the Public TRAXSITION  FROM  PRIVATE RIGHT T0 PUBLIC  RIGHT.  15? 
Court is called the Jz~stiee  of  the Country ; and the ques- 
tion whether  there  actually is or is not such an admini- 
stration of  Public  Justice, inay be  regarded as the most 
important of  all juridical interests. 
The non-juridical state is  that condition of  Society in 
which there is no Distributive Justice.  It is commonly 
called the Natural state (statm natzwalis), or the state of 
Nature.  It is  not the '  Social  State,'  as Achenwall  puts 
it, for  this  rnay  be  in  itself  an  artijeiul  state  (statzu 
artzj2ciaZ&), tha  t  is  to  be  contradis  tinguished  from  the 
'  Natural ' sta  te.  The opposite  of  the state of  Nature is 
the Civil state (status eivilis) as the condition of  a Society 
standing under a Distributive Justice.  In the state of 
Nature there rnay even be  juridical  forms  of  Society- 
such as Marriage, Parental Authority, the Household, and 
such  like.  For  none  of  these, however,  does  any  Law 
& pfio9.i  lay it down as  an incumbent  obligation, '  Thou 
shalt enter into this  state.'  But  it msy be  said  of  the 
Juridieal  state that  'all  men  who  mny  even  involun- 
tarily  come  into  Relations  of  Right  with  one  another, 
ozcght  to enter into this state.' 
The  Natural  or  non - juridical  Social  state  rnay  be 
viewed  as  the  sphere  of  PRIVATE  RIGHT,  and  the Civil 
state may be specially regarded as the  sphere  of  PUBLIC 
RIGHT.  The latter  state contains no more and no other 
Duties  of  men  towards  each  other  than  what  rnay  be 
conceived  in  connection  with  the  former  state;  the 
Matter  of  Private  Right  is,  in  short, the very Same  in 
both.  The  Laws  of  the Civil state, therefore, only turn 
upon  the  juridical  Form  of  the  CO-existence  of  men 
under a common Constitution ; and  in  this respect these 
Laws  must  necessarily  be  regarded  and  conceived  as 
Public Laws. 
The  Civil  Union  (Uni0 civilis)  cannot,  in  the strict 
sense,  be  properly  called  a  Society;  for  there  is  no 
sociality in  common  between  the  Ruler  (imperam) and 
the  Subject (subditus) under a Civil Constitution.  They 
are not  CO-ordinated  as Associates in a Society with each 
other, but the one  is  subordhated  to  the other.  Those 
who rnay be CO-ordinated  with one another ~ust  consider 
themselves  as  mutually  equal, in so  far as  they  stand 
under  common  Laws.  The  Civil  Union  rnay  therefore 
be regarded  not so much as being, but  rather  as  making 
a Society. 
42. 
The Postulate of  Public Right. 
From the conditions  of  Private  Right  in the Natural 
state, there arises the Postulate of  Public Right.  It  rnay 
be  thus  expressed:  'In  the  relation  of  unavoidable 
CO-existente with others, thou  shalt pass  from  the state 
of  Nature  into  a  juridical  Union  constituted  under  the 
condition  of  a  Distributive  Justice.'  The  Principle  of 
this  Postulate  rnay  be  unfolded  analytically  from  the 
conception  of  R@ht in  the  external  relation,  contradis- 
tinguished from mere Might  as Violence. 
No one is under obligation to abstain from  interfering 
with  the  Possession  of  others, unless  they  give  him  a 
reciprocal guarantee for the observance of  a similar absten- 
tion  from  interference  with  his  Possession.  Nor  does 
he require to wait for proof by experience of  the rieed of 
this guarantee, in view  of  the antagonistic disposition of 
others.  He  is therefore  under  no  obligation to wait tili 
he acquires practical  prudence  at his  own  cost;  for  he 
can  perceive  in himself  evidence of  the  natural  Incli- 
nation  of  men  to  play  the  master  over  others,  and  to disregard  the Claims of  the Right  of  others, when they 
feel themselves their Superiors by Might or Fraud  And 
thus  it is  not  necessary  to  wait  for  the  melancholy 
experience of  actual hostility ;  the individual is from the 
first  entitled  to  exercise a  rightful  compulsion  towards 
those  who  already  threaten  him  by  their  very  nature. 
Qisilihet  prmsu?nitu?* malzcs,  donec  securitatem  decierit 
oppositi. 
So long as the intention to  live  and  continue  in this 
state of  externally lawless Freedom prevails, men may be 
said  to  do  no  wrong  or  injustice  at all  to  olze  nnother, 
even when they wage war against each other.  For what 
seems cornpetent as good for the one, is equally valid for 
the other, as  if  it were  so  by  mutual  agreement.  Uti 
partes  de  jzire  sz~o  disponzint, ita jus  est.  But  generally 
they must  be considered as being in the highest state  of 
Wrong, as being and willing  to  be in a condition which 
is not  juridical ; and in which, therefore, no one  can be 
secured against Violence, in the possession of  his own. 
The distinction between what is only fornzally  and 
what is also materially wrong and unjust, finds fre- 
quent application in the Science of  Right.  An enemy 
wlio,  on  occupying  a  besieged  fortress,  instead  of 
honourably fulfilling  the conditions of  a Capitulation, 
nlaltreats the garrison on rnarching out, or otlierwise 
violates the agreement, cannot  complain  of  injury or 
wrong if on  another  occasion  the Same treatment  is 
inflicted  upon  themselves.  But,  in. fact,  all  such 
actions  fundamentally  involve  the  coinmission  of 
wrong  and injustice, in  the  highest  degree; because 
they take all validity away from the conception  of 
Right,  and  give  up  everything, as it  were  by  law 
itself,  to  savage  Violence,  and  thus  overthrow  the 
Rights of  Meii generally. 
THE  SCIENCE OF  RIGHT. 
PART  SECOND. 
PUBLIC  RIGHT. 
THE  SYSTEM  OF THOSE  LAWS  WHICH REQUIRE 
PUBLIC PROMULGATIOR. PUBLIC  RIGHT. 
THE PRINCIPLES OF  RIGHT IN CIVIL SOCIETY. 
43. 
Definition and Division of Public Right. 
PUBLIC  RIGHT embraces  the  whole  of  the  Laws  tliat 
require to be universally promulgated in order to prodiice 
a juridical state of  Society.  It is therefore a  Systern of 
those Laws that are requisite for a People as a multitude 
of  men forming a Nation, or for a number  of  Nations, iri 
their  relations  to  each  other.  Men  and  Nations,  on 
account of  their mutual influence on one another, require 
a jiiridical  Coltstitzdtion  uniting  them under one Will, in 
order that  they may participate  in what  is  right.-This 
relation  of  the  Individuals  of  a  Nation  to  each  other, 
constitutes  THE  CIVIL UNION  in  the  social  state; and, 
viewed as a whole in relation to its constituent members, 
it forms THE POLITICAL STATE  (Civitas). 
1. The State, as constituted by the cornmon interest of 
nll to live  in  a juridical  nnion, is  called, in view of  its 
form, the CO~IMONWEALTH  or  the  REPUBLIC  in the wider 
sense  of  the  terrri  (Res pzb6Zicn  latius sic  dicta).  The 
Principles  of  Right in this  sphere,  thus  constitute  the 
first  department of  Public  Right  as  the RIGHT  OF THE 
STATE  (jzcs  Civitntis)  or  National  Right.-2.  The  State, 
again,  viewed  in relation  to  other  peoples,  is  callcd  a Power (poteatia),  whence  arises  the idea  of  Potentates, 
Viewed  in  relation  to  the  supposed  hereditary iinity of 
the people  composing it, the  State constitutes a  Nation 
(Yens).  Under  the general  conception  of  Public Right, 
in addition  to  the Right  of  the  individual  State, there 
thus arises another departrnent of  Right, constituting the 
RIGHT  OB NATIONS  (jusgeatium) or International Right.- 
3. Further, as  the  surface  of  the  earth is not unlinlited 
in  extent, but  is  circumscribed  into  a  unity,  National 
Right and  International  Right  necessarily culminate  in 
the idea of  a UNIVERSAL  RIGHT  OF MANKIND,  which  may 
be  called  '  Cosmopolitical  Right'  (jzu  cosrnopoliticunt). 
And  National,  International,  and  Cosmopolitical  Right 
are  so  interconnected,  that  if  any  one  of  these  three 
possible forms of  the juridical  Relation fails  to  embody 
the  essential  Principles  that  ought  to regulate external 
freedom by  law, the structure  of  Legislation  reared  by 
the others will also be uridermined, and the whole System 
would at last fall to pieces. 
PUBLIC RIGHT. 
(Jus Civitatis.) 
Origin  of the Civil Union and Public Right. 
IT is  not  from  aiiy Experience prior to the  appearance 
of  an external authoritative Legislation, that we  learn  of 
the maxim  of  natural  violence  among  men,  and  their 
evil  tendency to  engage  in war with  each  other.  Nor 
is  it assumed  here  that  it is  merely  sorne  particular 
historical conditioii or fact, that  makes public  legislative 
constraint  necessary;  for  liowever  well-disposed  or 
favourable  to  Right  rnen  may  be  considered  to  be  of 
themselves, the rational Idea of  a state of  Society not yet 
regulated by  Right, must  be  taken as our  starting-point. 
This Idea implies that before a legal state of  Society can 
be  publicly  established,  individual  Men,  Nations  and 
States  can  never  be  safe  against  violence  from  each 
other; and  this is  evident  from the  consideration  that 
every one of  his-  own Will naturally does w7zat  scents good 
afid  right  Zr, his own ep,  entirely  independent  of  the 
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is to  be  reiiounced, tlie first  tliing incumbent 011  men is 
to accept  the Principle that it  is necessary to  leave the 
state  of  Nature,  in  which  every  one  follows  his own 
inclinations, and to form a union of  all those who  cannot 
avoid  coming  into  reciprocal  commiinication,  and  thus 
subject  theuiselves  in common  to the external restraint 
of  public compulsory Laws.  Men thus enter into a Civil 
Union,  in which  every  one  has  it determined  by  Law 
what  shall  be  recognised  as his ;  and this is secured to 
him by  a  competent  external Power  distinct  from  his 
own  individuality.  Such is the primary Obligation, on 
the part of all men, to enter into the relations of  a Civil 
State of  Society. 
The  natural condition of  nlankind  need  not, on  this 
ground, be  represented as a state of  absolute Injustice, as 
if  there  could  have  been  no  other  relation  originally 
among  men  but what was  merely  determined  by  force. 
Bilt  this  natural  condition  must  be  regarded, if it ever 
existed, as a state of  society that was void  of  regulation 
by Right  (statz~s  jzcstitim  vams), so  that  if  a  matter of 
Right came  to  be  im dispute (jus cont~ove~szcrn),  no com- 
petent  jiidge  was  found  to  give  an  authorized  legal 
decision  upon  it.  It is therefore  reasonable  that  any 
one should constrain another by force, to  pass from such 
a  non- juridical  state  of  life  and  enter  withiri.  the 
jurisdiction  of  a civil state of  Society.  For, although  On 
the basis  of  the ideas  of  Right  held  by  individuals  as 
such, external things may be  acquired  by Occupancy  or 
Contract, yet such acqiiisition is only provisory so  long as 
it has  not  yet  obtained  tlie  sanction  of  a  Public Law. 
Ti11  tliis  sanction  is reached, the condition of  possessioii 
is not deterniiiied by any public Distributive Justice, nor 
is it secured by any Power esereising Piiblic Eight, 
If  men were not disposed to recognise any Acquisi- 
tion  at all as rightful-even  in a provisional way- 
prior  to entering into the  Civil  state,  this  state of 
Society  uvould  itself  be  impossible.  For  the  Lau7s 
regarding the Mine and Thine in the state of  Nature, 
contain  formally  the very  same  thing  as tliey  pre- 
scribe in the Civil  state, when it is viewed  merely 
according to rational  conceptioris:  only  that  in the 
foims  of  the  Civil  state  tlie  conditions  are  la?d 
down  under  whicli  the formal  prescriptions  of  the 
state  of  Nature  attain  re:ilization  conformable  to 
Distributive Justice. -  Were  there,  then,  not  even 
provisionally,  an  external  Menm  and  Tuum  in the 
state of  Nature, neither would there be  any juridical 
Duties in relation to them ; and, consequeritly, there 
woiild  be  no  obligation to pass out of  that state irito 
another. 
The Form of  the State and its Three Powers. 
A  State (Civitcis) is  the union  of  a  nurnber  of  inen 
under  jiiridical  Laws.  These  Laws, as  such, are  to  be 
regarded  as necessary k  priori,-that  is, as  following  of 
tliemselves froni the conceptions of  external Right gener- 
ally,-aild  not  as merely  established  by Statute.  The 
FORM  of  tlie  State is thus  involved  in the  IcZeu  of  the 
State, viewed as it ought to be according to pure principles 
of  Eipht;  and  this  ideal  Form  fnrnishes  the normal 
criterion of  eveiy real iinioil that coilstitutes a Co~~imoil- 
wealth. 
Every  State  contaiils  iii  itself  THREE  POWERS,  tlie 
universal uiiited Will of  tlie People  being  thus  personi- 
fied in a political triad.  These are tlbe  Legislative Powe.r, 
the Executive  Power,  and  the  Jz~cliciary  Pou7er.-1.  The 
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embodied in  the person of  the Lawgiver ;  2. the Executive 
Power  is  embodied  in  the  person  of  the  Ruler  who 
administers the Law ;  and  3. the Judiciary Power, em- 
bodied  in  the  person  of  the Judge,  is the function  of 
assigning  every  one  what  is his  own, according  to  the 
Law (Potestas  leyislatoria, rectoria  et jz~diciui.iu).  These 
three Powers may be compared  to the three propositions 
in a  practical  Syllogism :-the  Major  as  the  sumptiori 
laying  down  the universal  Law  of  a  Will,  the Minor 
presentirig the command applicable to an action according 
to the Law as the principle of  the  subsumption, and the 
Conclusion containing the Sentence or  judgment  of  Right 
in the particular case under consideration. 
The Legislative Power and the Members of the State. 
The Legislative Power, viewed in its rational Principle, 
can only belong to the united Will of  the People.  For, as 
all Riglit ought to proceed from this Power, it is necessary 
that its Laws should  be unable to do wrong to any one 
whatever.  Now, if  any one individual determines anything 
in the State in contradistinction to anothe~,  it is always 
possible that he may perpetrate a wrong  on  that  other ; 
but this is never  possible when  all determine and decree 
what is to be Law to themselves.  '  Volenti non Jit injzcria.' 
Hence it is only  the united  and  consenting Will  of  all 
the People-in  so  far as Each  of  them  deternlines  the 
Same thing about all, and All  determine  the Same thing 
about each-that  ought to  have  the power  of  enacting 
Law in the State. 
The  Members  of  a  Civil  Society thus  united  for the 
purpose of  Legislation,  and  thereby constituting a State, 
are  called  its  CITIZENS;  and  there  are  three  juridical 
attributes that inseparably belong to them by Right.  These 
are-1.  Constitutional  FREEDOM,  as  the Right  of  every 
Citizen to have to obey no other Law than that to which 
he has given his consent or approval;  2.  Civil EQUALITY, 
as  the  Right  of  the Citizen  to recognise  no  one  as a 
Superior among the people in relation to himself, except 
in so far as such a one  is  as  subject  to his moral power 
to impose  obligations, as that other has power  to impose 
obligations upon him ;  and 3. Political  INDEPENDENCE,  as 
the Right to owe his existence and continuance in Society 
not  to  the  arbitrary  Will  of  another,  but  to  his  owri 
Rights and  Powers as a  Meinber of  the Commonwealth ; 
and, consequently, the possession of  a  Civil  Personality, 
which cannot be represented by any other than himself. 
The  capability  of  Voting  by  possession  of  the 
Suffrage, properly  constitutes the political qualifica- 
tion of a Citizen as a Member of  the State.  But this, 
again,presupposes the Independence or SeIf-sufficiency 
of  the individual Citizen among the people, as one who 
is not a mere  incidental part of  the Coninlonwealth, 
but a 9Iember  of  it acting of  his  own Will in com- 
inunity with others.  The last of the three qualities 
involved, necessarily  constitutes  the distinction  be- 
tween  active  and passive  Citizenship;  although the 
latter conception appears to stand in contradiction to 
the  definition  of  a  Citizen  as  such.  The  following 
examples  may serve to remove  this difficulty.  The 
Apprentice  of  a  Merchant  or Tradesnian,  a  Servant 
wlio  is  not  in the  ernploy of  the State, a  Minor 
(~tutzwalitc~  vel  civiliter), all Woinen,  and,.generally, 
every one who is compelled to maintain  hinlself  not 
according  to his  own  i~idustry,  but as it is arranged 
by  others  (the  State excepted),  are  without  Civil 
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incidentally included in the State.  Tlie Woodcutter 
whom I employ  on  my estate;  the Smith in India 
who carries  his  hammer, anvil, and  bellows into the 
houses where  he is engaged to work  in iron, as  dis- 
tinguished  from  the European Carpenter  or  Smith, 
who can offer the independent  products of  his labour 
as wares for public sale ;  the resident  Tutor  as dis- 
tin~ished  from tobe Schoolmaster ;  the Ploughman as 
distinguished from the Farmer and such like, illustrate 
the distinction  in question.  In all these  cases, the 
former members of  the contrast are distinguished froni 
the latter by being mere subsidiaries of  the Common- 
wealth  and  not  active  independent  Members  of  it, 
because  they are of  necessity  commanded and  pro- 
tected by others, and consequently possess no political 
Self-siifficiency in themselves.  Such Dependence on 
the Will of  others and the consequent Inequality are, 
however,  not  inconsistent  with  the  Freedom  and 
Equality  of  the individuals as Mey~  helping  to  con- 
stitute the people.  Much  rather is it the  case  that 
it is only under  such  conditions,  that a People  can 
become a State and  e~iter  into a Civil  Constitution. 
But all are not equally qualified to exercise the Right 
of the Suffrage under the Constitution, and to be  full 
Citizens of the State, and not mere  passive  Subjects 
under its protection.  For, although they are entitled 
to demand to be  treated  by  all the  other  Citizens 
according to laws of  natural Freedom and Equality, as 
passive parts of  the State, it does not  follow that they 
ought  themselves to have the Right to deal with  the 
State as active  Members  of  it, to reorganize it, or  to 
take action by way of  introducing  certain laws.  All 
they have a right in their circumstances to claim, may 
be no more than that whatever be the mode  in which 
the positive laws are enacted, these laws must not be 
contrary to the natural Laws that demand  the Free- 
dom of  all the people and the Equality that is  con- 
formable  thereto;  and  it  must  therefore  be  made 
possible for them to raise themselves from this passive 
condition  in  the  State, to  the  condition  of  active 
Citizenship. 
47. 
Dignities in the State and the Original Contract. 
All these tliree Powers in the State are DIGNITIES  ;  ancl as 
xiecessarily arising out of  the Idea of  the State and essen- 
tial generally to  the foundation  of  its Constitution, they 
are to be  regarded  as  POLITICAL  Dignities.  They imply 
the relatioii  between a universal  SOVEREIGN  as Head  of 
the State-which  according to the laws  of  freedom  caii 
be none other than the People itself  united iiito a Nation 
-and  the  mass  of  the  individuals  of  the  Nation  as 
SUBJECTS. The  former  member  of  the  relation  is the 
ruling  Power,  whose  function  is  to  govern  (imperans); 
the latter  is  the  rzcled  Constituents of  tlie State, whose 
function is to obey (suOditi). 
The  act by which  a  People  is  represented as consti- 
tuting itself into a State, is termed THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT. 
This is properly only an outward  rnode  of  representing 
the  idea  by  which  the  rightfulriess  of  the  process  of 
organizing  the  Constitution,  may  be  made  conceivable. 
According  to  this  representation,  all  and  each  of  the 
people  give  iip  their  external  Freedom  iii  order  to 
receive it immediately again  as  Members of  a Common- 
wealth.  The  Commonwealth  is  the  people  viewed  as 
iinited  altogether into a State.  And thus it is not to be 
said tliat the individual in the State has sacrificed a pnrt 
of  his inborn  external  Freedom for a particular pnrpose ; 
but he has abandonecl his  wild  lawless  Freedom wholly, 
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undiminished,  but  in the forni  of  a  regulated  order  of 
dependence, that is, in a Civil  state  regulated by laws of 
Right.  This relation of  Dependence  thus  arises  out  of 
his own regulative law-giving Will. 
48. 
Mutual Relations  and Characteristics of  the Three Powers. 
The three Powers  in the State, as regards  their  rela- 
tions to each other, are, therefore-(1)  CO-ordinate  with one 
another as so many Moral  Persons, and  the  one  is thus 
tlie Complement  of  the other  in the way of  completing 
the  Constitution  of  the  State;  (2)  they  are  likewise 
subwdinate  to one  another,  so  that  the one  cannot  at 
the Same time usurp the function of  the other by whose 
side it moves, each  having  its own Principle, and main- 
taining  its  authority  in a  particular  Person,  but  under 
the condition  of  the Will  of  a  Superior; and,  further, 
(3)  by  the  union  of  both  these  relations,  they  assign 
distributively  to  every  subject  in  the  State  liis  own 
Rights. 
Considered  as  to  their  respective  Dignity,  the three 
Powers may be thus described.  The Will of  the Sovereign 
Legislator,  in respect  of  what  constitutes  the  externd 
Mine and Thine, is to be regarded  as irreprehensible ;  the 
executive Function of  the supreme Ruler is to be regarded 
as irresistible ;  and the judicial  Sentence of  the Szqrenze 
Jztdge  is  to  be  regarded  as  irreversible,  beiiig  beyoiid 
appeal. 
49. 
Distinct Functions of  the Three Powers.  Autonomy of  the 
State. 
1. The  Executive  Power  belongs  to  the  Govervzor  or 
Begent  of  the  State, M-hether it assumes  the form  of  a 
Moral  or  Individual  Person, as tlie King or Prince  (rex, 
princeps).  This  Executive  Authority,  as  the  Supreme 
Agent  of  tlie  State, appoints  the Magistrates,  and  pre- 
scribes the Rules to the people, in accordance with whicli 
individiials  may  acqnire  anytliing  or maintain  what  is 
tlieir  own  conformably  to  the  Law,  each  case  being 
brought  under  its  application.  Regarded  as  a  Moral 
Person, this Executive Authority constitutes  the Govern- 
ment.  The  Orders  issued  by  the  Government  to  the 
People  and  the  Magistrates  as  well  as  to  the  higher 
Ministerial Adv~inistrators  of  the  State (gubel-natio), are 
Rescripts or Decrees, and not Laws ;  for they terininate ~II 
the decision  of  particular  cases, and  are  given  forth  as 
uiichangeable.  A  Government  acting  as  an  Executire, 
and  at the  Same  time  laying  down  the  Law  as  tlie 
Legislative  Power, would be a Bespotic  Governinent, and 
would  have  to  be  contradistinguished  fronl  a  patriotic 
Government.  A  putriotic  Government,  again,  is  to be 
distinguished  from  a  paternal  Government  (regime~~ 
patel-nnle) which is the most  despotic Government of  all, 
the Citizens being  dealt with by it as mere children.  A 
patriotic Government, however, is one in which the State, 
while dealing with the Subjects as if  they were Members 
of  a  Family, still  treats  theni  likewise  as  Citizens, and 
according  to  Laws  that  recognise  their  independence, 
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tlent  on  the  absolute  Will  of  niiotlier  beside  liim  or 
al~ove  him. 
2.  The Legislative  Aiithority  ought  not  at the Same 
tirne to be the Eseciitive or Governor ; for the Governor, 
as Administrator,  should  stand  under  the  aiithority  of 
the Law, and is bound  by it under  the supreme control 
of  the  Legislator.  The  Legislative  Autliority  nlay 
therefore  deprive  the  Governor  of  his  power,  depose 
him,  or  reform  his  adrninistration, biit  not plnish  him. 
This  is  the  proper  aiid  only  meaning  of  the  commoii 
saying in England, '  The King-as  the  Supreme Execu- 
tive  Power-can  do no wrong.'  For  any such  applica- 
tion of Punishment would  necessarily be  an act  of  that 
very  Executive  Power  to  which  the  supreme  Right  to 
eompel  according to Law pertains, and which would  itself 
be thus subjected to coercion ;  which is self-contradictory. 
3.  Further,  neither  the  Legislative  Power  nor  the 
Executive Power ought to exercise the  judieial  Function, 
but only appoint Judges as Magistrates.  It is the People 
who  ought  to judge  themselves,  through  those  of  tlie 
Citizens who are elected  by free Choice  as their  Repre- 
sentatives for this purpose, and  even  specially for  every 
process or  cause.  For the judicial  Sentence is a Special 
itct of  public  Distributive  Justice performed by a Judge 
or Court as a constitutional Administrator of  the Law, to 
a  Subject  as one  of  the  People.  Such  an act  is not 
invested  inherently  with  the  power  to determine  and 
assign to any one what  is Iiis.  Every individual among 
the people  being  merely passive  in this  relation  to the 
Supreme Power, either the Executive  or  the Legislative 
Authority might  do  him  wrong  in their  determinations 
in cases of  dispute regarding the  property of  individuals. 
It  would  not  be  the people  themselves wllo thus deter- 
mined, or wlio pronounced  the judginents  of  'guilty ' or 
'  not  guilty ' regarding  their  fellow - citizens.  For  it is 
to  the  determination  of  this issue  in a  cause, that  tlie 
Court  has  to  apply  the  Law ; and  it  is  by  means  of 
tlie  Executive Authority, that the Judge liolds  power  to 
assign  to  every  one  Iiis  own.  Hence  it is  only  the 
People  that  properly  can  judge  in  a  cause-although 
iiiclirectly-by  ltepresentatives  elected  and  deputed  by 
tlieinselves, as in a Jury.-It  would even be beneatli the 
dignity of  the Sovereign  Head  of  tlie  State to play the 
Judge; for this would be to put himself  into a  position 
in whicli it would  be  possible to do Wrong, and thus  to 
subject hiniself  to the demand  for  an appeal  to  a  still 
Iiiglier  Power  (a  rege  male  i??fom~znto  nd  ~cyem  melizis 
informandxn~). 
It  is by the co-operation  of  these  tliree  Powers-tlie 
Legislative,  the Executive,  and  the  Judicial-that  the 
State realizes its Autonomj.  This Autonomy consists  iri 
its organizing, forming, and maintaiiiing  itself  in accord- 
ance  with  tlie  Laws  of  Freedom.  In their uiiion  the 
Nr,lfaai.e of  tlie State is realized.  Xc(2us reirpubliciz szq~renur. 
lex.  By  this  is  not  to  be  iii~derstood  merely the indi- 
vidual  well-bei?.ry and  happiness  of  the  Citizens  of  the 
State ; for-as  Eousseau asserts--tliis  End may perhaps 
bo  more  agreeably and  more  desirably  attained  in  the 
state of  Nature, or even  ~iiider  a  despotic  Governmerit. 
But  tlie Welfare  of  the  State as its own Highest  Good, 
signifies  that  condition  in wliich  the  greatest  harinony 
is  attained  between  its Constitiition  and tlie Priilciples 
of  Riglit,--a  conditioii  of  the  State which  Reason  by 
a  Categorical  Imperative  makes it obligatory upoii iis to 
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CONSTITUTIONAL  AND JURIDICAL  CONUEQUENCES  AILISING 
BROM THE NATURE  OB THE CIVIL UNION. 
8. Right of  the Supreme Power, Treason ;  Dethronement ; 
Revolution ;  Reform. 
The  Origin  of  the  Supreme  Power  is practically  212- 
scrutuble  by  the  People  who  are  placed  under  its 
authority.  In  other words, the Subject need  not  reason 
ioo  curiously  in  regnrd  to  its  origin  in  the  practical 
relation, as  if  the Right of  the obedience due to it were 
to be doubted  (jus cont~overszbm). For as the People, in 
order  to  be  able  to  adjudicate  with  a  title  of  Right 
regarding  the  Supreme  Power  in  the  State,  must  be 
regarded  as  already united under one common legislative 
Will,  it  cannot  judge  otherwise  than  as  the  present 
Supreme  Head  of  the  State  (sununt~  imperans) wills. 
The  question  has  been  raised  as  to whether  an actual 
Contract  o£  Subjection  (pactum  subjectionis  civilis) 
originally preceded the Civil Government  as  a  fact ;  or 
whether the Power arose first, and the Law only followed 
afterwards, or  rnay  have  followed  in  this  order.  But 
such  questions, as  regards  the  People  already  aetually 
living  under  the  Civil  Law,  are either entirely aimless, 
or even fraught with  subtle danger  to the  State.  For, 
should  the  Subject,  after  having  dug  down  to  the 
ultimate  origin  of  the  State,  rise  in opposition to the 
present ruling Authority, he would  expose  himself  as a 
Citizen, according to the Law and with  full Right, to be 
punished, destroyed, or  outlawed.  A  Law  which  is so 
holy and inviolable  that it  is practkally  a  mime  even 
to Cast  doubt upon it, or  to  suspend  its  operation for a 
monie~it,  is  represented  of  itself  as  necessarily  derived 
from  some  Supreme, unblameable  Lawgiver.  And  this 
is  the  meaning  of  the  maxim,  'All Authority is froili 
God ;  ' which  proposition  does  not express the histo~icnl 
foundution  of  the Civil Constitution, but an ideal  Prin- 
ciple  of  the  Practical  Reason.  It  may  be  otherwise 
rendered  thus,  'It  is a  Duty  to obey  the  Law  of  the 
existing Legislative Power, be its origin what it may.' 
Hence it follows, that the Supreme Power in the State 
has only Rights, and no (compulsory) Duties towards the 
Subjeet.-Burther,  if  the Ruler  or  Regent, as the Organ 
of  the  Supreme  Power,  proceeds  in  violation  of  the 
Laws, as in imposing taxes, recruiting soldiers, and so On, 
contrary to  the  Law of  Equdity  in  the distribution  of 
the political  burdens, the  Subject may oppose complaints 
and oljections (gravamina) to this injustice, but not active 
resistance. 
There  cannot  even  be  an  Article  contained  in  the 
political Constitution that would  make  it  possible  for a 
Power in the State, in case  of  the  transgression  of  the 
Constitutional  Laws  by the Suprenie Authority, to resist 
or  even  to  restrict  it in so doing.  For, whoever would 
restrict  the  Supreme  Power  of  the  State  must  have 
more,  or  at least  equal  power  as  compared  with  the 
Power that  is so  restricted;  and  if  competent  to com- 
mand  the  subjects  to resist, such a one would also have 
to be  able to protect  them, and  if  he  is to be considered 
capable of  judging what  is right  in every case, he  may 
also publicly order Resistance.  Biit such a one, and not 
the actual Authority, would then be the Supreme Power; 
which is contradictory.  The  Supreme  Sovereign Power, 
then, in proceeding  by  a  Minister who  is  at the  Same 
time  the  Ruler  of  the  State,  consequently  becomes 
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imagine -,  when  they  have  properly  only  Lcgisiative 
influence-that  they  act  by  their Deputies  by way of 
limiting  the Sovereign  Authority,  cannot so mask and 
disguise  the  actual  Despotism  of  such  a  Government 
that it  will  not  appear  in  the  measures  and  means 
adopted  by the Minister to carry out his function.  The 
People, while  represented  by  their  Deputies in  Parlia- 
ment,  under  such  conditions,  may  have  in  these  war- 
rantors  of  their  Freedom  and  Rights,  persons  who  are 
keenly interested on their own account and their families, 
and who look to such  a  Minister  for  the benefit  of  his 
influence in the Army, Navy, and  Public  Offices.  And 
hence, instead  of  offering  resistance  to  the undue  pre- 
tensions  of  the  Government-whose  public declarations 
ought to carry a prior accord  oti  the part of  the people, 
which, however, cannot  be  slllowed  in peace,-they  are 
rather always ready to play into the hands of  the Govern- 
ment.  Hence the so-called limited political Constitution, 
as a  Constitution  of  the internal  Rights  of  the  State, 
is  an  unreality ; and  instead  of  b&ng  consistent  witli 
Right,  it is only  a  Principle  of  Expediency.  And  its 
aim is not so much to throw nll possible obstacles in the 
way  of  a  powerful  violator  of  popular  Rights  by  his 
arbitrary  influence  upon  the  Government,  as  rather  to 
cloak  it over under  the illiision of  a Right of  oppositiori 
conceded to the People. 
Resistance on tlie part  of  the  People  to the Supreriie 
Legislative  Power  of  the State, is in no case legitimate ; 
for it is only by submission  to  the universal Legislative 
Will,  that  a  condition  of  law  and  order  is  possible. 
Hence  there  is  110  Riglit  of  Sedition,  and  still  less  of 
Rebellion,  belonginp  to  the  People.  And  least  of  all, 
when  tlie  Siipreme  Power  is  embodied in an individual 
Monarch, is there any justification,  uiider  the pretext  of 
his  abuse  of  power,  for  seizing  his  Person  or  takiilg 
away  his  Life  (rnonar~honzae7~is~~~us  sub  specie  tyranni- 
ciclii).  The  slightest  attempt  of  this  kind  is Biyh 
Treason  (proditio  eminens);  and a  Traitor  of  this  sort 
who  aims  at  the  overthrozu  of  his  country  may  be 
punished, as  a  political  parricide, even with  Dezlth.  It 
is  the  duty  of  the Yeople  to  bear  any  abuse  of  the 
Supreme  Power,  even  then  thougli.  it  should  be  con- 
sidered to be  uilbearable.  And the reason  is, that  any 
Resistance  of  the  highest  Legislative  Authority  can 
never  but  be  contrary to  the  Law,  and  nlust  even  be 
regarded as tending  to  destroy the whole legal Constitu- 
tion.  In order  to be entitled to offer such Resistance, a 
Public Law would  be  required  to  permit  it.  But  the 
Supreme  Legislation would  by such  a  Law  cease  to  be 
supreme,  and  the  People  as  Subjects  would  be  made 
sovereign over that to which  they are  subject ; which  is 
a  contradiction.  And  the  contradiction  becomes  more 
apparent when  the  question  is  put:  Who  is  to  be  the 
Jucke  in  a  controversy  between  the  People  and  the 
Sovereign ?  For the People and  the Sovereign are to be 
constitutionally or  juridically  regarded  as  two  different 
Moral  Persons;  bnt  the  question  shows  that  the 
People would then have  to  be  the Judge  in their  own 
cause.-See  Szbpplementary Explartations, IX. 
The Dethronement of  a  Monarch  ruay be also con- 
ceived  as a  voluntary  abdication  of  the Crown, and 
a  resignation  of  his  power  into  the  hands  of  the 
Yeople;  or  it might  be  a  deliberate surrender  of 
these  withont  any  assault  on  the  royal  Person,  in 
order that the Monarch may be relegated into private 
life.  But, however it  happen,  forcible  compulsion 
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under the pretext  of  a '  Right  of  Necessity ' (caszis 
necessitutis) ; and least of  all can the slightest Riglit 
bs  shown for punishing tlle Sovereign on the ground 
of  previous maladrriinistration.  For all that has beeil 
already done  in the quality of  a  Sovereign, must  be 
regarded as done ontwnrdly by Right ;  and, considered 
as tlie  sonrce  of  the Laws,  the  Sovereign  himself 
can do  rio  wrong.  Of  all the abominations in the 
overthrow of  a  State by Revolution, even the murder 
or  assassinution  of  the  Monarch  is  not  the worst. 
For tlzat  may be done by tlie People out of  fear, lest 
if he is alIowed to live, he may again acquire power 
and inflict punishment upon  them ;  and so it may be 
done,  not  as an act of  punitive Justice, but merely 
from  regard  to self-preservation.  It is  the formal 
Execution  of  a  Monarch  that horrifies  a  soul  filled 
with ideas  of  human  right ;  and this feeling occurs 
again  and again as  often  as tlie  mind realizes  the 
scenes that terminated the fate of  Charles I. or Louis 
XVI.  Now  how  is this  Feeling to  be  explained? 
It is not  a  rnere  asthetic feeling,  arising from the 
working of the Imagination, nor from Sympathy, pro- 
duced  by fancying  ourselves  in  the  place  of  the 
sufferer.  <On the  contrary,  it is  a  snoral  feeling 
arising from the eiltire  subversion  of  all our notions 
of  Right,  Regicide, in short, is regarded as a  Crime 
which always remains such, and can never be expiatecl 
(crimen  immortale, inexpiubile); and  it appears  to 
resemble that Sin which the Theologiaus declare  cari 
neither  be  forgi~en  in this  world  nor  in the iiext. 
The explanation  of  this phenomenon  in the humaii 
mind appears to be furnished  by the following reflec- 
tions upon  it; and  they even  shed  some light upoii 
the Principles of  Political Right. 
Every Transgression of  a  Lam  only can  and must 
be explained as arising from a  Maxiin  of  the trans- 
gressor malcing sucli wrong-doing  his rille  of  action ; 
for were it not committed by him  as a ficc  Being, it 
could not be imputed to him.  But it is  absolutely 
impossible  to  explain  how  any  rational  individual 
forms such a Maxim  against the clear prohibition of 
the lawgiving Reason;  for  it is only  events which 
happeii according to the mechanical laws of  Nature 
that are capable of  explanation.  Now a  transgressor 
or criminal mdy commit his wrong-doing either accord- 
ing to the Mexim of  a  Rule  supposed  to be valid 
objectively  and  universally, or only as an Exception 
from the Rule by dispensing with  its obligatio~i  for 
the occasion.  In  the lutter case, he only diverges frorri 
the Law,  although  intentionally.  He may,  at the 
Same time, abhor his  own transgression, and without 
formally renouncing  his  obedience  to  the Law only 
wish  to. avoid  it.  In the fornzer  case, however, he 
rejects the authority of  the Law itself, the validity of 
which, however, he cannot repudiate before  his owrl 
Reason,  even  while  he  makes  it his  Rule  to  act 
against  it.  His  Maxim  is  therefore  not  merely 
defective as being  negatively contrary to the Law, but 
it is even  positively  illegal? as  being  dknzetrically 
contrary and in hostile opposition to it.  So far as we 
can  See  into and  understand the relation, it would 
appear as if  it were  impossible  for  men  to  commit 
wrongs and crimes of  a wholly useless form of wicked- 
ness,  and  yet  the idea  of  sudh  extreme  perversity 
cannot  be  overlooked in a  System  of  Moral  Philo- 
sophy. 
There is thus a feeling of  horror at the thought of 
the  formal  Execution  of  a  Monarch  by  his Peopk 
And the reason of it is, that whereas an act of Assassi- 
nation  must be considered as only an exception  fronl 
the Rule which  has been  constituted a  Maxim, sucli 
an Execution  must  be  regarded  as a  cornplete per- 
version  of  the  Principles  that  should  regulate  the 
relation  between a Sovereign and his  Feople.  For  it 
makes the People, who owe their constitutional exist- 
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to  be the Iiiiler over him.  Hence mere violence is thus 
elevated with bold  brom, and as it were  by principle, 
above the holiest Right ;  and, appearing like an abyss 
to swallow up everything without recall, it seems like 
suicide comniitted by the State upon itself, aild a crime 
that is capable of  no  atonement.  There  is therefore 
reason to assume that the consent that is accorded to 
such executions is not really based  upon  a supposed 
Principle of  Rigl~t,  but only spsings  from fear  of the 
vengeance  that would be  taken upon the People were 
the same  Power to revive  again in the State.  And 
hence it may be held that the formalities accompany- 
ing them, have only been put forward in order to give 
these deeds a look  of  Punishment  from  the accom- 
paniment of  a judicial process, such as could  not  go 
along  with  a  mere  Murder  or  Assassination.  But 
such a cloaking of  the deed  entirely fails of  its pur- 
pose, because this pretension on the part of  the People 
is  even worse  tlian  Murder  itself,  as it implies  a 
principle which  would  necessarily make the restora- 
tion of  a State, when once overthrown, an  impossibility. 
An alteration of  the still defective Constitution of  the 
State may sometimes  be quite  necessary.  But all  such 
changes ought only to proceed from the Sovereign Power 
in the way of  Bgorrn, and are  not  to  be  brought  aboiit 
by  the people in the way of  Revolz~tion; and when  they 
take place, they should  only affect the Executive, and not 
the Legislative Power.  A  political Constitution which is 
so modified that  the  People  by their  Representatives  in 
Parliament  can  legally  ~esist  the Executive  Power  and 
its representative  Minister, is called a  Limited  Constitu- 
tion.  Yet  even  under  such  a  Constitution  there  is no 
Right of  active Resistance, as by an arbitrary combination 
of  the People  to  coerce  the Guvernment  into  a  certain 
active procedure ; for this would be to assume to perform 
an act of  the Executive  itself.  All that  can  rightly Be 
allowed,  is  only a  negative Resistance, amounting  to  an 
act of Refusal  on  the part of  the Yeople  to  concede  all 
the demands which the Executive may deem it necessary 
to make in behoof  of  the political Administration.  And 
jf  this  Right were  never  exercised, it would  be  a  Sure 
sign that the People were corrupted, their Representatives 
venal,  the  Supreme  Head  of  the Government  despotic, 
and his Ministers practically betrayers of  the People. 
Further, when on  the success of  a  Revolution  a  new 
Constitution  has  been  founded, the  unlawfulness  of  its 
beginning and of  its institution  cannot  release  the Sub- 
jects from the obligation of  adapting  themselves, as good 
Citizens, to  the  new order of  things ;  and  they are not 
entitled to refuse  honourably to  obey the authority that 
has thus attained the power in the State.  A  dethroned 
Monarch, who has  survived  such a  Revolution, is not to 
be called to account on the ground of  his former admini- 
stration ;  and still less may he  be  punished  for it, when 
withdrawing into the private life of  a  citizen he prefers 
his  own  quiet  and  the  peace of  the  State  to  the  un- 
certainty of  exile, with  the  intention of  maintaining  his 
claims for  restoration at all  hazards, and  pushing  these 
either by secret  counter-revolution  or  by the  assistance 
of  other Powers.  However, if  he  prefers  to  follow  the 
latter  Course, his  Rights  remain,  because  the Rebellion 
that drove him from  his  position was  inherently unjust. 
But the question then emerges as to whether other Powers 
liave the Right to  form themselves  into  an  alliance  in 
behalf  of  such a dethroned  Monarch  merely in order not 
to leave the crinie  committed by the People  unavenged, 
or to do away with it as a scandal to all the States; and 
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restore  by  force  to  another  State  a  formerly  existing 
Constitution  that  has  been  removed  by  a  Revolution. 
The discussion of  this question, however, does not belong 
to this department of  Yublic Right, but  to  the  following 
section, concerning the Right of  Nations. 
B.  Land Rights.  Secular and Church Lands.  Rights. of 
Taxation ;  Finance ;  Police ;  Inspection. 
1s the Sovereign, viewed as embodying the Legislative 
Power, to be regarded as the  Supreme  Proprietor  of  the 
Soil, or only as the Highest Euler  of  the  People  by the 
laws  ?  As the Soil is the supreme condition under which 
it is alone possible to have  external  things as one's own, 
its possible possession and use  constitute the first acquir- 
able basis of  external Right.  Hence  it is  that  all such 
Rights must be derived from  the  Sovereign as Over-lord 
and Pararnount  Superior  of  the Soil, or,  as  it may  be 
better  put,  as  the  Supreme  Proprietor  of  the  Land 
(Dontinus territorii).  The People, as forming the mass of 
the Subjects, belong to the Sovereign as a People ;  not in 
the  sense  of  his  being  their  Proprietor  in  the  way  of 
Real Right, but as their Supreme Commander or Chief in 
the  way of  Personal  Right.  This  Supreme  Proprietor- 
ship, however, is only an  ldea of  the Civil Constitution, 
objectified to represent, in accordance with  juridical  con- 
ceptions, the necessary union  of  the private  property of 
a11 the people under  a  public  universal  Possessor.  The 
relatioii is so represented in order that it may form a basis 
for  the  determination  of  particular Rights in property. 
It does  not  proceed,  therefore,  upon  the  Principle  of 
rnere  Ayy~egation,  which  advances  empirically from  the 
parts to the Whole, but from  the necessary formal prin- 
ciple of  a Division  of  the  Soil  according to  conceptions 
of  Ripht.  In accordance with this Principle, the Supreme 
Universal  Proprietor  cannot  liave  any  private  property 
in any part  of  the Soil; for  otherwise he  woulcl  make 
himself a private  Person.  Private  property in  the  Soil 
belongs only to the People, taken  distributively and  not 
collectively ;-from  which  condition, however,  n nomndic 
people must be  excepted as having  no  private property 
at all in the Soil.  The  Supreme Proprietor  accordingly 
ought not to  hold  private Estates, either  for  private  use 
or for the support of  the Court.  For, as it would depencl 
upon  his  own  pleasure  how  far  these  should  extend, 
the State would  be  in  danger  of  seeing all property in 
the Land taken into the  hands  of  the  Government, and 
all  the  Subjects treated  as bondsmen  of  the  Soil  (glebce 
ccclscripti).  As  possessors  only of  what was  the private 
property of  another, they might  thus be  deprived of  all 
freedom and regarded as Serfs or Slaves.  Of  the Supreme 
Proprietor  of  the  Land, it may Be  said  that kepossesses 
nothing as his  own, except  himself ; for  if  Be  possessed 
things  in  the  State  alongside  of  others,  dispute  and 
litigation would  be  possible with  these  others  regarding 
those things, and  there would  be  no  indepenclent Judge 
to  settle  the  cause.  But  it may  be  also  said  that  he 
possesses  eve~ything; for  he  lias  the  Supreme  Right  of 
Sovereignty over the whole People, to whom  all external 
things severally (clivisim) belong ;  and as such he assigns 
distributively to every one what is to be his. 
Hence there cannot be  ariy Corporation in the  State, 
nor any Class or Order, tliat as Proprietors  can  transmit 
the Land for a sole exclusive use to the following genera- 
tions  for  all  time  (ud  inj'initurn), according  to  certain 
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such  Statutes  at  aiiy time, oiily under  the  condition  of 
indemnifying survivors for their iiiterests.  The Order of 
Kniyhts,  constitutiizg  the  nobility  regarded  as  a  mere 
rank  or  class of  specially titled  individuals,  as  well  as 
the  Order  of  the  CZe~gy, called  the  Church,  are  both 
subject to this relation.  They caiz  never  be  entitled  by 
any  hereditary  privileges  witli  wliich  tliey  may  be 
favoured,  to  acquire  an  absolute  property  in  the  soil 
trailsmissible to their successors.  They can only acquire 
the use of  such property for  the time  being.  If  Public 
Opinion has ceased, on account of  other arrangenieiits, to 
impel the State to protect  itself  from  negligence  in  the 
national defence by appeal to the milita~y  honozw  of  the 
knightly  order,  the  Estates  granted  on  that  condition 
may be recalled.  And, in like inanner, the Church Lands 
or  Spiritualities  may be  reclaimed by the  State witliout 
scruple,  if  Public  Opinion  has  ceased  to  inipel  the 
members of  the State to maintain Masses for the Souls of 
tlze  Dead,  Prayers for  the  Living,  and  a  multitude  of 
Clergy, as means to  protect themselves from  eternal fire. 
But in both cases, the condition of  indemnifying existing 
interests must be observed.  Those who  in  this  connec- 
tion falI under the niovement of  Reform, are not entitled 
to complain that their  property is takeii from  them ;  for 
the foundation  of  their  previous  possession  lay  only in 
the  Opinion  of  the PeopZe,  and  it can  be  valid  only  so 
long  as  this  opiriion  lasts.  As  soon  as  this  Public 
Opinion in favour of such institutions dies out, or is even 
extinguished in the judgment of  those who have the greatest 
claim by their acknowledged merit to lead and represeiit it, 
the putative proprietorship  in questioiz must cease, as  if 
by  a public appeal inade regarding it to the State (a YP~ 
i~zale  info~mato  ad Yegem  nzelizbs  iqfornzandz~rn). 
On  this primarily acquired  Supreme Proprietorsliip in 
the Land, rests the Right  of  the  Sovereign:  as universal 
Proprietor of  the country, to assess the private proprietors 
of the Soil, and to demand Taxes, Excise, and Dues, or the 
performance  of  Service to  the  State  such  as  may  be 
required in War.  But this  is  to  be done  so  that  it is 
actually  the  People  that  assess  themselves,  this  being 
the only mode of  proceeding according to Laws of  Plight. 
This niay be  effected  throiigh the medium  of  the Body 
of  Deputies  who  represent  the  People.  It is also per- 
missible,  in  circilmstances  in  which  the  State  is  in 
imminent  danger,  to  proceed  by  a  forced  Loan,  as  a 
Right  vested  in  the  Sovereign, although  this  msly be  s 
divergence from the existing Law. 
Upon  this  Principle  is  also  founded  the  Right  of 
administering  the  National  Economy,  including  the 
Finaiice  and  the  Police.  Tlie  Police  has  specially  to 
care  for  the  Ynblic  Safety,  Convenience,  and  Decency. 
As  regards  the  last  of  these,-the  feeling  or  negative 
taste  for  public  Propriety,-it  is  important  that  it  be 
not  deadened  by such  influences as  Begging,  disorderly 
Noises, offensive Smells, public Prostitution (Vefius vzclgi- 
vaga),  or  otlier  offences  against  the  Moral  Sense,  as it 
greatly facilitates the Government in the task of  regulat- 
ii~g  the life of  the People by law. 
For the preservation of  the State there further belongs 
to  it  a  Right  of  Inspection  (jus  inspectionis),  which 
eiltitles the public Authority to See that no secret Society, 
political  or  religious, exists  among  the  people  that  caiz 
exert  a  prejudicial  influence  upon  the  public  Weal. 
Accordingly, when it is  required by the  Police, no  such 
secret  Society may  refuse  to  lay  Open  its  constitution. 
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Police, can only  be justified  in a  case  of  Necessity ;  aiicl 
in every particular  instance, it niust be authorized  by a 
higher dnthority. 
C.  Relief  of  the Poor.  Foundling Hospitals.  The 
Church. 
The  Sovereign,  as  undertaker  of  the  duty  of  ilie 
People, has the Riglit to tax  them  for  purposes  essenti- 
ally connected  with  their own  preservation.  Such  are, 
in particular, the Belief  of  the Poor, Foundling Asylunis, 
and  Ecclesiastical  Establishments,  otherwise  designated 
charitable or pious Foundations. 
1.  The  People  have  in fact  united  themselves  by 
their common Will into a  Society, which  has to be per- 
petually  niaiiltained;  and  for  this  purpose  they  have 
subjected themselves to the internal Power of  the State, 
in order  to preserve  the  members  of  this  Society even 
when they are not  able to Support  themselves.  By tlie 
fundamental  principle  of  the State, the  Government  is 
justified  and  entitled  to  compel  those who  are able, to 
furnish  the  means  necessary to  preserve  those who  are 
not themselves capable of  providing for the most  neces- 
sary  wants  of'  Nature.  For  the  existence  of  persons 
with property in the State,  implies their subrnission under 
it for protection  and the provision by tlie State of what 
is  necessary  for  their  existence;  and  accordingly  the 
State founds a Right upon an obligation on their part to 
contribute  of  their  means  for  the preservation of  their 
fellow-citizens.  This may be  carried  out by taxing  the 
Property or  the commercial  industry of  the Citizens, or 
by establishing Funds and  drawinp  interest  frorn  tliem, 
not for the wants of the State as such, which is rich, but 
for those  of  tlie  People.  And  this  is  not  to  be  done 
riierely  by  volttntaq  contributions,  but  by  comp~ilsory 
exactions as State-burdens, for  we  are  here  considering 
only the Right  of  the State in relation  to  the People. 
Among the volu.ntn.r2/ modes of  raising such contributions 
Xotte.l.ies oiight  not  to be  allowed, because  they increase 
the number of  those who are poor, and involve danger to 
the  pulslic  property.-It  niay  be  asked  whether  the 
Relief  of  the  Poor  ought  to  be  adruinistered  out  of 
current cont~~ibutions,  so  that  every  age  should  maintain 
its own Poor ;  or whether this were better done by means 
of  permanent  fztnds  and  charitable iristitutions, such  as 
Wiclows'  Hornes,  Hospitals,  etc. ?  And  if  the  former 
method is the better, it  may also  be  considered whether 
the means  necessary are to be  raised by a  legal  Assess- 
inent rather than by Begging, which is generally nigh akin 
to robbing.  The former method must in reality be regarded 
ILS the only one that is conformable to the IZight  of  the 
State,  which  cannot  withdraw  its connection  from  any 
one who has to live.  For a legal ciirrent  provision  does 
not niake  the profession of  poverty a  means of  gain for 
the indolent, as  is to be  feared  is  the  case with  pious 
Foundations when  they  grow  with  the  number  of  the 
poor;  nor  can  it be  charged  with  being  an  unjust  or 
iinrighteous  burden  imposed by the Government  on  the 
people. 
2.  The  State has  also  a  Right  to  impose  upon  the 
People  the  duty  of  preserving  Children  exposed  from 
want or shame, and who would  otherwise  perish;  for it 
cannot knowingly allow this  increase of  its power to be 
rlestroyed, however  unwelcome  in some  respects it may 
be.  But it is a difficult qiiestion  to determine  how this 
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wliether it would not  be  right to exact  contributions for 
this purpose  from  the unmarried  persons  of  botli  sexes 
who are possessed of  mealis, as being  in part responsible 
for tlie evil ; and further, whether the end in view would 
be  best  carried  out by Foundling  Hospitals, or  in what 
other way consistent with Riglit.  But this is a  problem 
of  which no soliition  has  yet been  offered that does not 
in some measure offend against night or Morality. 
3.  The  Chzc~clt  is here  regarded  as  an Ecclesiastical 
Establishment  merely, and as such it must  be  carefully 
distinguished  from Religion, which as  an internal  mode 
of  feeling lies wholly beyond the sphere of  the action of 
the Civil Power.  Viewed  as  an Institution  for  public 
Worsl~ip  founded  for  the  people,-to  whose  opinion  or 
conviction it owes its origin,-the  Church Establishment 
responds to a real want in the  State.  This is the need 
felt by the people to regard  themselves  as  also Subjects 
of  a  Supreme  Znvis.ibZe  Power  to which  they must  pay 
homage,  and which  may  often be  brought  into  a  very 
undesirable  collision  with  the Civil  Power.  The  State 
has therefore a Right in this relation ; but it is not to be 
regarded as the Right of  Constitutional Legislation in the 
Church, so  as to organize  it as may seem  most  advan- 
tageous for itself, or to prescribe and command its faith and 
ritual forms of  worship (htus) ; for  all this must be  left 
entirely to the teachers and rulers which the Church has 
chosen for itself.  The function of  the State in this con- 
nection, only includes the negative Right of  regulating the 
influence of  these public teachers upon tlle visible political 
Commonwealth,  that  it may  not  be  prejudicial  to  tlie 
public  peace  and  tranquillity.  Consequently the  State 
lias to talce measures, on occasion of  any internal conflict 
in the  Church,  or  on  occasioii  of  any  collision  of  the 
several  Churches with  each  other, that Civil  concord  is 
not endangered ; and this Eight falls within the province 
of  the Police.  It is  beneath  the dignity of  tlie  Suprenie 
Power to interpose  in  determining what  particular  faith 
the Church shall profess, or to decree that a certain faith 
shall be  unalterably held, and  that tlie Church  may not 
reform  itself.  For  in doing  so,  the  Supreme  Power 
would  be  mixing  itself up in a  scholastic wrangle, on a 
footing of equality with its subjects ;  the Monarch would 
be  making  himself  a  priest; and the Churchmen  might 
even  reproach  the Supreme  Power  with  understanding 
nothing  about  matters  of  faith.  Especially  would  this 
hold in respect of  any prohibition of  internal Reform in 
the  Church; for  what  the  People  as  a  whole  cannot 
determine upon for themselves, cannot be  determined for 
the People by the Legislator.  But  no  People  can  ever 
rationally determine that they will never advance farther 
in their insiglit into matters of  faith, or resolve that they 
will never reform the institutions of  the Church ; because 
this  would  be  opposed  to  the  humanity  in their  own 
persons, and to their highest Rights.  And  therefore  the 
Supreme  Power  cannot  of  itself  resolve  and  decree  in 
these  matters  for the Peop1e.-As  regards  the cost  of 
maintaining the Ecclesiastical  Establishment, for  similar 
reasons this  must be  derived not from  the public  funds 
of  the  State, but  from  the section  of  the  People  who 
profess the particular faith of  the Church ;  and thus only 
ought  it to  fall as a  burden  on  the Community.-See 
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D.  The Right of assigning OfEces  and Dignities in 
the State. 
Tlie night of  tlie Supreme Authority in the State also 
includes : 
1. Tlie Distributioii of  Oficcs,  as public  and  paid  eui- 
ployments ; 
2.  The Conferring of  Diynitics, as unpaid  distinctions 
of  Raiik, foiinded  merely on  hoilour,  but  establisliing  a 
gradation  of  higher  and  lower  orders  in the  political 
scale;  tlie  latter,  although  free  in  tliemselves,  being 
uncler  obligation  determined  by  the  pixblic  law  to 
obey  the  former  so  far  as  they  are  also  entitled  to 
command ; 
3.  Resides  tliese  relatively  beneficent  Rights,  the 
Supreme  Power  in the State  is  also  invested  with tlie 
Right of  administering Pulzislzmcnt. 
As  regtards  Civil  Oflces,  the  question  arises  as  to 
wlietlier  the  Sovereign  has  the  Right,  after  bestowing 
an office on  an individiial, to  take it again  away at his 
niere pleasure, without aiiy crime having been committed 
by the hoIder  of  tlie  office.  I say, No.  For what  the 
united Will of the People would never  resolve  regarding 
their Civil Officers,  cannot (constitutionally) be determiried 
by tlie Sovereign regarding tliem.  The People have to bear 
tlie cost  incurred by the appointnlent of  an Official, and 
iindoubtedly it must be their Will that any one in Office 
sliould be conipletely competeiit for its duties.  But siich 
cornpetency can  oiily be  acquired by a  Ions  preparation 
and  training, ancl  this  process would  iiecessarily occupy 
the time that would be recluired for acquiring the  means 
of  support  by  a  diffcreiit  occtipntion.  brbitrary  and 
frequent  changes  would  therefore,  as  a  rule,  liave  the 
effect  of  filling Offices with  fiinctionaries who  liave  not 
acquired  the  skill  reqnired  for  their  duties, and whose 
judgments  had  not  attained  maturity by  practice.  All 
this is contrary to the purpose of  the State.  And besides 
it is requisite in the interest of the People, that it should 
be possible for every individual to rise from a lower office 
to the higher offices, as these  latter would  otherwise fall 
into  incompetent  hands,  and  that  cornpetent  officials 
generally shoiild  have  some  guaraiitee  of  life-long  pro- 
vision. 
Cicil Dignitics include not only such as are  connected 
with  a  public  Office, but  also  those  which  make  the 
possessors of  them without any accompanying services to 
tlie State, members of a higher class or rank.  The latter 
constitute the Nobility, whose  members are  distinguished 
from  the  common  citizens  who  form the mass  of  the 
l'eople,  Tlie  rank of  the Nobility is inherited by male 
descendants;  and  these  again  communicate  it  to wives 
who  are  not  nobly born.  Female  descendants of  noble 
families,  however,  do  not  communicate  their  rank  to 
husbands who  are  not  of  noble  birth, but  they descend 
themselves  into  tlie  common  civil  status of  the People. 
This  being so, tlie question  then  emerges  as  to whether 
the Sovereign has the Right  to  found  a  kmeditary rank 
nnd  class,  intermediate loetween  himself  and  tlie  other 
Citizens ?  The import of  this question does not turn on 
wlietlier it is conformable to the yrudence of  the Sovereign, 
froin  regard  to  his  own  and  the  People's  interests,  to 
have such an institution ;  but whether it is in accordance 
with the Bight  of  the People  that they should  have  a 
class of  Persoiis  above  them, who, wliile  being  Subjects 
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least  as  privileged  Superiors?  The  answer  to  this 
cluestioil, as in previous  instances, is to be  derived  froni 
tlie Priilciple that '  what  the People  as constituting  tlie 
whole mass of  the Subjects could  not  determine  regarcl- 
ing themselves  and  their  associated  citizens,  cannot  be 
constitutionally  determined  by  the  Sovereign  regarding 
tlie People.'  Now a heredita-  Nobility is a Rank which 
talses precedence of  Merit and  is hoped for without any 
good reason,-a  thing of  the imagination without genuine 
reality.  For  if  aii  Ancestor  had  merit,  he  could  not 
transmit it to his posterity, but they must always acquire 
it for tliemselves.  Nature  has  in fact  not  so  arranged 
that t,he Talent and Will which  give rise to merit in the 
State, are hereditary.  Ancl because it cannot be supposed 
of  any individual  that he will  throw  away his  Freedont, 
it is impossible that the common Will of  all the People 
should agree to such a groundless  Yrerogative, and hence 
the  Sovereign  cannot  nlake  it valid.-It  may  happen, 
liowever, that such an anomaly as  that of  Subjects who 
would  be  more  than  Citizens,  in the  manner  of  born 
Officials or  hereditary  Professors,  has  slipped  into  the 
inechanism of  the Government  in olden  times, as in the 
case  of  the  Feudal  System, which  was  almost  entirely 
organized  with  reference  to War.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, the State cannot  deal  otherwise with  this  error 
of  a wrongly instituted  Ranlc  in its midst,  than by tlie 
remedy of  a  gradual  extinction  throiigh  hereditary posi- 
tions being  left  unfilled  as they fall vacaiit.  The State 
has therefore  the PLight  provisorily to  let a  Dignity  in 
Title continue, until  the Public Opinion  matures on  the 
subject.  And  this  will  thus  pass  from  the  threefold 
division  into  Sovereign, Nobles, and People, to the two- 
fold arid only natural division into Sovereign and People. 
No  individual  in tlie  State  can  indeed  be  entirely 
without  Dignity;  for  he  has  at least  that  of  being  a 
Citizen, except  when  he  has  lost  his  Civil  Status by a 
Crime.  As a Criminal he is still  maintained in life, but 
Iie is made the  mere  instrunient of  the Will of  another, 
whether it  be the State or a particular Citizen.  In  the latter 
positioil, in which he could only be  placed by a juridical 
judgment,  he would practically become a Slave, and would 
belong as property (dominizcm) to  another, who would  be 
not  merely his  Master (herus) but  his  Owner (doozinzu). 
Such an Owner would be entitled to exchange or alienate 
him as a thing, to  use  him  at will  except  for  shameful 
purposes, and to dispose of  Ais Powers, but not of  his Life 
aild Members.  No one can bind  himself  to such a con- 
dition of  dependence, as he would  thereby cease to be  a, 
Person, and it is  only as a Person  that  he  can  make  a 
Contract.  It may, however, appear  that  one  man  may 
bind  himself  to  another  by a Contract  of  Hire, to  dis- 
charge a certain  servioe that is permissible  in its End, 
but is left  entirely zcndetermined  as regards  its nleasure 
or  amount ; and that  as  receiving  wages  or  board  or 
protection  in  return,  he  thus  becomes  only  a  Servant 
subject  to  the  Will  of  a  Master  (sz~bditm) and  not  :I 
Slave (servus).  Rut this is an illusion.  For  if  Masters 
are  entitled  to use the  powers of  such  subjects  at will, 
they may exhaust these powers,-as  has been done in the 
case  of  Negroes  in  the  Sugar  Islands,-and  they may 
thus  reduce  their  servants  to  despair  and  death.  Hut 
this would imply that they had actually given themselves 
away to their Masters as property ; which, in the case of 
persons  is impossible.  A Person can therefore only con- 
tract to perform worls that is defined both in pality anrl 
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In the latter case he may enter into a Contract of  Lease for 
the use of  the land of  a  Superior, giving  a  definite  rent 
or annual return for its utilization by himself, or he rilay 
contract  for  his  service  as  a  Labourer  upon  the  land. 
But he does not thereby rnake himself  a slave, or a bonds- 
man, or a serf attached to the soil (gleba adscriptus), as  he 
would thus divest himself of  his personality ;  he can only 
enter  into  a  temporary  or  at  most  a  heritable  Lease. 
And  even  if  by comniitting  a  Crime  he  has  personally 
become subjected  to  another, this  siibject-condition  does 
not become hereditary ;  for he has only brought  it upoii 
himself  by his own wrong-doing.  Neither  can  one who 
has been  begotten by a slave be  claimed  as  property on 
the  ground  of  the  cost  of  his  rearing,  because  such 
rearing  is  an absolute  duty  naturally  incumbent  upon 
parents;  and  in case  the  parents  be  slaves, it devolves 
upon  their  masters  or  owners, who, in undertalcing  the 
possession  of  such  subjects, have  also  made  then~selves 
responsible for the performance of  their duties. 
E.  The Right of Punishing and of Pardoning. 
The Right of  administering  Punishment, is the Right 
of  the  Sovereign  as the  Supreme  Power to inflict  pain 
upon a Subject on account of  a Crime cornrnitted by him. 
The  Head  of  the State cannot  therefore  be  punished; 
but his  supremacy may be  withdrawn  fron~  him.  Any 
Transgression  of  the  public  law which  makes  hitn who 
commits  it incapable  of  being  a  Citizen,  constitutes  a 
Crime, either simply as a  private  Crime (crinzen), or also 
as a publie Crime (crimw pcblicum).  Private crimes Ge 
dealt with by a Civil Court; Public Crimes by a Criminal 
Court.-Embezzlement  or  peculation  of  money or goods 
entrustecl  in  trade, Fraud  in  purchase  or  sale, if  clone 
before  the eyes  of  the pnrty  who  suffers,  are  Private 
Crimes.  On  the  other  hand,  Coining  false  money  or 
forging Bills of  Exchange, Theft, Robbery, etc., are Public 
Crirnes, because the Commonwealth, and not merely some 
particular  individual,  is  endangered  thereby.  Such 
Crinies  may be  divided  into  those  of  a  bnse  character 
(indolis abjectca)  and those of  a  viole~zt  character  (indolis 
violentica). 
Judicial  or  Juridical  Punishment  (pmta forensis)  is 
to  be  distinguished  from  Natural  Punishment  (pma 
naturnlis), in which  Crime  as  Vice  punishes  itself, and 
does  not  as  such  come  within  the  cognizance  of  the 
Legislator.  Juridical Punishment can never  be  admini- 
stered  merely as a  means  for  promoting  another  Good 
either with regard  to  the Criminal  himself  or  to  Civil 
Society, but  must  in all cases  be  imposed only because 
the individual  on whom  it is inflicted has  committed a 
Crime.  For one man ought never to be dealt with merely 
as a means snbservient to the purpose of  another, nor be 
mixed  up  with  the  subjects  of  Real  Right.  Against 
such  treatment  his Inborn  Personality has  a  Right  to 
protect him, even although he may be condemned to lose 
his Civil Personality.  He must first be found guilty and 
pu.nishable, before there  can  be  any thought  of  drawing 
from his Punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow- 
citizens.  The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative ;  and 
woe  to  him  who  creeps  through  the  serpent-windings 
of  Utilitarianism  to  discover  some advantage  that  may 
discharge him  from  the Justice of  Punishment, or  even 
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maxim : '  It is better that  ons  man should die tlian thst 
the wliole  people  should  perish.'  For  if  Justice  aiid 
Righteousness  perish,  human  life would  no longer have 
any value in the wor1d.-What,  then, is  to  be  said  of 
such  a  proposal  as  to  keep  a  Criniinal  alive who  Iias 
been condemned to deatli, on  his  being  given  to uilder- 
stand tliat if  he agreed to certain dangerous experiments 
being performed upon him, he would  be  allowed  to sur- 
vive  if lie  came  happily through  them?  It is argued 
tliat  Pliysicians  might  thus obtain new information that 
would  be of  value  to  the  Commonweal.  But  a  Court 
of  Justice would  repudiate  with  scorn  any proposal  of 
this  kind  if  made  to  it  by  the  Medical  Faculty; for 
Justice  would  cease  to  be  Justice,  if  it were  bartereti 
away for any considesation whatever. 
Biit what  is the  mode  and  measure  of  Punishment 
which  Public Justice talces as its Principle and Standard? 
It  is  just  the  Principle  of  Equality,  by  which  the 
pointer  of  the Scale  of  Justice  is  made  to  incline  110 
more  to  the  one  side  tlian  the other.  It rnay be ren- 
dered by saying that the undeserved  ecil which  any one 
commits on another, is to be regarded  as perpetrated  oll 
Iiimself.  Hence  it  rnay  be  said:  '  If  you  slander 
another,  you  slander  yourself ; if  you  steal  frorii 
another, you  steal from yourself ; if  you  strike  another, 
you strike yourself ;  if  you  kill  another, you  kill your- 
self.'  This  is  the Right  of  ~ETALIATION  (jzu  talioks) ; 
anrl  properly  understood, it is the only Principle which 
in regulating a Public  Court, as distinguished frsm mere 
private judgment, oan  definitely assign  both  the  quality 
anJ the quantity of  a just penalty.  All other standards 
are  wavering  and  uncertain; and  on  account  of  other 
coiisiderations  involved  in them,  tliey contain  no  prin- 
ciple  conformable  to  tlie  scnteiice  of  pure  and  strict 
Justice.  It rnay  appear,  liowever,  that  difference  of 
social  status  would  not  admit  tlie  application  of  the 
Principle  of  Retaliation,  which  is  that  of  '  Lilie  witli 
Like.'  But  although  the  application  may  not  in  all 
cases be possible according  to  the  letter, yet  as  regards 
the effect it niay always  be  attained  in  practice,  by clue 
regard  being giveii to the disposition  aiicl  sentiment  of 
tlie parties in tlie Iiigher social sphere.  Thus a pecuniary 
penalty  on  account  of  a  verbal  injury,  niay  have  no 
tlirect  proportion  to  tlie  injustice  of  slander;  for  one 
who  is wealthy rnay be  able  to  iiidnlge  himself  in this 
offence  for  his  owii  gratification.  Yet  tlle attack com- 
rnitted  on  the honour  of  tlie  party aggrieved  rnay have 
its equivalent  in the  pain  inflicted  upon  the  pride  of 
the  aggressor,  especially  if  he  is  condemned  by  the 
jadgment of  the Court, not oiily ta retract and apologize, 
but to submit to soine meaner ordeal, as kissing the hand 
of  the injured Person.  In like manner, if  a  nzan  of  the 
highest rank  has violently assanlted  an iniiocent  citizen 
of  the lower orders, he rnay be  condemned  not  only to 
:~pologize  but to undergo a solitary and paiiiful imprison- 
rrient, whereby, in addition to the discomfort endured, the 
vanity of  the  offender  would  be  painfully affected, aiicl 
the  very  shaine  of  his  position  would  coastitute  an 
adequate  Retaliation  after  the  priilciple  of  '  Like  witli 
Like.'  Bnt  how theii would  we  render  the  statement: 
' If  you  steal  from  another,  you  steal  from  yourself '  ? 
In this  way,  that  whoever  steals  anything makes  the 
property  of  all insecure; he  therefore  robs  hirnself  of 
all  security  in  property,  accordiiig  to  the  Right  of 
Eetaliation.  Such  a  one  lias  nothing, and can  acquire 
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possible  by  otliers  supporting  him.  But  as  the  State 
should not do tliis gratuitously, he  must for this purpose 
yield his powers to the State to be used in peiial  labour ; 
and thus he falls  for  a  time,  or it may be for life, into 
a  condition  of  s1avery.-But  whoever  has  conlmitted 
Murder, must  die.  There  is,  in this  case,  no juridical 
substitute or surrogate, that can be given or talieii for the 
satisfaction  of  Justice.  There  is no Likeness  or propor- 
tion  between  Life,  however  painful,  and  Death;  and 
therefore  there  is  no  Equality  between  the  crime  of 
Murder  and  the retaliation  of  it but what is judicially 
accomplished  by  the  execution  of  the  Criminal.  His 
death, however, must be lxept free from all maltreatment 
that would make  the humanity suffering  in  his  Person 
loathsome  or  abominable.  Even  if  a  Civil  Society 
resolved  to  dissolve  itself  with  the  consent  of  all its 
members-as  might be supposed in the case of  a  People 
inhabiting  an island  resolving  to  separate  and  scatter 
themselves  t.hroughout  the whole world-the  last  Mur- 
derer lying in the prison ought t~ be executed before the 
resolution was  carried  out.  This  ought  to  be  done  in 
order that every one may realize the desert of  his deeds, 
slnd  that  bloodguiltiness  may  not  remain  upon  the 
people;  for  otherwise  they  might  all  be  regarded  as 
participators  in  the  murder  as  a  public  violatioil  of 
Justice. 
The Equalization of  Punishment with  Crime, is there- 
fore  only  possible  by  the  cognition  of  the  Judge 
extending  even  to  the  penalty  of  Death, according  to 
the Right of  Retaliation.  This is manifest from the fact 
that it is only thus  that a  Sentence can be pronounced 
over all criminals proportionate  to their internal wicked- 
ness;  as mzly  be Seen  by considering  the case when  the 
punishment  of  Death has to be inflicted, not on accouiit 
of  a  murder,  but  on  account  of  a  political crime  that 
can  only  be  punished  capitally.  A  hypothetical  case, 
founded  on  history,  will  illustrate  this.  In the  last 
Scottish  Rebellion there were various  participators  in it 
-such  as Balmerino  and others-who  believed  that  in 
taking  part in the Rebellion  they were only discharging 
their duty to  the House  of  Stuart; but there were also 
others who were  animated  only by private  motives  and 
interests.  Now,  suppose  that  the  Judgment of  the 
Supreme  Court  regarding  theni  had  been  this : that 
every  one  should  have  liberty  to  choose  between  the 
punishment of  Death  or  Penal  Servitude  for  life.  In 
view  of  such  an alternative,  I say  that  the  Man  of 
Honour  would  choose  Death,  and  the  Knave  would 
choose  servitude.  This  would  be  the  effect  of  their 
human  nature  as it is; for  the honourable  man values 
his  Honour  more  highly than  even  Life  itself, whereas 
a Knave regards  a  Life,  although  covered  with  shame, 
as better in his  eyes  than  not  to  be.'  The  former  is, 
without gainsaying, less guilty than the other; and they 
can  only  be  proportionately  punished  by  death  being 
inflicted  equally upon them both ; yet  to the oize it is a 
mild punishment when  his  nobler temperament is takeiz 
into  account,  whereas  it  is  a  hard  punishnzent  to  the 
other in view  of  his  baser  temperament.  But, on  the 
other hand, were  they  all  equally  condemned  to  Penal 
Servitude  for  life,  the  honourable  inan  would  be  too 
severely  punished,  while  the other,  on  account  of  his 
baseiiess of  nature,  would be  too  mildly  punished.  In 
the  judgrnent  to  be  pronounced  over  a  number  of 
crinzinals united in such a conspiracy, the  best Equalizer 
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of  Punishinent  and Crime in tlie form  of  pnblic Justice 
is Death.  And besides all this, it has izever been heard 
of, that  a  Criminal  condemned to death on account  of  a 
murder  has  complained  that  the  Sentence  inflicted  011 
him more than was  right  and just ; and  any one would 
treat  him  with  scorn  if  he  expressed  himself  to  this 
effect  against  it.  Otherwise  it  would  be  necessary  to 
admit  that  although wrong and  injustice  are  not  done 
to the Criminal by the Law, yet the Legislative Power is 
not entitled to administer this rnode of  Punishment ; and 
if it did  so, it would be in contradiction with itself. 
However  many  they may be who  have  committed  a 
murder, or have even commanded it, or acted  as art and 
part in it, they ought all to  suffer  death ; for so Justice 
wills  it, in  accordance  with  the Idea  of  tlie  juridical 
Power  as  founded  on  the  universal  Laws  of  Reason. 
But  the  number  of  the Accomplices  (corre;,!  in such a 
deed  rnight  happen  to  be  so  great  that  the  State, in 
resolving  to  be  without  such  criminals,  would  be  in 
clanger of  soon also being  deprived of  subjects.  But it 
will  not  thus  dissolve  itself,  neither  must it return  to 
the  much  worse  condition  of  Nature,  in  which  there 
would be no  external Justice.  Nor, above all, should it 
deaden  the  sensibilities  of  the People  by the spectacle 
of  Justice  being  exhibited  in  the  mere  carnage  of  a 
slaughteriog bench.  In such  circumstances  the Sove- 
reign must always be allowed to have it in his power to 
take the part  of  the  Judge  upon himself  as  a  case  of 
Xecessity,-and  to  deliver  a  Judgment  which,  instead 
of  the penalty of  death, shall assign some other punish- 
ment to  the Criminals, and thereby preserve a multitude 
of  the People.  The  penalty of  Deportation is relevant 
in this  connection.  Such  a  form  of  Jud,pent  caizizot 
be  carried  out according  to  a  public law, but  only by 
itri  authoritative ucf  of  tlie royal Prerogative, and it niay 
only be applied as an act of  grace in individual cases. 
Against  these  doctrines,  the  Marquis  BECCARIA  Iias 
given  forth  a  different  view.  Moved  by  the compas- 
sionate  sentimentality  of  a  humane  feeling,  he  has 
assertecl  that  all  Capital  Pui~isliment  is wrong in itself 
and  unjust.  He  has  put  forward  this  view  on  the 
ground that the penalty of  death could not be  contained 
in  the original  Civil  Contract;  for, in that  case, every 
one  of  the Yeople would have lind to consent to lose his 
life  if  he  niurdered  any of  his  fellow-citizens.  But, it 
is argued, such  a  consent  is impossible, because  no one 
can  tlius  dispose  of  his  owii  1ife.-All  this  is  mere 
sophistry and  perversion  of  Right.  No  one  undergoes 
Yunishment  because he has willed  to  be  punished,  bet 
hecause he. has willed  n punishnble  Action ;  for  it is in 
fact no  Punishment when  any one  experiences what he 
wills,  ancl  it  is  impossible  for  any  one  to  will  to  be 
punished.  To say, '  I will  to  be punished, if  I murder 
any one,'  ean mean nothing more  than, ' I submit inyself 
nlong  with  all  the other  eitizens  to  the Laws ;' and  if 
there are  any Criminals  among  the People, these  Laws 
will  include  Penal  Laws.  The  individual  who,  as  a 
Co-legislator, enacts  Pentsl  Lnw,  cannot  possibly  be  tl~e 
same  Person who,  as  a  Subject,  is  punished  according 
to  the  Law; for,  qzt6  Criminal,  he  cannot  possibly be 
regarded  as  having  a  voice  in  the  Legislation,  the 
Legislator being rationally viewed as just  and  holy.  If 
any one, then, enact a  Penal  Law  against  himself  as  a 
Criminal,  it miist  be  the  pure  juriclically  law - giving 
Reason  (Izomo  7toz6n~enon), which  subjects  hirn  as  one 
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(homo phenomenm), along with all the others in the Civil 
Union, to t.his Penal Law.  In other words, it is not the 
People  take~  distributively, but  the Tribunal  of  public 
Justice,  as  distinct  from  the  Crirninal,  that  prescribes 
Capital  Punishment ;  and  it  is  not  to  be viewed  as if 
the  Social  Contract  contained  the  Promise  of  all  the 
individuals to allow themselves  to be punished, thus dis- 
posing of  thernselves and their lives.  For if  the Rigl~t 
to  punish  must  be  grounded  upon  a  promise  of  the 
wrongdoer, wliereby he is to be regarded as being williilg 
to be punished, it ought  also  to  be  left to him  to  find 
liitnself  deserving of  the Yunishment ; and the Criminal 
would thus be his  owii Judge.  The chief error (T~&TOV 
+eüGos)  of  this  sophistry  consists  in  regarding  the 
judgment  of  the  Criminal  himself,  necessarily  deter- 
mined  by  his  Reason,  that  he  is  under  obligation  to 
undergo  the loss  of  his  life, as a  judgment  that  must 
be grounded on a resolution of  his  Will  to take it away 
liimself ; and thus the execution of the Right in question 
is represented as' united in one and the same Person with 
the adjudication of  the Right. 
There  are,  however,  two  crimes  worthy of  death,  in 
respect  of  which  it still remains  doubtful  whether  tlle 
Legislature have the Right  to  deal with  them  capitally. 
It  is the  sentiment  of  Honour  that  induces  their  per- 
petration.  The  one  originates in a  regard  for womanly 
Honour,  the other  in  a  regard  for  military Honour; 
and in both cases  there  is a  genuine  feeling  of  honour 
incumbent on the individuals as a Duty.  The former  is 
the  Crime  of  MATERNAL  INBANTICIDE  (infanticidium 
materrtale) ;  the latter is the Crime of  KILLING  A  FELLOW- 
SOLDIER  in a Duel (ComntiZitolzicidium).  Now Legislation 
cannot take away the shame of  an illegitimate birth, nor 
wipe off  the stain attaching from a suspicion of  cowardice, 
to an officer who cloes not resist an act that would  bring 
him  into  conteinpt,  by  an  effort  of  his  owii  that  is 
Superior to the fear of  death.  Hence  it appears that in 
.such circumstanoes, the individuals concerned are remitted 
to  the  State  of  Nature;  and  their  acts  in  bot11  cases 
must be called Womicide, and not Mzwder, which involves 
evil  intent (honzicidiuaz  dolost~m).  In all instances  the 
acts  are  undoubtedly  punishable; but  they  cannot  be 
punished  by the Supreme  Power with  deatl-i.  An ille- 
gitimate child  comes into  the  world outside of  the Law 
which  properly  regulates  Marriage, and  it is  thus borii 
beyond the pale or  constitutional  protection cf  the Law. 
Such  n child  is  introduced, as ic were, like  prohibited 
goods,  into  the Commonwealtli, and  as it  has  no  legal 
right to existente in this way, its destruction  might  also 
be ignored ; nor can the  shame of  the mother when her 
unmarried  confinement  is  known,  be  removed  by  any 
legal  ordinance.  A  subordinate Officer, again, on whom 
an insult is inflicted, Sees himself compelled by the public 
opinion of  his associates to obtain satisfaction ;  and, as in 
the state of  Nature, the  punishment of  the offender cari 
only be effected by a Duel, in which  his  own  life is es- 
posed to danger, and not by means of  the Law in a Court 
of  Justice.  The  Duel is therefore  adopted as the means 
of  demonstrating his Courage as that  characteristic  upori 
which the Honour of his profession essentially rests ;  and 
this is  doiie  even if  it should issue in the killing of  his 
adversary.  But  as  such  a  result  takes  place  publicly 
and  under  consent  of  both  parties, although it may be 
dolle  unwillirigly,  it  cannot  properly  be  called  Murder 
(homicidizbm dolosz~m).-What  then is the Right  in both 
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liere in fact brought into great straits, having  appareiitly 
either to declare the notion of Honour, which is certainly 
no mere fancy here, to be nothing in the eye of  the Law, 
or to exempt the  crime  from  its  due  pimisliment;  and 
thus it would  become  either  remiss or cruel.  Tlie knot 
thus tied is to he  resolved  in the following way.  Tlie 
Categorical Imperative of  Penal  Justice, that the killing 
of  ariy  persori  contrary to  the Law  must  be  punished 
with  death, remains  in force; but the Legislation  itself 
ancl the Civil Constitution  generally, so long  as they slre 
still barbarous and incomplete, are at fault.  And this is 
tlie reason why the subjective motive-principles of  Honour 
aniong  the  People, do  not  coincide  with  the  standarcls 
which  are  objectively  conformable  to  another  purpose; 
so that tlle public Justice issuing from the State becomes 
Injustice relatively to  that which  is iipheld  arnong  the 
People themselves.  [See  Sz~pplementaq  Explnnations, V.] 
The RIGHT  OF YARDONING  (JUS  u~/yrcrtictndi),  viewed iii 
relation  to  the  Criminal, is the Right  of  mitigating  or 
entirely remitting  his Punishment.  On  the  side of  the 
Sovereign  this  is the most  delicate  of  all Iiights, as it 
rnay be esercised so as to set  forth the  splendour of  his 
dignity, and  yet  so  as to do  a  great wrong  by  it.  It 
ought not to be exercised  in application to tlie crimes of 
the  subjects  against  each  other;  for  exewption  from 
Punishment (impunitas  crimink)  would  be  the greatest 
wrong  that  could  be  dorie  to  them.  It is  oilly  on 
occasion  of  some  form of  TREASON  (crimcn  lmsm  majes- 
tat&),  as  a  lesion  against  himself,  that  the  Sovereign 
should make ilse of  this  Right.  And  it shoiild  not  be 
exercised  even  in this  connection, if  the  safety  of  the 
People would  be  endangered  by remitting such Punisli- 
inent.  This  Riglit  is  the  only  one  whicli  properly 
deserves tlie name of  a '  Eight of  Majesty.' 
Juridical  Relations of  the  Citizen  to  his  Country and  to 
other Countries.  Emigration ;  Immigration ;  Banish- 
ment ;  Exile. 
The  Land  or  Territory wliose  inhabitants-in  virtue 
of  its political  Constitution  and  without  tlie  necessary 
iiiterveiltion  of  a  special  juridical  act-are,  by  birtli, 
fellow-citizens  of  one  and  the  Same  Commonwealth, is 
called their COUNTRY  or Fatherland.  A Poreiyn Coiintry 
is  one  in which  they would  not  possess  this  condition, 
but would be  living  abroad.  If  a  Country abroad form 
part of  the  territory under  tlie  same Government  as  at 
Iiome, it constitutes a  Proviltce, according  to  the Romaii 
wage of  the terrn.  It  does not constitute an incorporated 
portion  of  the  Empire  (inzperii)  so  as to  be  the aboclc 
of  equa.1  fellow-citizens, but  is  only  a possession  of  the 
Goveriiinerit, like a  lower  Hozcse;  and  it  must  therefore 
honour the dorriain of  the ruling  State as the 'Mother 
Country ' (regio donlina). 
1. A  Subject,  even  regarded  as  a.  Citizeii,  has  tlie 
Itight of  Emigration;  for the State caiinot retain him as 
if  he were  its property.  But  he  mny only  carry away 
with him his Moveables  as  distinguished  froni  his  fixed 
possessions.  However, he is eiltitled to sell  his  immov- 
able property,  and talce the value of  it in money with hini. 
2.  The Siipreme Power as Master of  the Country, has 
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Strangers and  CoIonists.  This will  hold  even  although 
the natives of  the Conntry may be unfavourably disposed 
to it, if their private property in the soil is not diminished 
or interfered with. 
3.  In the  case  of  a  Subject  wlio  has  committed  a 
Crime that  renders all society of  his  fellow-citizens with 
him prejudicial to the State, the Supreme Power has also 
the Right of  inflicting Bunishment  to  a  Country abroad. 
By such Deportation, he  does  not  acquire  any share  in 
the Eights of the Citizens of  the territory to which lie is 
banished. 
4.  The Snpreme I'ower  has also the Right of  imposing 
Exile  generally (Jw exilii), by which  a  Citizen  is  sent 
abroad  into  the wide  world  as  the '  Out-land."  And 
because the Supreme Authority thus withdraws  all  legal 
protection from the Citizen, this  amounts to making  him 
an '  outlaw '  witliin the territory of  his own country. 
The Three Forms of  the State.  Autocracy ;  Aristocracy ; 
Democracy. 
The  three  Powers  in the State, involved  in the c,on- 
cep,tion of  a  Public  Government  generally (W  pzsblicn 
lutius dicta), are  only  so  many  Relations  of  the united 
Will of  the People  which  emanates  from  the 6 priori 
Reason ;  and viewed as such it is the objective practical 
realization of  the pure  Idea of  a  Supreme  Head of  the 
State.  This Suprenie Head  is the Sovereign;  but con- 
ceived only as a Representation of  the whole People, the 
Idea still requires physieal  embodiment in a Person, who 
1 In the old German language  Elend,' rhich  in its modern  use means 
'misery. ' 
inay exhibit  tlie  Suprenie Power of  the State, aiid  bring 
the idea  actively to  bear  upoii  the popular Will.  The 
relation  of  the  Supreme  Power  to  the  People, is  con- 
ceivable in three different forms : Either One  in the State 
rules over all ; or Son~e,  united in a  relation of  Equality 
with each other, rule over all the others ; or AL2  together 
rule over each and all indiviclually, including  themselves. 
The Form  of  the State is  therefore  either autocratic, or 
aristocratic,  or democratic.-The  expression  '  ntonurcJzic ' 
is not so suitable as '  autocratic ' for the conception  here 
intended ;  for  a '  Monarch'  is one who  has  the  ltiyhest 
power, an 'Autocrat' is  one who  has  all  power, so thst 
this latter  is  the Sovereign, whereas  the  former  merely 
represents the Sovereignty. 
It  is evident that an Autocracy is tlie sinzplest form of 
Government in the State, being  constituted  by the rela- 
tion of  One, as King, to the People, so that  there  is  one 
only who is the Lawgiver.  An Aristocracy, as a form of 
Government, is, however, compoz~nded  of  the union of  two 
relations : that of  the Nobles  in relation  to one  another 
as  the  Lawgivers,  thereby constituting  the  Sovereignty, 
and  that  of  this  Sovereign  Power  to  the  People.  A 
Dernocracy, again, is the  inost  con2pZcx  of  all  the  forms 
of  the State, for it has to begin by uniting the will of  all 
so as to form a  People;  and  theii  it has  to  appoint  a 
Sovereign  over  this  common Union, whicli  Sovereigi~  is 
no other than the United Will itse1f.-The  consideration 
of  the ways in whkh these Forms are adulterated by the 
intrusion  of  violent  and  illegitimate  usurpers of  power, 
as in Oligarchy and Ochlocracy, as well  as the discussion 
of  the so-called mked Constitutions, may be  passed  over 
here  as not  essential,  and  as  leading  into  too  much 
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As  regards  the Acluti7~istration  of  Riglit iii the State, 
it may be said that  the simplest  mode is also  the best ; 
but as regards  its bearing on Riglit  itself, it is also  the 
most dangerous for the People, iii view of  the Despotisnl 
to which simplicity of  Administration  so  naturally gives 
rise.  It  is undoubtedly a rational maxim to aini at simpli- 
fication  in the machinery whicli  is  to  unite  the People 
under  compulsory Laws, and this would be  secured were 
all the People to be passive and to obey oiily one  persotl 
over them; but the method would not give Subjects who 
were  also  Citizens  of  the State.  It is  sometirnes  snid 
tliat  the  People  should  be  satisfied with  the  reflectioil 
that  Monarchy, regarded  as  ail  Autocracy,  is  the  best 
political  Constitution, if  the Mo7zarch  is good, that  is, if 
he has  the judgment  as  well  as  the Will to do  right. 
But this is a mere  evasion, ancI  belongs  to  tlle  common 
class  of  wise  tautological  phrases.  It only amounts  to 
saying  that '  the best Constitution  is that by which the 
supreme  administrator  of  the  State  is  made  the  best 
Buler ;' that is, that the best Constitution is the best ! 
Historical Origin and Changes.  A Pure Republic. 
Representative Government. 
It  is vain  to  inquire into  the  historical Origiil of  tlie 
political  Mechanism ; for it is no  longer  possible  to dis- 
cover  historically  the  point  of  time  at  which  Civil 
Society took  its  begirining.  Savages  do  not  draw up a 
documentary Eecord of  their having submitted themselves 
to  Law; and  it  may  be  iilferred  fronl  the  nature  of 
umivilised men that they niust have set out from a state 
of  violence.  To  proseciite such a.n inqiliry in the inteil- 
tion of  finding a  pretext  for  altering  the existing  Con- 
stitution by violence, is no less than penal.  For  such  a 
mode  of  alteration wouId  amount  to  a  Eevolution, that 
could  only  be  carriecl  out  by  an  Insurrection  of  the 
People, and not  by  constitutional  modes  of  Legislation. 
But Insurrection against an aIready existing Constitution, 
is an overthrow of  all civil and juridical relations, and of 
Right  generally ;  and  hence  it is not  a  mere  alteration 
of  the  Civil  Constitution,  but  a  clissolotion  of  it.  It 
would  thus  form a  mode  of  transition to a  better  Con- 
stitution  by  Palingenesis  and  not  by  mere  Meta- 
morphosis ;  and it would  require a  new  Social Contract, 
upon  whiqh  the  former  Original  Contract,  as  then 
annulled, would have no influence. 
It  rnust,  however,  be  possible  for  the  Sovereign  to 
change  the  existing  Constitution,  if  it is  not  actually 
coiisistent with  the Idea  of  the  Original  Contract.  In 
doing so it is essential  to  give  existence to that  form of 
Government  which  will  properly  constitute  the People 
into  a  State.  Such  a  change  cannot  be  made  by the 
State deliberately  altering  its Constitution  frorn  one  of 
the three Forms to one of  the other  two.-For  exanlple, 
political  changes  should  not  be  carried  out  by  the 
Aristocrats  combining to subject  themselves to an Auto- 
cracy,  or  resolving  to  fuse  all  into  a  Democracy,  or 
conversely ; as  if  it  depended  on  the  arbitrary  choice 
and liking  of  the  Sovereign  what  Constitution  he  may 
impose  on  the  People.  For, even  if  as  Sovereign  he 
resolved  to  alter  the  Constitution  into  a  Democracy, 
he  might  be  doing Wrong  to  the  People, because  they 
might hold such a Constitution in abhorrence, and regard 
either of  the other two as more  siiitable to them in the 
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Tlie Fornis  of  the State are only the letter (Zitte~a)  of 
tlie  original  Constitution  in  the Civil Union; and  they 
may  therefore  reniain  so  long  as  they  are  considerecl, 
from  ancient  and  long  habit  (and  tlierefore  only  sub- 
jectively), to be necessary to the machinery of  the political 
Constitution.  But  the pikt of  that  original  Contract 
(anima yacti o~igina7ii)  coritains and imposes the obliga- 
tion on  tlie  coiistituting Power to make the inode of  the 
Government conformable to its  Idea ; and,  if  this cannot 
be  effected  at  once,  to  charige  it  gradually  and  con- 
tinuously till it  harmonize in its working with the only 
rightful Constitution, which  is  that of  a  Pwe  R~Olic. 
Tlius the old empirical and statutory Forms, which  serve 
only to affect the political subjection of  the People, will be 
resolved iato the original and rational Forms which alorie 
take Freedom  as  tlieir  principle, and  even  as  the  coii- 
dition  of  all  compulsion  and  constraint.  Compulsion 
is in fact riquisite for the realization of  a juridical  Con- 
stitution, acoonding to the proper  idea of  the State ;  and 
it will lead  at last to tlie  realization  of  that  Idea, even 
accordiiig  to  the  letter.  This  is  the  only  enduring 
political Constitution, as in it the LAW  is itself  Sovereigii, 
and is no  longer  attached to a  particular  Person.  This 
is the ultiinate End of  all Public Right, and the state in 
which every citizen  can  have what  is  his  own  perenzp- 
torily  assigned  to him.  But so long as the Form of  the 
State hzls  to be  represented, according  to  the Letter, by 
inany different Moral Persons invested with the Supreme 
Power, there can  only be a provisory internal Right, and 
not an absolutely juridical state of  Civil Society. 
Every true  Republic is  and  can  only  be  constituted 
hy a Repmentntirc System of  tlie People  Such a Repre- 
sentative  System  is  iiistituted  in  naine  of  the  People, 
and is constituted by all the Citizens being united together, 
in order, by means of  their Deputies, to protect and secure 
their Rights.  But  as  soon  as a  Supreme  Head  of  the 
State  in  person-be  it  as  King,  or  Nobility,  or  the 
whole body of  the  People  in  a demoeratic 'ITnion-be- 
Comes  also  representative, the United  People  then  does 
not  merely represent the Sovereignty, but they are them- 
selves  sovereign.  It is in the People  that  the  Supreme 
Power  originally resides, and it is accordingly from this 
Power that all the Rights of  individual Citizens as mere 
Subjects, and especially as Officials oQ  the State, must be 
derived.  When the Sovereignty of  the People themselves 
is thus realized, the Republic is established ; and it is no 
longer necessary to give up the reins of  Government into 
the hands of  those by whom they have been hitherto held, 
especially as they might  again destroy all the new Insti- 
tution~  by their arbitrary and absolute Will. 
It  was  therefore a great error  in judgment on the 
part of  a powerful Ruler  in our time, when  lie tried 
to extricate  himself  from the embarrassment arising 
from  great  public  debts, by  transferring this burden 
to the People, and leaving them to undertake and dis- 
tribute  them  among  themselves  as they might  best 
think fit.  It  thus became natural that the Legislative 
Power, not  only  in respect  of  the Taxation  of  the 
Subjects, but iii respect  of  the Government, should 
come into the hands of  the People.  It was  requisite 
that they should be  able to prevent the incurring of 
new  Debts  by  extravaganee or  war; and  in conse- 
quence, the Supreme Power of  the Monarch entirely 
disappeared, not by being merely suspended, but  by 
passirig over in fact to the People, to whose legislative 
Will the property of  every Subject thus became sub- 
jected.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  a  tacit  and  yet 
obligstory promise must be assumed as having, under such  circumstances, been  given  by  the  Kational 
Assembly, not  to constitute themselves into a  Sove- 
reignty,  but  only  to  administer  the  affairs  of  the 
Sovereign for  the time, and  after this  was  done  to 
deliver the reins  of  the ,Government  again into the 
Monarch's  hands.  Such  a  supposed contract would 
be null and void.  The Right of  the Supreme Legis- 
lation  in  the  Commonwealth  is  not  an  alienable 
Right, but is the most personal of  all Rights.  Who- 
ever  possesses  it, can  only dispose by the collective 
Will of  the  People, in respect  of  the People;  he 
cannot dispose in respect of  the Collective Will itself, 
which  is the ultimate foundat-ion of  all public Con- 
tracts.  A  Contract, by which  the People would  be 
bound to give back their authority again, would not be 
consistent with  their position as a Legislative Power, 
and yet it would  be  made  binding upon the People ; 
which, on the principle  that 'No  one can serve two 
Masters,' is a contradiction. 
PUBLIC RIGHT. 
Ir. 
THE  RIG~  OF NATIONS  AXD INTERNATIONAL  LAW. 
(Jus Gentium.) 
Nature and Division of the Right of Nations. 
The  individuals,  who  make  up  a  People,  may  be 
regarded  as Natives  of  the Country  Sprung  by  natural 
descent  from a  Common  Ancestry  (congeniti),  although 
this  may not  hold  entirely true in detail.  Again, they 
may be  viewed according to the intellectual and juridical 
relation,  as  born  of  a  common  political  Mother,  the 
Repiiblic,  so  that  they  constitute, as  it  were, a  public 
Family or  NATION  (gern, natio)  whose  Members  are  aII 
related  to~  each  other  as  Citizens  of  the  State.  As 
members  of  a  State, they do  not  mix  with  those  who 
live beside them in the state of  Nature, considering such 
to be ignoble.  Yet these savages, on account of  the law- 
less  freedom  they  have  chosen,  regard  themselves  as 
Superior to civilised peoples;  and they constitute  tribes 
and  even  races,  but  not  States.-The  public  Right  of 
States (jus  publicuh  Civitatum) in their  relations  to  one 
another, is what  we  harre  to consider under  the  designa- 
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as a  Moral  Person, acts in  relation  to  another  existing 
in the  condition  of  natural  freedom,  and  consequently 
in a state of  continual war, such Right takes it rise. 
The  Right  of  Nations in relation to the State of  War 
inay  be  divided  into:  1.  The  Right  of  going  to  War; 
2. Right dzcring  War ; and 3. Right ~fte~  War, the object 
of  which  is  to  constrain  the  nations  mutually to pass 
from  this  state  of  war,  and  to found a  common  Con- 
stitution establishing  Perpetual  Yeace.  The  difference 
between  the  Right  of  individual  men  or  families  as 
related  to  each  other  in  the  state of  Nature,  and  the 
Right  of  the Nations among themselves, consists in this, 
that  in  the Right  of  Nations  we have to consider not 
merely  a  relation  of  one  State to another  as  a whole, 
but also the  relation  of  the individual persons  in one 
State to  the  individuals  of  another  State, as well as to 
that State as a whole.  This difference, however, between 
the  Right  of  Nations  and  the Right of  Individuals in 
the  mere  State  of  Nature,  requires  to be  determined 
by elements which  caii  easily be  deduced from the con- 
ception of  the Iatter. 
Elements of the Right of Nations. 
The  elements  of  the  Right  of  Nations  are  as 
follow :- 
1. STATES,  viewed  as  NATIONS,  in  their  external 
relations  to  one  another -  like  lawless  savages -  are 
naturally in a non-juridical condition ; 
2.  This  natural  condition  is  a  STATE OF  WAY.  in 
which the Right of  the  stronger prevails ;  and  although 
it may not in fact be always foiincl  as  a  state of  actual 
war  and  incessant  hostility,  arid  although  no  real 
wrong is done to  any one  therein,  yet  the  condition  is 
wrong  in  itself  in  the highest  degree, and  the Nations 
which  form  States  contignous to each  other are bound 
mutually to pass out of  it; 
3.  An  ALLIANCE  OF NATIONS,  in accordance with the 
idea  of  an  original  Social Contract, is necessary to pro- 
tect  each  other  against  external aggression and attack, 
but not involving interference with  their several internal 
tlifficulties and disputes ; 
4.  This mutual connection by Alliance  must  dispense 
with a distinct  Sovereign Power,  such  as  is set  up  in 
the  Civil  Constitution ;  it can  only take the form  of  a 
FEDERATION,  which  as  such  may  be  revoked  on  any 
occasion, and  mnst  consequently be  renewed  from  time 
to time. 
This  is  therefore  a  Right  which  Comes  in  as  an 
accessory  (im subsidium)  of  another  original  Right,  in 
order  to  prevent  the Nations  from  falling  from  Right, 
md  lapsing into the state of  actnal war with each other. 
It thus issiies in the idea of a Fa!dus Amphictyonurn. 
Right of Going .to War  as related to the Subjects 
of the State. 
We  have  then  to  consider,  in  the  first  place,  the 
original  Right  of  free  States  to  go  to  71Tar  with  each 
other as being still in a  state  of  Nature, but as exercis- 
ing this  Right  in  order  to  establish  some  condition  of 
society approaching the juridical  state.  And, first of  all, 
the question  arises as to what  Right  the  State  has  in 
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war  against  other  States,  to  employ their property and 
even their lives  for  this  purpose,  or at least to  expose 
them to hazard and  danger ; and  all this in such a way 
that it  does not depend upon their own personal judgment 
whether they will  march  into  the field  of  war  or  not, 
but  tlie  Supreme Command of  the Sovereign  claims  to 
settle and dispose of  them thus. 
This Bight  appears  capable  of  being  easily  estab- 
lished.  It may  be  grounded  upon  tlie  Right  wliicli 
every  one  has  to  do with what  is his  own  as he will. 
Whatever  one  has  made  substantially  for  hiinself,  he 
holds  as  his  incontestable  property.  The  following, 
then, is such a  deduction  as  a  mere  Jurist would  put 
forward. 
There are various natu~al  Products in a country which, 
as regards the number  and  qunntity in which tliey exist, 
niust be  considered  as specially  prod~ced (artefncta) by 
the  worlr  of  the  State;  for  the  country  would  not 
yield them to  such  extent were  it not  under  the  Con- 
stitution  of  the State  and  its  regular  administrative 
Government, or  if  the inhabitants  were  still  living  iri 
the State of  Nature.  Slieep, cattle, domestic fow1,-the 
most useful  of  their  kind,-swine,  and such like, would 
either  be  used  up  as necessary  food  or  destroyed  by 
beasts  of  prey  in the district  in which  I live,  so  that 
they  would  entirely  disappear,  or  be  found  in very 
scant supplies, were it not  for  the Government securing 
to the inhabitants their acquisitions and property.  Tliis 
liolds  likewise  of  the population  itself,  as  we  See  in 
the case  of  the American  deserts;  and  even  were  the 
greatest industry applied in those regions-which  is not 
yet done-there  might be  but a scanty poprilatioii.  The 
inhabitants  of  any country would  be brit  sparsely sowii 
!iere  and there were it not  for  the protection of  Goverii- 
ment ; becaiise without  it they could  not  spread  tlieni- 
selves  with  their  households  upon  a  territory  whicli 
was  always  in danger  of  being  devastated  by  eneniies 
or by wild beasts of prey ;  and further, so great a multi- 
tude of  men as now live in any one  country could  not 
otherwise obtain sufficient means of  Support.  Hence, as 
it can  be  said  of  vegetable  growths, such  as potatoes, 
as  well  as  of  domesticated  animals,  that  because  the 
abundance  in  which  they  are  found  is  a  procluct  of 
human  labour,  they  may  be  used, destroyed,  and con- 
sumed by man; so it seems that it may be  said of  the 
Sovereign as the Supreme Power  in the State,  that  he 
has the hight to lead his Subjects, as being for the most 
part  productions  of  his  own,  to  war,  as  if  it were  to 
the chase, and even to march them to the field of  battle, 
as if  it were on a pleasure excursion. 
This  principle  of  Right  may  be  supposed  to  float 
dimly before  the mind  of  the Monarch, and it certainly 
holds  tnie  at  least  of  the  lower  animals  which  may 
become  the  property  of  man.  But  such  a  principle 
will not  at all apply to  men, especially when viewed  as 
citizens who must be regarded  as mernbers  of  the State, 
with a share in the legislation, and not merely as means 
for  others  but  as  Ends  in themselves.  As such they 
must  give  their  free  consent, through  their  representa- 
tives, not only to the carrying on  of  war  generally, but 
to  every  separate  declaratioii  of  war ; and  it  is onIy 
under  this  limiting condition that the State has a Right 
to  demand  their  Services  in  undertalrings  so  full of 
danger. 
We  would  therefore  deduce  this  Kight  rather  from 
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Uncler  this  relation  the  people  mnst  be  regarded  as 
liaving given  their  sanction; and, liaving  the Right  of 
votiug, they  rnay  be  considered,  although  thus passive 
in reference to  themselves  individually,  to  be  active  in 
so far as they represent the Sovereignty itself. 
Right of  Going to War  in relation to Hostile States. 
Viewed  as  in  the  state  of  Nature,  the  Right  of 
Nations  to yo  to  Wur and  to  carry on hostilities is the 
legitimate way by which they prosecute  their  Rights  by 
their  own  power  when  they  regard  themselves  as 
injured;  and  this  is  done  because  in  that  state the 
method  of  a  juridical  Process,  although  the  only  one 
proper to settle such disputes, cannot be adopted. 
The  threatening  of  War is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  active  injury  of  a  first  Aggrebsion, which  again  is 
distinguished  from  the  general  outbreak  of  Hostilities. 
A  threat  or  menace  may  be  given  by  the  active pre- 
paration  of  Armaments, upon which, a  Right  of  Preven- 
tion (jzu prceventionh)  is  founded '9n  the other side, or 
merely by the formidable  increase of%he  power of  another 
State (potestas tremenda) by acquisition of  Territory.  Lesion 
of  a  less powerful  country  rnay  be  involved  merely in 
the condition of  a more powerful neighbour prior  to any 
nction  at all; and  in  the  State  of  Nature  an  attaclc 
under  such  circumstances  would  be warrantable.  This 
international relation is the  foundation  of  the  Right  of 
Equilibrium,  or  of  the '  balance  of  Power,'  anlong  all 
the States that are in active contiguity to each other. 
The RQht  to  go  to  War is  constituted  by any  overt 
ccct  of  Injz~ry.  This  includes  any  arbitrary  Retaliation 
or  act  of  Reprisal  (rdorsio) as  a  satisfaction  taken  by 
one people for an offence  committed by another, without 
any attempt being made to obtain  reparation in a peace- 
ful way.  Such  an  act  of  retaliation would  be  similar 
in kind to an outbreak  of  hostilities without  a  previous 
Declaration of  War.  For if  there is to be  any Right at 
all  during  the  state of  war,  something analogous  to  a 
Contract  must  be  assumed, involving  acceptance  on  the 
one side of  the  declaration on  the other, and  amounting 
to  the  fact  that  they both will to  seek  their  Right  in 
this way. 
57. 
Right during War. 
The  determination of  what  constitutes Riglit in, War, 
is the most difficult problem of  the Right of  Nations and 
International  Law.  It is very difficult  even  to  forni a 
conception  of  such  a  Right, or to  think of  any Law in 
this  lawless  state without  falling  into  a  contradiction. 
Inter arma silent  legea  It must  then  be  just  the right 
to carry on War accurding to  such  principles  as  render 
it always  still possi.  .le to pass  out  of  that  natural con- 
dition of  the  states in tlieir  external  relations  to  eacli 
other, and to enter into a condition of  Right. 
No war of  independent States against each other, can 
rightly be a war of  Punishment (bellum punitivz~m). For 
punishment  is  only  in  place  uiider  the  relation  of  a 
Superior (i~nperantis)  to  a  Subject  (subditz~m)  ; and  this 
is not the relation of  the States to one another.  Neither 
can  an  international war  be  'a war  of  Extermination' 
(bellum internieinum),  nor  even '  a war  of  Subjugation ' 
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extinction  of  a  State by  its  people  being  eitlier  fused 
into one mass with the conquering State, or being reduced 
to  slavery.  Not that this necessary means of  attaininp 
to  a  condition  of  peace  is  itself  contradictory  to  the 
right of  a  State; but because  the idea of  the  Right  of 
Nations includes merely the conception of  an antagonism 
that is in accordance with principles of  external freedoin, 
in order  that  the State may maintain what  is  properly 
its own, but  not  that it may acquire a  condition which, 
from  the  aggrandizement  of  its  power,  might  become 
threatening to other States. 
Defensive measures and means of  all kinds are  allow- 
able to a State that  is  forced to war, except  such  as by 
their use would  make the Subjects  using  them  unfit  to 
be  citizens;  for the State would  thus  make  itself  unfit 
to be  regarded  as  a  Person  capable of  participating  in 
equal  rights  in the international  relations  according to 
the Right of  Nations.  Among these forbidden means are 
to  be  reckoned  the  appointment  of  Subjects to act as 
spies, or  engaging  Subjects  or  even  strangers  to  act  as 
assassins,  or  poisoners  (in  which  class  might  well  be 
included the so-called  sharpshooters who lurk in ambush 
for individuals), or even employing agents to spread false 
news.  Iii a word, it is forbidden to use any such malig- 
nant  and  perfidious  means  as  would  destroy  the  con- 
fidence which would  be  requisite  to  establish  a  lasting 
peace thereafter. 
It is permissible in war to impose exactions and con- 
tributions  upon  a  conquered  enemy ; but  it  is  not 
legitimate to  plunder  the people in the way  of  forcibly 
depriving individuals of  their property.  For  this would 
be robbery, seeing it was  not  the  conquered  people  but 
tlie State under whose government they were placed that 
carried  on  the  war  by  means  of  theni.  All  exactioiis 
should  be  raised  by  regular  Repz~isition,  and  Receipts 
ought  to  be  given  for them, in  order  that when  peace 
is  restored  the  burden  imposed  on  the  country or  the 
province may be proportionately borne. 
58. 
Right after War. 
The  Right  that  follows  after  War,  begins  at  the 
moment  of  the Treaty of  Peace  and  refers  to  the  con- 
sequences  of  the  war.  The  conqueror  lays  down  the 
conditions under which he will agree with the conquered 
power  to  form  the  conclusion  of  Peace.  Treaties  are 
drawn  up; not  indeed  according  to  any  Right  that  it 
pertains  to  him  to  protect,  on  account  of  an  alleged 
lesion by his opponent, but as taking this question  upon 
himself,  he  bases  the right  to  decide  it upon  his  own 
power.  Hence  the  conqueror may not  demand  restitu- 
tion of  the cost of  the war; because he would then have 
to declare the war  of  his  opponent  to  be  unjust.  And 
even although he  should  adopt  such an argument, he is 
not  entitled  to  apply  it;  because  he  would  have  to. 
declare  the war  to  be  punitive, and  he would  thus  in 
turn  inflict  an  injiiry.  To  this  right  belongs  also the 
Exchange of Prisoners, which is to be carried out without 
raiisom and without regard to equality of  numbers. 
Neither  the  conquered  State  nor  its  Subjects, lose 
their  political  liberty by conquest  of  the  country, so as 
that the  former  should  be  degraded to a colony, or the 
latter  to  slaves;  for  otherwise it  would  have  been  a 
penal war, which is contradictory in itself.  A colony or 
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constitution, legislation, and territory, where  persons  be- 
longing to another State are merely strangers, but whicll 
is nevertheless subject to the supreme exemtive  power  of 
another State.  This other State is called  the '  mother- 
country.'  It is ruled as a daughter, but has at the same 
time its own form of  government, as in a separate Parlia- 
ment under the presidency  of  a Viceroy (civitas I~ybrida). 
Such was  Athens  in relation  to  different  islands ;  and 
such is at present [1'7 9 61 the relation of  Great Britain to 
Ireland. 
Still less can Slaverzj be  deduced as a rightful  institu- 
tion,  from the conquest  of  a  people  in  war; for  this 
would  assume  that  the war  was  of  a  punitive  nature. 
And  least  of  all  can  a  basis  be  found  in war  for  a 
hereditay Slavery, which  is absurd  in itself, since guilt 
cannot be inherited froni the criminality of  another. 
Further, that an Amnesty is involved in the conclusion 
of  a Treaty of  Peace, is already implied in the very idea 
of  a Peace. 
The Rights of Peace. 
The Bights of  Peace are :- 
1. The  Right  to  be  in Peace  when  War  is  in  tlie 
neighbourhood, or the Right of  Neutrality. 
2.  The Right  to have  Peace  secured  so  that  it may 
continue when it has  been  concluded, tliat is, the Right 
of  Guarantee. 
3.  The  Right  of  tlie  several  States to  enter  into  a 
mutual Alliance, so as  to defend  themselves  in common 
against all external or even internal attacks.  This Right 
a ion  of  Feclerntion, liowerer, cloes not estend to the form t' 
of  any League for external aggression or internal aggrari- 
dizement. 
60. 
Right as against an Unjust Enemy. 
The ltigllt of  a State against an z~njust Enemy has 110 
liinits, at least in respect of  quality as distinguished from 
quantity or  degree.  In other  words,  the injured  State 
may  use-not,  indeed,  any means,  but  yet-all  those 
means that are permissible and in reasonable  measure in 
so  far  as  they are in its power, in order  to  assert  its 
Iiight to what is its own.  Rut what  then  is  an zmjust 
enemy  according  to the  conceptions  of  the  Right  of 
Nations, whkn, as holds  generally of  the state of  Nature, 
every State is judge  in its own  cause ?  It  is one whose 
publicly expressed Will, whether in  word or deed, betrays 
n  maxim  which, if  it  were  taken  as  a  universal  rule, 
would make a state of  Peace  among  the nations impos- 
sible,  and  would  necessarily  perpetuate  the  state  of 
Nature.  Such  is the violation  of  public  Treaties, witli 
regard  to  which  it  may  be  assumed  that  sny  such 
violation concerns  all nations by threatening  their  free- 
dom, and that they are tlius summoned  to unite  against 
such a wrong, and to take away the power of  committing 
it.  But this does not  include the Right to partition und 
appropriate the country, so as to make a State  as  it were 
disappear from the  earth ; for this would be an injustice 
to tlie people of  that State, who cannot lose their original 
Right to unite into a Comrnonwealth, and  to  adopt  such 
n new Constitution as by its nature woiild  be  unfavoiir- 
able to the inclination for war. 
Further, it may be said that tlle expression 'an unjust 
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OE  Nature is itself  a  state of  injustice.  A just  Enemy 
would  be  one  to whom  I would  do  wrong  in offering 
resistance;  but  such  a  one  would  really  not  be  my 
Enemy. 
61. 
Perpetual Peace and a Permanent Congress of  Nations. 
The natural state of  Nations as well  as of  individual 
nien  is a  state  which  it is  a  duty  to  pass  out  of,  in 
order  to eiiter  into  a  legal  state.  Hence,  before  this 
transition  occurs, all the  Right  of  Nations  aiid  all the 
external  property  of  States  acquirable  or  niaintainable 
by war, are merely provisory ;  and they can only become 
peremptoly  in a  universal  Union  of  States  analogous 
to  that  by  whicli  a  Nation  becomes  a  State.  It  is 
thus only that a  real  stute  of  Peace  could be established. 
Eut with  the too  qeat extension  of  such  a  Union  of 
States over vast regions any government of  it, and conse- 
quently the protection  of  its individual  members, must 
at last become impossible ; and thus a multitude of  such 
corporations  would  again  bring  round  a  state of  war. 
Hence  the  Perpetual  Peace, which is the ultimate end of 
all  the  Eight  of  Nations, becomes in fact an impractic- 
able idea.  The political  principles, however, which  aim 
at such an end, and which enjoin the formation  of  such 
unions  among  the  States  as  may promote a continuous 
approxiw~atioa  to a Perpetual  Peace, are  not  impractic- 
able;  they  are  as  practicable  as  this  approximation 
itself, which  is  a  practical  problem  involving  a  duty, 
and  founded  upon  the  Right  of  individual  men  and 
States. 
Such a  Union of  States,  in  order  to maintain  Peace, 
may be  called  a  Permanent  Congress of  iV7ationi; and  it 
is  free  to  every  neighbouring  State  to joiri  in it.  A 
union  of  this  kind,  so  far  at least  as  regards  the for- 
malities  of  tlie  Right  of  Nations  in  respect  of  the 
preservation  of  peace,  was  presented  in  the  first  half 
of  this  century, in  the  Assembly OE  the  States-General 
at the Hague.  In this  Assembly most of  the Europeari 
Courts, and even the smallest Republics, brought forward 
their complaints about the  hostilities  which were carried 
on  by  the  one  against  the  other.  Thus  the whole  of 
Eiirope appeared  like  a single Federated State, accepted 
as Umpire by the several nations  in  their  public  dieer- 
ences.  But  in  place  OE  this  agreement,  the  Bight  of 
Nations  aftcrwards  siirvived  only  in  boolcs;  it  dis- 
appeared  froin  the  cabinets, or,  after  force  Ilad  beer~ 
already used, it was  relegated in the form  of  tlieoretical 
deductions to the obscurity of  Archives. 
By  such  a  Conywss  is  here  meant only a voluntary 
combiilation  of  different  States  that would  be  dissoluble 
at any time, and not such a iinion as is embodied  in the 
United  States  of  America, founded  upon a political con- 
stitution,  and  therefore  indissoluble.  It is  only  by  a 
Congress  of  this kind  that  the  idea  of  a  Piiblic  Right 
of  Nations  caii  be  established, and  thnt  tlie settlement 
OE  their  differeilces by the  mode  of  a  civil process, ai-id 
not by tlie barbaroiis means of  war, can be  realixed. THE PRINCIPLES  OF  PUBLIC RICHT.  227 
PUBLIC  RIGHT. 
111. 
SHE  UNIVERSAL  RIGHT OF  MANKIXD. 
(Jus cosmopoliticum.) 
62. 
Nature and Conditions of Cosmopolitical Right. 
THE rational  idea  of  a  universal,  peacfil,  if  not  yet 
friendly, Union  of  all the  Nations  upon  the earth that 
rnay  come  into  active  relations  with  each  other,  is  a 
jurid,ical  Principle,  as  distinguished  from  philanthropic 
or  ethical  principles.  Nature  has  enclosed  them 
altogether  within  definite boundaries,  in  virtue  of  the 
spherical form of  their abode as a ylobus  terraqz~eus  ;  and 
the  possession  of  the  soil  upon which  an  inhabitant of 
the  earth  rnay  live,  can  only be regarded  as possession 
of  a  part  of  a, limited  whole,  and  consequently  as  a 
part to wlzich  every one  liss  originally a  Right.  Hence 
all nations  originally hold  a  community of  the soil, but 
not a juridical  community of  possession  (communio), nor 
consequently  of  the use  or  proprietorship  of  the  soil, 
but only of  a possible physical intercozcrse  (commerciz~nl,) 
by  means  of  it.  In other  words,  they  are  placed  in 
such  thoroughgoing  relations  of  each  to  all  the  rest, 
that they rnay claim  to  enter  into  intercozlrse  with  oiie 
another, and they have  a  right  to  make  an attempt in 
this  direction,  while  a  foreign  nation  would  not  be 
entitled to treat theni on this account as enemies.  This 
liight, in so  far  as  it relates to  a  possible Uiiion of  all 
Nations, in respect of  certain laws universally regulating 
their intercourse with each other, rnay be  called '  Cosmo- 
political Right ' (jus cosmopol,iticum). 
It  rnay appear that seas put  natiuns  out  of  all  com- 
munion  with  each  other.  But  this  is  not  so ;  for  by 
means  of  commerce,  seas  form  the  happiest  natural 
provision for their intercourse.  And the rnore  there are 
of  neighbouring  coast - lands,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea,  this  intercourse  becoines  the  more 
animated.  Aiid  hence communications with such lands, 
especially where  there are  settlements  upon  them  coii- 
nected  with  the mother  countries  giving  occnsion  for 
such  communications,  bring  it  about  that  evil  and 
violence  committed  in  one  place  of  our globe  are  felt 
in all.  Such possible abuse cannot, however,  annul  the 
Right  of  mau  as  a  citizen  of  the  world  to  attempt  to 
enter iiito communion with all others, and  for  this  pur- 
pose  to visit  all  the regions  of  the  earth, altliough this 
cloes  not  constitute  a  right  of  settlement  upon  the terri- 
tory of  another people (jus incolatz~s),  for which a special 
contract is required. 
But  the question  is  raised  as to whether, in the case 
of  newly  discovered countries, a  people  rnay  claim  the 
right  to  settle (accolatus), and  to  occupy possessions in 
the  neighbourhood  of  another  people  that  has  already 
settled  in  that  region ; and  to  do  this  without  their 
consent. 
Such  a  Right  is  indubitable,  if  the  new  settlement 
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former, that neither would restrict  or  injure the other in 
the use of  their territory.  13ut in the  case  of  nomadic 
peoples, or  tribes  of  shepherds and hunters (such as the 
Hottentots,  the  Tungusi,  and  most  of  the  American 
Indians),  whose  support  is  derived  from  wide  desert 
tracts, such occupation should never 'take  place  by force, 
but pnly by  contract ; and any such contract ought never 
to  take  advantage  of  the  ignorance  of  the  original 
dwellers  in  regard  to  the  cession  of  their  lands.  Yet 
it is commonly alleged  that  such  acts  of  violent appro- 
priation rnay be justified  as subserving the general  good 
of  the  world.  It  appears  as  if  sufficiently justifying 
grounds were  furnished  for  them, partly by reference to 
the civilisation  of  barbarous  peoples  (as  by  a  pretext 
of  this kind  even  Busching  tries  to excuse-the bloody 
introduction of  the Christian religion into Germany), and 
partly by founding  upon  the necessity of  purging  one's 
own  country  from  depraved  criminals, and the hope  of 
their improvement or  that  of  their  posterity, in another 
continent like New  Holland.  But  all these alleged good 
purposes  cannot wash  out  the stain  of  injustice  in the 
ineans  employed  to  attain  theni.  It rnay  be  objected 
that had such scrupulousness about  making  a  beginning 
in founding a  legal  State with  force been always main- 
tained, the whole  earth would  still  have  been in a state 
of  lawlessness.  But such  an objection  would  as  little 
annul the  conditions  of  Right  in  question  as  the  pre- 
text  of  the  political  revolutionaries, that  when  a  con- 
stitution has become degenerate, it belongs  to the people 
to  transform  it by force.  This would amount generally 
to being unjust  once  and  for  all, in  order  thereafter  to 
found justice the more surely, and to mnke it flourish. 
CONCLUSION. 
IP  one  cannot  prove  that  a  thing  G, he  rnay  try  to 
prove  that  it  is  not.  And  if  he  succeecls  in  doing 
neither (as  often  occurs), he rnay still ask whether it  is 
in his interest to accept  one  or  other of  the  alternatives 
hypothetically, from the theoretical or the practical point 
of  view.  In other words, a hypothesis  rnay be  acceptecl 
either in order  to  explain  a  certain  Phenomenon (as in 
Astronomy to account for the  retrogression  and  station- 
ariness of  the  planets), or  in  order  to  attain  a  certain 
end, which  again  rnay be  either pmgmatic  as  belonging 
merely  to  the  sphere  of  Art, or  moral  as  involving  a 
purpose  which  it  is  a  duty to  adopt  as  a  maxim  of 
action.  Now it is evident  that  the  assumption (stqpo- 
sitio) of  the practi~abilit~  of  such an End, though pre- 
sented merely as a theoretical and problematical judgment, 
rnay be  regarded as constituting a duty ;  and  hence it is 
so regarded in this case.  For although there rnay be no 
positive obligation to believe  in such  an End, yet  even 
if there were not the least theoretical probability of  action 
being  carried  out  in  accordance with  it, so  long  as  its 
impossibility cannot be demonstrated, there  still remains 
a duty incumbent upon us with regard to it. 
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utters within us its irrevocable  Teto :  '  The~e  sl~all  be no 
War.'  So  there  ought  to be  no  war, neither  betweeiz 
me and you in the condition  of  Nature, nor between us 
as  menibers  of  States which,  although  internally  in a 
condition of  law, are still  externally in their  relation to 
each other in a condition of  lawlessness ;  for this  is not 
the way  by which  any one  should  prosecute  his  Right. 
Hence the question no longer is as to whether  Perpetual 
Peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether 
we rnay not be  deceiving  ourselves  when  we  adopt  the 
former alternative, but we must act on the supposition of 
its being real.  We must work for what rnay perhaps not 
be  realized,  and  establish that  Constitution  which  yet 
seems best  adapted  to bring  it  about*  (mayhap Republi- 
canism in all States, together and separately).  And thus 
we may put an end to the evil of  wars, which  have beerl 
the chief interest of  the internal  arrangements of  all the 
States without exception.  And although  the  realization 
of  this  purpose  rnay always  remain  but  a  pious  wish, 
yet we do certainly not deceive ourselves in adopting the 
maxim of  action that will guide us in working incessantly 
for it ; for it is a duty to do this.  To  suppose that the 
moral Law within us is itself deceptive, would be sufficient 
to excite the horrible wish rather to  be  deprived  OE  all 
Reason  than to  live  under  such  deception, and even to 
see  oneself, accordiiig  to such principles,  degraded  like 
the lower animals to the level o£ the mechanical  play of 
Nature. 
It  rnay be said that the universal and lasting establish- 
ment  of  Peace  constitutes  not  merely  a  part, but  the 
whole final  purpose and End  of  the Science of  Right as 
viewed within the limits of  Reason.  The state of  Peace 
is  the only condition  of  the  Mine  and  Thine  that  is 
secured  and  guaranteed by Laws  in  the relationship  of 
men  living  in numbers  contiguous  to  each  other,  aiid 
who  are thus  combined in a Constitution whose  rule  is 
derived not from the mere  experience of  those who have 
found it the best as a normal guide for others, but which 
must be taken by the Reason & priorz'  from the ideal of  a 
juridical  Union  of  meii  under  public  laws  generally. 
For all particular examples or instances, being  able  only 
to furnish illustration but not proof, are deceptive, and at 
all events require  a Metaphysic to establisli them by its 
necessary  principles.  And  tliis  is  conceded  indirectly 
even  by  those who turn Metaphysics into  ridicule, when 
they say, as they ofteii do, '  The best Constitution is that 
in which  not  Men but  Laws  exercise  the  power.'  For 
what can be more metaphysically sublime in its own way 
than  this very  Idea  of  theirs, which  according  to tlieir 
own  assertion  has,  notwithstanding,  the  most  objective 
reality ?  This  rnay  be  easily  shown  by  reference  to 
actual  instances.  And it is this very  Idea which  alone 
can  be  carried  out  practically, if  it is not  forced on iii 
a  revolutionary  and  sudden  way  by  violent  overthrow 
of  the  existing  defective  Constitution;  for  this  would 
produce for the time the momentary annihilation  of  the 
whole  juridical  state  of  Society.  But  if  the  idea  is 
carried  forward  by  gradual  Reform,  and  in accordance 
with  fixed  Principles,  it  rnay  lead  by  a  continuous 
approximation  to  tlie  highest  political  Good,  nnd  to 
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SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS  OF THE 
PRINCIPLES  OF RIGHT. 
The Occasion for these Explanatioiis was furnished 
mainly by a Review of this work that appeared in the 
Göttingelz  Joz~rnal,  No.  28,  of  18th February  1797. 
The Review  displays insight,  and with  sympathetic 
appreciation  it  expresses  '  the hope  that  this  Ex- 
position  of  Principles  will prove a permanent  gaiii 
for juridical Science.'  It  is here  taken as  a guide in 
the arrangement of  some critical Remarks, and at the 
same time as suggesting some expansion of  the systern 
in certain points of  detail. 
Objection as to the Faculty of Desire. 
In the very first words of  the GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
the acute Reviewer  stumbles on a  Definition.  He asks 
what is meant by '  the Faculty of  Desire.'  In the said 
Introduction it is defined as '  the Power which Man has, 
through his mental representations, of  becoming the cause 
of  objects  corresponding  to these  representations.'  To 
this Definition the objection  is taken, '  that  it amounts 
to nothing as soon as we abstract from the aternal  cori- 
ditions of  the effect or consequence of  the act of  Desire.' 
'But  the  Faculty  of  Desire,'  it is added, 'is  something 
even to the Idealist, although  there is no  external world 
according  to  his view.'-ANSWER  : 1s there not  likewise 
a violent  and  yet  consciously iileffective form of  Desire 
as  a  inere  mental  longing, which  is  expressed  by sucli 
words  as '  Would  to  God  sucli  a  one were  still  alive !' 
Yet although this  Desire  is actlcss  in  the  sense  of  not 
issuing in overt  action, it is not c$ectle.ss  in the sense  of 
having  no  consequence  at all; in  short, if  it  does  not 
produce  a  Change  on  external  things, it at least worlrs 
powerfully  upoil  the internal  condition  of  the  Subject, 
and even nlay superinduce a morbid condition of  disease. 
A Desire, viewed as an active Striving (niszu)  to be a enusc: 
by  rrieans  of  one's  own  mental  representations,  eveii 
although  the individual  may perceive  his  incapacity to 
attain  the  desired  effect, is  still  a  ~iiode  of  causality 
within his own  internal  experience.-There  is therefore 
a misunderstanding involved in the objection, that because 
the consciousness of one's  Power  in a case of  Desire may 
be at the same  time  accompanied with  a  consciousiless 
of  the Want of  Pozver  in  respect  of  the  external world, 
the definition is therefore not  applicable to the  Idealist. 
But as the question only turns  generally upon  the rela- 
tion  of  a  Cause (the  Representation)  to  an  Effect  (the 
Feeling), the Causality of  the Representation  in respect 
of  its object-whether  it  be  external or internal-must 
inevitably be  included  by thought  iii  the conception  of 
the Faculty of  Desire. 
Logical Preparation  for the Preceding Conception of 
Right. 
If  philosophical Jurists would rise to the Metapl~ysical 
Principles  of  the  Science  of  Right,  without  which  all 
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rnust  not  be  indifferent to securing completeness in tlie 
Division  of  tlieir  juridical  conceptions.  Apart  from 
such  internal  completeness their science would not be  a 
rational  System., but  only  an  Aggregate  of  accidental 
details.  The topical arrangement of  Principles  as  deter- 
mined  by the  forni  of  the  System, must  therefore  be 
made  complete ;  that is to say, there  must  be  a  proper 
place  assigned  to  each  conception  (loczu  conzmunis)  as 
determinecl by the synthetic form of  the Division.  And 
it would have to be afterwards made apparent that when 
any other  conception were  put in  the  place  of  the  one 
thus assigned, it would be contradictory to itself  and out 
of  its own place. 
Now  Jurists  have  hitherto  received  only two  formal 
commonplaces in their Systems, narilely, the  conceptions 
of  Real  Right  and  of  Personal  Riglzt.  Biit  since  there 
nre  other  two  conceptions possible  even  d p~iori  by  a 
mere  formal  combination of  these  two as members of  a 
rational  Division,  giving  the  conception  of  a  Personal 
Right of  a Real  Kind, and  that  of  a  Real  Right  of  a 
Personal  Kind, -  it  is  natural  to  ask  whether  these 
further  conceptions,  although  viewed  as  only  proble- 
matical in themselves, sliould not likewise be incorporated 
in  the scherne  of  a  complete Division  of  the juridical 
System ?  This  in fact  does not  admit  of  doubt.  The 
merely logical Division, indeed, as  abstracting from  the 
object  of  Knowledge,  is  always  in  the  form  of  cc 
Dichotomy ;  so  that  every  Right is either  a  Real  or  a 
not-Real  Right.  But the  metaphysical  Division,  here 
under  consideration, may  also  be  in  the  fourfold  form 
of  a  Fetrahotomy;  for  in  addition  to  the two  simple 
members  of  the  Division, there  are  also  two  relations 
between  them, as conditions of  mutual limitation arising 
from  the  one  Eight entering into combination with  tlie 
otlier ; and  the  possibility  of  this  requires  a  special 
investigation.-Bnt  the conception  of  a Beal RigJzt  of  n 
Personal  Kind  falls  out  at  once ; for  tlie  Right  of  ;1 
TJhing as against a Person  is  ineonceivable.  It remaiiis, 
therefore, only to consider, whether the  converse  of  this 
relation  is  likewise  inconceivable ;  or  whether  the  con- 
ception  of  a  Personal R@ht of  a  Real  Iiind  is  not  only 
free  froin iiiternal contradiction, but is even contained  C% 
priori  in  Reason aiid  belongs as a necessary constituent 
to  the conception of  the external Mine and Thine in  its 
coinpleteness,  in  order  that Pe~sons  'may be  viewecl  so 
far in the same way as Things ;  not indeed to the extent 
of  treating  them  in  all  respects  alilre, but by regard to 
tlie possession  of  them, and to proceeding with Persons iii 
certain relations as if  they were Things. 
Justification of  the Conception of  a Personal Right of  a 
Real Kind. 
The  Definition  of  a  Personal  Right  of  a  Real Kind 
may be  put  shortly and  appropriately  thns : 'it  is  tlie 
Hight  which  a  man  has  to  have  another  Pe~soqz thaii 
himself  as his.'  I say intentionally a '  Persori ;  ' for  one 
miglit  have  another  man  who  had  lost  his  civil  per- 
sonality and  becoine  enslnved  as I~is;  but  such  a  Real 
Riglit is not iiilder consideration here. 
Now  we  have  to  examine  the  questioii whether  tliis 
conception-described  as  '  a  new  phenomenon  in tlie 
juristic sky '-is  a stella mirabilis in the sense of  growing 
into  a  star  of  tlie  first  magnitude,  unseen  before  but 
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~e),  and they have likewise a  Right to  coiilpel  tlie  diilcl 
to  perform  and  obey all  tlzeir  commands  in  so  far  as 
they are  not  opposed  to  any law  of  freedom  (jus ad 
rem) ; and  hence they have also  a  Personal Right  over 
tlie child. 
3.  Finally, if,  ori  attaining  the  age  of  majority,  the 
diity  of  the  parents  in regard  to  the maintenance  of 
their  children  ceases, they have  still  the  Riglit  to  use 
them  as  niembers  of  the  honse  subjected  to  eheir 
authority,  in  order  to  nlaintain  the  household  until 
they are released from parental  control.  This  Right  of 
the  parents  follows from  tlie  natural  limitation  of  the 
fornler  Right.  Until the children attain maturity, they 
belong  as members of  the household to the fam*  ;  b~it 
thereafter  they rnay belong to the dolnestics  (fc6muZatus) 
as  servants  of  the  household, and  they can  enter  into 
this relation oiily by a  contract whereby they are  bound 
to  the master  of  the hoiise  as  his  domestics.  In like 
nlanner, a relation of  master and servant may be fornled 
outside of  tlze family,  in accordance with a  personal  right 
of  a  real  kiiid  on  the  part  of  the nlaster ; and  the 
domestics  are  acquired  to  the  household  by  contract 
(fnmuiatus  domesticus).  Such  a  contract  is not a mere 
letting  and  hiring  of  work  (Zocatio  konduetio  operm) ; 
but  it further  includes the giving of  the  person  of  the 
donlestic into the possession  of  the master, as  a  letting 
and hiring of  the person (locatio co~zductb  pewonae).  The 
latter relation  is distinguished from the former  in  that 
the doinestic  enters the contract  on  the understanding 
that  he will be available for ererythiiig that is allowable 
in respect of  the well-being of  the household, and is not 
inerely ei~gaged  for a certain assigned and specified piece 
of  work.  On  the  otlier  hand,  an  artisan  or  a  day- 
labourer  who  is  hired  for  a  specific  piece  of  work, 
does  not  give  himself  into  the  possession  of  another, 
iior  is he therefore a member of  his houseliold.  As tlie 
latter is not in the legal  possession of  his employer, who 
has  bound  him  only  to  perform  certain  things,  the 
employer,  even  though  he  should  have  him  dwelling 
in his house (.i?zpuilinus), is not entitled to seize him  as H 
thing  (via faeti),  bnt niust press for the performance  of 
his  engagement  on  the ground of  personal right, by the 
legal means that are at his command (via$bT.is). 
So  rnuch, then, for the explanation and vindication  of 
this new Title  of  Right in the Science of  Natural  Law, 
which  niay at first appear strange, biit which lias  never- 
theless beeil always tacitly in use. 
IV. 
Confusion of Real and Personal Right. 
The proposition '  Purchase breaks Hire' (5  3 1, p.  13  1) 
has  further  been  objected  to  as  a  heterodoxy  in the 
doctrine of  Natural Private  Right.  It  certainly appears 
at first sight to be contrary to all the Rights of  contract, 
that any one should intimate the termination of  the lease 
of  a house to the present Lessee before the expiry of  tlie 
period of  occupation  agreed upon;  and  that  the  former 
can thus, as it appears, break  his  promise  to  the  latter, 
if  he  only gires hirn  the usual warning  determined  by 
the customary and legal practice.  But let it be supposed 
that it can  be  proved  that  the Lessee when  he enteret1 
upon  his  coiitract  of  hire knew, or  must  have  1-  ~noc:~  I, 
that  the  promise  given  to him  by  the  Lcssor  or  pro- 
prietor  was  naturally (without  needing  to  be  e~pressly 
stated  in the  contract,  and  therefore  tacitlg) connecteci 2  42  KANF'S  PHILOSOPHY OP  LAW.  SUPPLEMENTARY  EXPLANATIONS OP PRINCIPLES.  2 43 
with the  condition 'in  so  fa~  as  he  sltoztld  not  sell  his 
17Lozue withirt  this time, or  might  have  to  renounce it 011 
the occasion of  an  action  on  the  part of  his  creditors.' 
On this supposition the Lessor does not break his pronzise, 
which is already conditioned in itself according to reason, 
and  the Lessee  does  not  suffer  any infringernent of  his 
Right by such  an  intimation  being  made to hin1 before 
the period of  lease  has  expired.  For  the  Right  of  the 
latter  arising  from  the  contract  of  hire,  is  a  Personal 
Right  to  what  a  certain  person  has  to  perform  for 
another (jus ad  rem) ;  it is not a Real  Right (jus in  ~e) 
that holds against every possessor of  the thing. 
The Lessee  might  indeed  secure  himself  in  his lease 
and acquire a Real Right in the house ;  but he could do 
this only by having it engrossed by a reference to the house 
of  the Lessor as attached  to  the  soil.  In this  way  he 
would provide agajnst being dispossessed before the expiry 
of  the time agreed  upon, either by  the intimation of the 
proprietor  or  by his  natural  death, or  even by his  civil 
death as a bankrupt.  If  he did  not  do  this, because he 
would rather be free to conclude  another lease on better 
conditions, or because the proprietor would not have such 
a burden (onzcs) upon  Iiis  house, it is to be inferred that, 
in respect of  the period of  intimation, bot11  parties were 
conscious  of  having  made  a  tacit  contract  to  dissolve 
their relation at any time, according to their convenience, 
-subject,  however,  to the conditions determined by the 
rnunicipal law.  The  confirmation of  the Right to brealc 
hire  by  purchase,  may  be  further  shown  by  certain 
juridical  consequences  that  follow  from  such  a  naked 
contract  of  hire  as is  here  under  consideration.  Thiis 
the Heirs of  the  Lessee when  he  dies  should not  have 
the obligation  imposed upon  them  to  continue  the hire, 
because  it  is  only  an  obligation  as  against  a  certain 
person  and  should  cease  with  his  death, although  here 
again the legal period of  intimation must be always kept 
in view.  The  right of  the Lessee as such can thus only 
pass  to  his  heirs  by  a  special contract.  Nor,  for  the 
same reason, is he  entitled  even  during the  life of  both 
parties, to sztblet  to  others what he has  hired for himself, 
withont express agreement to that effect. 
Addition to the Explanation  of  the Conceptions of 
Penal Right. 
The mere  idea of  a political Constitution  among .men 
involves the conception of  a punitivi: Justice as belonging 
to  the supreme  Power.  The  only question, then, is  to 
consider whether the legislator may be  indifferent to the 
mode.~  of  punishment, if they are only available as nieans 
for the removal of  crime, regarded  as a violation  of  the 
Security of  property in the  State; or  whether  he  must 
also  have  regard  to  respect  for  tlie  Humanity  in  the 
person of  the criminal, as related  to  the  species ;  and  if 
this  latter  alternative  holds, whether he is to be  guided 
by pure principles of  Right, taking the jus  talionis as in 
form  the  only  b pl-iori  idea  and  determining  principle 
of  Peiial  Right,  rather  than  aiiy  generalizatioii  from 
experience as to the remedial measures most effective for 
his purpose.  But if this is so, it will then be asked how 
he would  proceed in the  case  of  crimes  which  do  not 
admit of  the  application of  this Principle of  Retaliation, 
as being either  impossible in itself, or as in  the  circuni- 
stances  involving  the  perpetration  of  a  penal  offence 
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tlie  relations  of  rape,  p~derasty,  aiid  bestiality.  Tlie 
fornier  two  would  have  to  be  punislied  by  castratioii 
(after the manner of  the wliite  or  blaclc  eunuchs  iii  a 
seraglio), ancl  the last by expnlsion  for  ever  froin  civil 
society,  because  the  individual  has  made  hiniself  un- 
worthy  of  human  relations.  Per  quod  qz6i.s  pecmt  per 
i(le?n  punitur  et  idern.  These crimes are called unnatural, 
hecause they are committed  against  all that is essential 
l o Humanity.  To punish  them  by  cirbitrary  penalties, 
is literally opposed to the coiiception of  a  pemal  Justice. 
But  even then the criminal caniiot complain  that wrong 
is done to him, since his own evil deed draws the punish- 
nient upoil liiinself ; and he only experiences what  is  iil 
accordance with the spirit, if  not the letter, of  the pei-ial 
Iiaw whicll he has brolcen in his relation to otliers. 
Every piinisliment iniplies sornet#liing  that is rightly 
degrading to the feeling of  honour of  the party con- 
demned.  For it coiitains a mere one-sided compiilsioii. 
Thiis his dignity as a citizeri is suspeilded,  at  least in a 
particular instance, by his being  subjected  to an es- 
ternal obligation of  diity, to which he may not oppose 
resistance  oii  his  side.  Meri  of  rank  and  wealth, 
when mulcted in a fine, feel the humiliatioii of  being 
compelled to beiid  under  the will  of  an  inferior  iti 
position, niore than the loss of  the money.  Pnnitive 
Justice  (jzrstitia punitiva), in whicli  ehe  ground of 
the  penalty  is nzornl  (piu  pcccatwn  est), must  be 
clistinguished fioni punitive Ezpcdiency,  the fonndatioii 
of  which  is nierely  pragniatic  (ne peceetur) as being 
grounded upon the experience of  what operates most 
effectively to prevent  ciime.  It  has consequently aii 
entirely  clistinct  place  (loczu  justi)  in tlie  topic:il 
arrangemeilt  of  the  jnriclical  coiicel~tioils.  It is 
neither  the  conception  of  wliat  is  conclaciblr  to  a 
certain effect (conclzieibilis), nor even  that of  tlie pure 
Honesdz~m,  wliich must be properly placed in Ethics. 
VI. 
On the Right of Usucapion. 
lleferring  to 5  33, p.  133, it  is said  that '  the Bight 
of  Usz~cnpion  ought to be founded  on natural  right ;  for 
if it were not  assumed  that  an iclcal  acpuisition, as it is 
here  called,  is  established  by  bonu  Jide  possession,  no 
itcquisition would  be  evcr  peremptorily secured.'-But  I 
assume  a  rnerely  provisory  acqiiisition  in the state of 
iiature; and,  for  this  reason,  insist  upon  the juridical 
iiecessity  of  the civil  constitution.-Fnrther,  it is saicl, 
' I assert  myself  as  bolza  Jide  possessor only against  any 
one who cannot  prove that he was bonajde possessor of 
the Same  thing before  me, and who  has not  ceased  by 
his own will to be such.'  But  the question here  under 
consideration  is  not  as to whether I can  assert  niyself 
as owner of  a t11ing  although  another  should  put  in a 
claim  as  an earlier  real  owner  of  it, the cognizance of 
his  existence  as  possessor  and  of  his  possessorship  as 
owner  having  been  absolutely  impossible;  which  case 
occnrs  when  such  a  one  has  given  no  publicly  valid 
indication  of  his  iininterrupted  possession,-  whether 
owing  to  his  own  fault  or  not,-as  by Registration  iii 
p~iblic  Records, or  uncoiitested  voting  as  owner  of  the 
property in civil Assemblies. 
The question really iinder  consideration is  this : Who 
is tlie party that ought to prove his rightful Acquisition ? 
This  obligation as  an  onus proban&  cannot  be  imposed 
iipon the actual  Possessor, for he is in possession of  the 
thing  so  far  back  as his  aiithenticated  liistory reaches. The former alleged owner of it is, however, entirely sepa- 
rated, according to juridical principles, from the series of 
successive possessors by an interval of  time within which 
he  gave  no  publicly valid  indications of  his  ownership. 
Tliis intromission or discontinuance of  all public  posses- 
sory activity reduces  him to an untitled  claimant.  But 
Iiere, as in theology, the maxim holds that  conservatio est 
conthtua  c~eatio.  And  althoiigh  a  claimant,  hitherto 
unmanifested  but  now  provided  with  discovered  docu- 
mentary  evidente,  should  afterwards  arise,  the  doubt 
again would come  up with  regard  to  hirn as to whether 
a  still  older  claimant  might  not  yet  appear  and found 
a  claiin  upon  even  earlier  possession.-Mere  length of 
time in possession  effects  nothing  here  in  the  way  of 
finally  acquiring  a  thing  (acgztirere  per  ztszicapionenz). 
For it is absurd to  suppose that what is wrong, by being 
long continued, would at last  become  right.  The use of 
the thing, be it ever so long, thus presupposes a Right in 
it ;  whereas the latter cannot be  founded upon the former. 
Hence Usucapion, viewed as acquisition of  a thing merely 
by  loiig  use  of  it,  is  a  contradictory conception.  The 
prescription  of  claims, as  a  mode  of  securing possession 
(conse~vatio  possessionis  nzece  per  prcescriptionern),  is  not 
less contradictory, although it is a different conception as 
regards  the  basis  of  appropriation.  It is  in  fact  a 
negative Principle;  and it takes  the complete  disuse  of 
a Right, even such as is necessary to manifest  possessor- 
ship, as  equivalent  to  a ren~hncintion  of  the thing (dere- 
Zictio).  But  such  renunciation is a juridical  act, and  it 
iinplies  the  use  of  the  Right  against  another, in  order 
to  exclude  him  by any claim (per perscr+tionern)  from 
acquiring the object ;  which involves a contradiction. 
I acquire therefore without probation, and without any 
juridical act; I do  not  require  to  prove, but I acquire 
by  the  law  (lege).  What  then  do  I  acquire?  The 
public  release  from  all  further claims ; that is, the  legctl 
security of  my  possession  in virtue of  the fact  that I do 
not reqiijre  to  bring  forward  the  proof  of  it, and may 
now found upon uninterrupted possession.  And the fact 
that  all  Acquisition  in the  state  of  Nature  is  merely 
provisory, has no influence upon the question of  Security 
iii  the  Possession of  what  has  been  acquired,  this  con- 
sideration  necessarily  taking  precedence  before  the 
fornier. 
VII. 
On  Inheritance and Succession. 
As regards  the  'Right  of  Inheritance,'  the  acuteness 
af  the  Reviewer  has  here  failed  him, and  he  has  not 
reached the nerve of  the proof  of  my position.  I do not 
say (5 34, p.  136) that '  every  man  necessarily  accepts 
every thiv  that  is  öJered  to  him, when by such  accept- 
ance he can only gain and can  lose  nothing ;  ' for  there 
are no things of  such a  kind.  But what  I  say is,  that 
every one always in fact  accepts tRe R@ht of  the o$er  of 
the thing, at the  moment  in which it  is offered, inevit- 
ably  and  tacitly,  but  yet  validly;  that  is,  when  the 
circumstances are  such  that  revocation  of  the  offer  is 
impossible,  as  at  the  moment  of  the  Testator's  death. 
For the Promiser  cannot then  recall  the  offer ; and the 
nominated  Beneficiary, without  the intervention  of  any 
juridical  act, becomes  at  the  moment  the acceptor, not, 
of  the promised inheritance, but  of  the  Right  to  accept 
it or decline it.  At that moment he Sees himself, on the 
opening of  the Testament  and  before  any acceptance of 
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before;  for  he  has  acquired  exclusively  the  Biyht  to 
nceept,  which  constitutes  aii  element  of  property.  A 
Civil  state is  no  doubt  here  presupposed,  in  order  to 
make  the  thing  in  question  the  property  of  cbnuther 
Person  when  its  former  owner  is  no  more;  but  this 
transmission of  the possession from the hand of  the dead 
(murt-main) does not alter the  possibility of  Acquisition 
according  to  the universal Principles  of  Natural Right, 
nlthough a Civil Constitution  must be  assumed  in order 
to  apply them  to  cases of  actual  experience.  A  thing 
which  it  is  in my  free  choice  to  accept  or  to  refuse 
unconditionally, is  called a res jncens.  If  the  owner OE 
t thing  offers me gratuitously a thing of  this kind,-as, 
for instance, the  furniture of  a house out of  which I am 
:~hoiit  to remove,-or  promises it shall  be  miile, so long 
as he cloes  not  recall  his  offer  or  promise, which is im- 
possible  if  he  dies  when  it is  still valid, then  I have 
exc1usi~-ely  a Right to the acceptance of  the thing offered 
(jzis in re  jaeente) ;  in other words, I alone  can  accept 
or refuse it, as I please.  And  this Right, exclusively to 
have the choosing of  the thing, I do not obtain by means 
of  a special juridical  act, as by a declaration that '  I will 
t,hslt  this  liight. shall  belong  to  me ;' but I obtain  it 
without any special  act  on  ~r:y  part, and  rnerely by the 
law (lege).  I can therefore declare myself  to this effect : 
'I  will  that  the  thing sha2l  not  Belong  tu  noe'  (for  the 
acceptance of  it might bring me into trouble with otliers). 
33ut I cannot will  to  have  exclusively  the  choiee  as  to 
whether it shall ur  shall not  belong  to me ;  for this  Eight 
of  accepting  or  of  refusing  it, I have  immediately  by 
virtue of  the Offer  itself, apart  from  any declaration of 
acceptance on my part.  If  I could  refuse  even to have 
the  choice, I  might  choose  not  to  clioose; which  is  a 
contradiction.  Now  this  right  to  choose  passes  at the 
moment of  the cleatli of  tlie Testator to me ;  but altllongh 
instituted heir  by his Will (institutio  harsdis), I do  nct 
yet, in fact, acquire any of  the property of  the Testator, 
but  merely  the jzwidicnl  or  rational  possessio~e of  that 
property  or  part  of  it, and  I can  renounce  it  for the 
benefit  of  others.  Hence  this  possessioii  is  not  inter- 
rupted  for  a  moment, but  the  Succession, as  in a  con- 
tiiiiious  series,  passes  by  acceptance  from  the  dying 
Testator  to the  lieir  appointed  by  hiin;  and  thus  the 
proposition  testamenta  szbnt  jzwis  ncttzww  is  estahlished 
beyond all dispute. 
VIII. 
The Right of  the State in relation to Perpetual 
Foundations for the Benefit of  the Subjects. 
A FOUNDATION  (Sanetio testcimentaria Oenej'ieii pcrpetwi) 
is  a  voluntary  berieficent  institution,  confirmed by  the 
State  and  applied  for  the  benefit  of  certain  of  its 
members, so that it is established for all the period of  their 
existence.  It is  called perpetunl  wheil  the  ordinance 
establishing it is connected with  tlie Constitutio~  of  the 
State ;  for the State must  be  regarded  as  instituted for 
all time.  The  beneficence of  such a foundation applies 
either to the people  generally, or to a  class  as  a  part of 
the  people  iinited by certain  particular  principles, or to 
a certain family and their desceiidants for ever.  Hospitals 
present  an  example  of  the  first  kind  of  foundations; 
Churches of  the second ;  the Orders in the State (spiritual 
and  secular) of  the third; Prirnogeniture  and  Entail of 
the fourth. 
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cession, it is said that they cannot be abolished ; because 
the Right  has  been made the property of  the appointed 
heirs in viitue of  a  legacy, and to  abrogate  such a  con- 
stitution (corpzcs  rnysticzcnz)  would amount to taking froni 
sonie oiie what was his. 
A.  Hospitals. 
Such  benevolent  institutions as  Hospitals  and  other 
Foundations for the poor, for  iiivalids, and  for  the sick, 
when  they have  been  fourided  by  the property of  the 
State, are certainly to be regarded as indissoluble.  But 
if the spirit, rather  than  the  mere  letter, of  the will of 
a private Testator is to form the ground of  determination, 
it may be that  circumstances will arise in the Course of 
time  such as would make the abolition of  such founda- 
tions  advisable, at least in respect of  their form.  Thus 
it has  been  found  that the poor  and  the sick  inay be 
better  and  more  cheapIy  provided  for  by  giving  theni 
the assistance  of  a  certain  sum of  money proportionate 
to the wants  of  the time, and  allowing  them  to  board 
with  relatives  or  friends,  than by  maintaiiiiog  theni 
in  magnificent  and  costly  institutions  like  Greenwich 
Hospital, or  other  similar  institutions  which  are main- 
tained at great expense and yet impose  much restriction 
on  personal  liberty.  Lunatic  asyliims,  however,  must 
be  regarded  as  exceptions.  In abolishing  any  such 
institutions  in favour  of  otlier  arrangements, the  State 
caiinot be said to be  taking  froni the people  the enjoy- 
nient  of  a  benefit to which  they have  a  right  as  their 
owii ; rather does  it promote  their  iiiterest by choosing 
wiser means for the maintenance of  their  rights and the 
advancement of  their well-being. 
B.  Churches. 
A  spiritual  order,  like  that  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church, which does not propagate itself  in direct descend- 
ants, may, under  the favour  of  the  State, yossess  lands 
with  subjects  attached  to  them,  and  may  conqtitute  a 
spiritual corporatioii called the Church.  To this corpora- 
tion  the  laity  may,  for  the  salvation  of  their  soiils, 
bequeatli  or  give  lands which  are  to  be  the  property 
of  the Church.  The  Roman  Clergy  have  thus in fact 
acquired possessions whicli have been legally transmitted 
from one  age to another, and which  have  been  formally 
conflrmed by Papal Bulls.  Now, can it be admitted that 
this relation  of  the clergy to the laity may be  annulled 
by the supreme power of  the secular  State ;  and would 
not this amount to taking violently from  them what was 
their  own, as has  been  attempted, for  example,  by  the 
unbelievers of  the French Republic ? 
The question  really to be determined  here  is whether 
the Church can belong  to the State or the State to the 
Church, in  the  relation  of  property;  for  two  supreme 
powers  cannot  be  subordinated  to  one  another without 
contradiction.  It is  clear  that  only  the fornzer  eonsti- 
tzction.  (politico - hierarchica),  according  to  which  the 
property of  the Church  belongs  to  the State, can  have 
proper  existente; for  every Civil Constitution is of  this 
uiorld,  because  it is an earthly  human  power  that  can 
be  incorporated  with  all its consequences and effects in 
experience.  On  the  other  hand,  the  believers  whose 
Zingdom  is  in Heaven  as  tlze  otlm wo~ld,  in so  far as 
a hierarchico-political  constitution  relating to this world 
is  concecled  to  them,  must  submit  themselves  to  the 
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lrlcri  who  act  in  the  world.  Heuce  the  former  Con- 
sti~ution  is only in place. 
Eeligion, as  manifested  in tlie  form  of  belief  in the 
clognias of  the Church and tlie power  of  the Priests who 
form  the  aristocracy of  such  a  constitution, even wheri 
it is monarchical and papal, ought  not to be forced npon 
the people, nor takeii from tliem by any political  power. 
Neither should thc citizeii-as  is at present  the  case  iii 
Great Britaiii witli the Irish  Nation-be  excluded  froin 
the political  Services  of  the  State, and  the advantages 
thence  arising,  on  accourit  of  a  religion  that  may  be 
different  froni that of  the Court. 
Now,  it rnay  be  that  certain  devout  and  believing 
souls,  in  order  to  become  participators  of  the grace 
which the Churcli promises to procure  for believers even 
after  their  death,  establish  an  institution  for all time, 
in accordance witli which, after their death, certain lands 
of  theirs  shall  beconie  the  property  of  the  Churcli. 
Further, the State may  make  itself  to  a  certain exterit, 
or entirely, the vassal  of  the Churcli, in order to obtain 
by the prayers, indulgentes,  and expiations administered 
by the clergy as  the servants  of  the  Church, participa- 
tion  in  the  boon  promised  in the  other  world.  BLI~ 
such a  Fouildation,  although  presuinably  made  for  all 
time, is not  really established  as  a  perpetuity ; for tlie 
State inay  throw  off  any burden  thus  imposed upon  it 
by  the  Church  at will.  For  the  Church  itself  is  an 
institution  established  on  faith,  and  if  this  faith be an 
illusion  engendered by mere opinion, and  if  it disappenr 
with  the  enlighteiiment  of  the  people,  the  terrible 
power  of  the Clergy  founded  upon  it also  falls.  The 
State will then, with  full  right, seize upon the presiimed 
property of  the Church, consisting  of  the land bestowed 
upoii  it by  legacies.  However,  the feudatories  of  the 
hitherto  existing  institution,  may  of  their  own  right 
demand to be indemnified for their life interests. 
In like manner, Foundations  established  for all time, 
in behoof  of  the poor as well as educational Institutions 
even  supposing them to have a certaiii definite character 
impressed by the idea  of  their  founder, cannot  be  held 
ns  founded for all time, so  as to  be  a  burden  upon the 
land.  The  State  must  have  the liberty to reconstitute 
them,  in  accordance with  the  wants  of  the  time.  No 
oiie  may be  surprised  that  it proves  always  more  and 
inore  difficult  to  carry out  such  ideas, as for instance a 
provision that  poor  foundationers must niake up for the 
iiiadequacy of  the funds  of  their  benevolent  institutioii 
by  singing  as  mendicants;  for  it is only  natural  that 
one  who  has  fouiided  a  beneficent  institution  sllould 
feel  a  certain  desire  of  glory  in  connection  with  it, 
and that he should be unwilling to have another altering 
his  ideas,  when  he  may  have  intencled  to  irnmortalize 
himself  by it.  Hut  this  does not Change tlie conditions 
of  the  thing  itself, nor  the  right, and  even  the duty of 
the  State,  to  modify  any  foundation  when  it becomes 
inconsistent with its own preservation and Progress ;  and 
hence no  such institution ca11  be regarded as unalterably 
founded for all time. 
C.  The Orders in the State. 
The  nobility  of  a  country  whicli  is  not  uncler  sii 
aristocratic  but  a  monarchicnl  Constitution,  uiay  weil 
form  an  institution  that  is  not  only  allowable  for  a. 
certaiii  time,  but  even  necessary  froin  circumstances. 
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closely  considered, it will  not  at least  be  convicted  of 
lzeterodoq.  Rather, iiideed, inay it  be  lioped  that  tliis 
penetrating, thoughtful, and modestly censuring Critic rnay 
not grudge to make a  second examination  of  this  point, 
nor  regret  to  have taken tlie whole discussion under  his 
protection against the pretentious  and shallow utterances 
of  otliers.  And this all the more, in view of  his  state- 
ment that he 'regards  these  Metaphysical  Principles  of 
tlic Science of  Right as a real gain for the Science.' 
Now, it  is asserted that obedience  must  be  given  to 
whoever  is  in  possession  of  the supreme  authoritative 
nncl legislative power  over  a  people ;  and  this  must  be 
clone  so  unconditionally by right,  that it would even be 
peiial to inquire publicly into  the  title  of  a  power thus 
held, with  tlie view of  calliilg it in  doubt,  or  opposing 
it in consequence of  its  being found defective.  Accord- 
ingly it is maiiitained, that '  Obey  the  authority u~kielz  has 
powey  over  you ' (in  everything which  is not  opposed to 
niorality),  is  a  Categorical  Imperative.  This  is  the 
objectionable  proposition  which  is  called  in  question ; 
ancl it is not merely tliis  principle which  founds a  right 
upoii  the  fact  of  occupation  as  its condition, but  it is 
ereii  tIie  very  idea  of  a  sovereignty  over  a  people 
obliging me  as belonging  to  it, to obey the  presumptive 
rigllt  of  its  power, without previous inquiry (5 44), that 
appears to arouse the reasori of  the Beviewer. 
Now  every fact is an  object  which  presents  itself  to 
tlie  seiises, whereas what  caii  only  be  realized  by  pure 
Rensoii  inust  be  regarded  as  an  idea  for  which  no 
adequately corresponding o<ject  can be found  in  experi- 
ence.  Thiis a.  perfect j~~~~iclieal  Colzstitzcticwn  among nieil 
is aa iC%?.%l  Thing in itself. 
If  tlieii a people be  iiiiited  by laws iincler a sorereigii 
power, it is conformable to the idea of  its unity  as such 
under  a  supreme authoritative will, when it is in fact so 
presented  as  an object  of  experience.  But  this holcls 
only of  its phenomenal  manifestation.  In other words, 
a juridical constitution so far exists in the  general  sense 
of  the term;  and although  it  rnay  be  vitiated  by great 
defects and coarse errors, and rnay be in need of  important 
improvements, it is  nevertheless  absolutely unallowable 
and punishable to resist it.  For  if  the  people  regarded 
themselves as entitled to  oppose  force  to  the  Constitu- 
tion,  however  defective  it  rnay  be,  and  to  resist  the 
suprerne  authority, they would  also  suppose they had  a 
right to substitute force for the supreme Legislation that 
establishes  all  rights.  But  this  would  result  in  a 
supreme will that would destroy itself. 
The  idea  of  a  political  Constitution  in  general, 
involves  at the  same  time  an  absolute  coinmand  of  a 
practical  Reason  that judges according to conceptions of 
right, and  is valid  for  every people;  and  as  such  it  is 
holy  and  irresistible.  And  although  the  organization 
of  a  State  were  defective  in  itself, yet  no  subordinate 
power  in  the  State  is  entitled  to  oppose  active  resist- 
ance  to  its legislative  Head.  Any defects  attaching to 
it ought to be gradually removed by reforms  carried  ont 
on itself ;  for otherwise, according to the opposite maxim, 
that  the  subject  rnay  proceed  according  to  his  own 
private will, a good  Constitution  can only be realized by 
blind  accident.  The  precept, '  Obey  the  azltho~ity  that 
has power  over  you,'  forbids investigating  into  how  this 
power  has  been  attained,  at  least  with  any  view  to 
underrnining  it.  Por  the Power  which  already  exists, 
and under which any one  rnay  be  living,  is already  in 
possession  of  the power  of  Legislation ; and  one  may, indeed, rationalize about it, but not set liimself  up as  an 
opposing lawgiver. 
The  will  of  the  people  is  naturally  un-unified,  and 
consequently  it is lawless;  and  its  unconditional  sub- 
jection  under  a  soz:e~.eigm  Will,  uniting  all  particulczr 
wills  by one law, is  a jaet  which  can  only originate in 
the institution  of  a  supreme power, and  thiis  is public 
Right founded.  Hence to allow a Right of  resistance to 
this sovereignty, and  to  limit  its  supreme  power,  is  8 
coritradiction;  for  in  that  case  it  would  not  be  the 
supreme legal power, if  iii  might  be  resisted,  nor  could 
it primarily determine  what  shall  be  publicly  right  or 
not.  This  principle is involved  d,  prwri  in the idea  of 
a political Constitution generally as a  conception  of  the 
practical Reason.  And although  no example adequately 
corresponding to  this  principle  can  be found in experi- 
ence, yet  iieither  can  aiiy  Constitution  be  in  complete 
contradiction  to it when  it is  taken  as  a  staiidard  or 
rule. 
APOLOGIA. 
ICANTB VINDICATION  OF HIS  PHILOSOPHICAL 
STYLE. 
[IN  THE PREFACE  T0 THE FIRST EDITION,  1796-97.1 KANT'S  VINDICATION  OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL 
STYLE. 
THE  reproach of  obscurity, and  even of  a  studied  inde- 
finiteness affecting  the appearance of  profound  insight, 
lias been frequently raised against my philosophical style 
of  exposition.  I do not know  how I could better  meet 
or  remove  this objection than by readily accepting tlie 
condition which  Garve,  a  philosopher  in  the  genuine 
sense of  the term, has  laid  down  as  a  duty incumbent 
upon every writer, and especially on philosophical aubhors. 
And for my part, I rvould only restrict his injunction by 
the condition, that it is to be  followed  only so far as the 
nature of  the science which is to be iniproved  or enlarged 
will allow. 
Garve  wisely and  rightly  demands, that every philo- 
sophical doctrine must be  capable of  being  presented iii 
a popular form, if the expounder of  it is to escape the sus- 
picion of  obscurityjn his ideas ;  that is, it must be capable 
of  being conveyed in expressions that are universally in- 
telligible.  I readily admit this, with the exception only 
of  the systematic Critique of  the Faculty of  Reason, aiid 
all that can only be  determined and  unfolded by  it ;  for 
all this  relates  to  the  distinction of  the sensible in our 
knowledge frorn the supersensible, which is attainable by 
Reason.  This can  never be  made  popular, nor can anp formal  Metaphysic  as  such  be  popular ; although  their 
results  may  be  made  quite  intelligible  to  the  common 
reason, which  is  metaphysical without  its  being  known 
to be  so.  In this sphere, popularity in expression is not 
to be  thought of.  We are here  forced  to use  scholastic 
nccztracy, even if  it should  have to bear  the  reproach of 
troublesomeness ; because it is only  by  such  technical 
language that the precipitancy of  reason can be  arrested, 
and brought to understand  itself  in face of  its do,matic 
assertions. 
But  if  pedants  presume  to  ddress  the  public  in 
technical  phraseology  from  pulpits or  in popular books, 
and  in  expressions  that  are  only fitted  for the Schools, 
the fault  of  this must not be laid as a  burden upon  the 
critical  philosophers,  any  more  than  the  folly  of  the 
mere  wordmonger (logodct!dalus) is to  be  imputed to the 
grammarian.  The  laugh  should here  only turn against 
the man and not against the science. 
It may sound  arrogant, egotistical, and, to those  who 
have not yet renounced their old systeni, even derogatory, 
to assert '  that before  the rise of  the Critical Philosophy, 
there was  not  yet a philosophy at all.'  Now,  in  order 
to be able to pronounce upon  this seeming presumption, 
it is necessary to resolve the  question as to whether  tl~re 
can  really be  more  than  one  philosophy.  There have,  in 
fact, not only been various modes of  philosophizing and of 
going  back to the  first  principles of  Reason  in  order to 
found  a  system  upon  them, with more  or  less  success; 
but there must  be  rnany attempts of  this kind of  which 
every  one  has  its  own  merit  at least for  the  present. 
However, as objectively considered there can only be one 
human  Reason,  so  there  cannot  be  many Philosophies ; 
in other words, there  is  only one  true  System of  Philo- 
sophy  founded  upon  principles,  however  varionsly  and 
however contradictorily men may have philosophized over 
one and the same proposition.  Thus the Moralist rightly 
says,  there  is  only  one  virtue,  and  only  one  doctrine 
regarding it ; that is, one single system  connects all  the 
duties of  virtue  by one  principle.  The Chemist, in Iike 
manner, says there is  only one  chemistry, that which  is 
expounded by Lavoisier.  The Physician, in like manner, 
says there is only one  principle, according  to  Brown, in 
the  system  of  classifying Diseases.  But  because  it is 
held that the new  systems exclude all the others, it is not 
thereby meant  to  detract  from  the  merit  of  the  older 
Moralists,  Chemists,  and  Physicians;  for  without  their 
discoveries, and  even  their  failures, we  would  not  have 
attained to the  unity of  the true  principle of  a complete 
philosophy  in  a  system.  Accordingly,  when  any  one 
announces a  system of  philosophy as a production of  his 
own, this is  equivalent to saying that '  before this Philo- 
sophy there was properly no philosophy.'  For should he 
admit that there had been  another and a true philosophy, 
it would  follow  that  there  may be two  true  systems of 
philosophy regarding its proper  objects ;  which is a con- 
tradiction.  If, therefore, the  Critical  Philosophy  gives 
itself  forth as that System  before which  there  had  been 
properly no true  philosophy at all, it does no  rnore  than 
has been done, will be done, and  even  inust be  done, by 
all who construct a Philosophy on  a plan of  their own. 
Another objectioil has been made to my System which 
is of  less  general  significance,  and  yet  is  not  entirely 
without importance.  It has been  alleged that one of  the 
essentially distinguishing elements of  this Critical  Philo- 
sophy is not a growth of  its own, but has been  borrowed 
from soine  other philosophy, or even from  an  exposition VINDICATION O? HIS PHILOSOPHICAL STYLE.  2 6 5 
of  ~athernatics. Such is the  supposed  discovery, whicli 
a Tübingen Eeviewer  thinks he has  made, in  repard  to 
the  Definition  of  Philosophy which  the author  of  the 
Critipue of  the Pure Reaso~z  gives out as his  own, and as 
a not insigniiicant  product of  his system, but which it is 
alleged  had  been  given  many  years  before  by  another 
writer, and almost in the Same words,'  I leave it to any 
one to judge  whether  the words:  'intellectualis  qumdaln 
constructio,'  could have originated the thought of  the pre- 
sentation of  a given conception in an intzcitive perception 
b p~ioTZ, hy which  Philosophy  is  at once  entirely and 
definitely distinguished from Mathematics.  I am certain 
that Hausen himself would have refused to recognise tliis 
as an explanation of  his expression ;  for the possibility of 
an intuitive  perception  d,  priori, and  the recognition of 
Space as such  an  intuition  and  not  the mere  outward 
coexistence of  the  manifold  objects  of  empirical  per- 
ception (as  Wolf  defines it), would have at once  repelled 
hiin, on the ground that he would have felt himself  thiis 
entangled  in  wide  philosophical  investigations.  The 
presentation, const~ucted,  as it  were,  by the Understanding, re- 
ferred to by the acute Mathematician, meant nothing more 
than the (empirical) recpresentation of  a  Line  correspond- 
ing  to  a  conception,  in  malzing  which  representation 
attention is to be given  merely to the Rule, and abstrac- 
tion  is  to  be  niade  from  the  deviations  from  it  that 
inevitably  occur  in  actual  execution, as  may  be  easily 
perceived in the geometrical construction of  Equalities. 
And  least  of  all  is there  any importance to  be  Iaicl 
iipon  the  objection  made  regarding  the  Spirit  of  this 
Philosophy, on the ground of  the improper use  of  some 
of  its  terms  by  those  who  merely  ape  the  system  in 
words.  The  technical  expressions  employed  in  the 
C~itiqzce  of  the Pzcre Reasoa  cannot  well  be  replaced  by 
others in  current  use, but it is  another thing  to employ 
them  outside of  the  sphere of  Philosophy in the public 
interchange of  ideas.  Such a  usage of  them  deserves to 
be  well  castigated, as  Nicolai  has  shown; but  he  even 
shrinks from adopting the view  that such technical terms 
are  entirely  dispensable in  their  own  sphere, as if they 
were  adopted  merely  to  disguise  a  poverty  of  thought. 
However, the  laugh  may  be  much  more  easily  turned 
iipon  the  unpopular  pedant  than  upon  the  zcnc~itical 
ignora~ms;  for  in  truth  the  Metaphysician  who  Sticks 
rigidly to his system without any concern about Criticism, 
may be  reckoned as belonging to tlie latter class, although 
llis  ignoraiice  is  voluntary,  because  he  will  only  not 
accept what does not belong to his own older school.  But 
if, according to Shaftesbury's saying, it is no  contemptible 
test of  the  truth  of  a predominantly practical  doctrine, 
that it can endure Ridiez~le,  then  the Critical Philosophy 
must, in the  Course  of  time, also  have  its turn; and  it 
may yet  laugh  best  when  it will  be  able  to  laugh  last. 
This will be  when  the mere paper  Systems of  those who 
for a long time  have  had  the  leacl  in words, crumble  to 
pieces otie after the other ;  and it Sees all their adherents 
scattering away,-a  fate which inevitably awaits them. 
Porro  de  actuali  constructione hic  non  queritiir,  cum  ne  possiiit 
quidem sensibiles figure  ad rigorem  definitionum effingi ;  sed requiritur 
copitio eorum,  quibus absolvitur  formatio  qu*  intellectz~alis  qwedam 
constructio est.  C.  A. Hausen, Elem, Mathes. Pars L p.  86 (1734). 